61–70 of 148 posts
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Yes it is.
I could be wrong but in my experience OS just selects one random and uses that for some time not round robins it.
How the hell did that pass any sort of responsible review process at Microsoft? Now Microsoft owns all your home networks, only like the default address on every home router out there...
I'm trying to figure out how this could have happened, but I control so few IP addresses that many of my DNS entries are manually assigned. And you'd have to be incompetent if you have access to set DNS records and you set them to RFC 1918 addresses. Anyone have any theories on how this could happen?
about ten years ago, apple added a stray record to the apple.com zone .... a DNAME[1] record ....... that pointed to apple.com 1: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNAME_record this had some pretty disastrous results[2] 2: https://mashable.com/archive/apple-tunes-app-store-icloud-pr... bad things happen everywhere
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Serve malicious updates from a locally controlled machine, for one. Lord knows about auth.
Why doesn't windows update use authentication (eg https)?
$ ping -4 microsoft.com
ping: microsoft.com: Address family for hostname not supported
$ ping -6 microsoft.com
PING microsoft.com(2603:1030:c02:8::14 (2603:1030:c02:8::14)) 56 data bytes
64 bytes from 2603:1030:c02:8::14 (2603:1030:c02:8::14): icmp_seq=1 ttl=112 time=68.4 msEarlier quoted context omitted.
Serve malicious updates from a locally controlled machine, for one. Lord knows about auth.
Do most DNS forwarders not block addresses that resolve to a local IP these days? I know dnsmasq does, and NextDNS too I think.
Y'all, instead of the constant confirmed here. Just do an authoritative lookup. dig +trace +short microsoft.com NS a.root-servers.net. from server 100.100.100.100 in 10 ms. NS b.root-servers.net. from server 100.100.100.100 in 10 ms. NS c.root-servers.net. from server 100.100.100.100 in 10 ms. NS d.root-servers.net. from server 100.100.100.100 in 10 ms. NS e.root-servers.net. from server 100.100.100.100 in 10 ms. NS…
$ export srch="192.168.1.0"; echo "as of $(date '+%s';):"; for dns in 1.1.1.1 8.8.8.8 76.76.2.0 9.9.9.9 208.67.222.222 185.228.168.9 76.76.19.19 94.140.14.14; do dig @${dns} microsoft.com +short | grep "${srch}" > /dev/null; if [ $? == 0 ]; then echo "${dns} still has ${srch} for microsoft.com"; else echo "${dns} no longer has ${srch} for microsoft.com"; fi; done
as of 1703033639:
1.1.1.1 still has 192.168.1.0 for microsoft.com
8.8.8.8 still has 192.168.1.0 for microsoft.com
76.76.2.0 still has 192.168.1.0 for microsoft.com
9.9.9.9 still has 192.168.1.0 for microsoft.com
208.67.222.222 still has 192.168.1.0 for microsoft.com
185.228.168.9 still has 192.168.1.0 for microsoft.com
76.76.19.19 still has 192.168.1.0 for microsoft.com
94.140.14.14 still has 192.168.1.0 for microsoft.com
$ pbpaste | sed 's;^; ;' | pbcopyI mean: I don't expect anything less from Microsoft than doing stuff like that and it cannot affect me for I nullroute microsoft.com from my unbound server (unboud takes wildcard when nullrouting or NXDOMAINing crap domains like microsoft.com or meta.com etc., which is sweet).
However I'd expect my trusty DNS resolver to also prevent me from anyone not on my private LANs to impersonate addresses reserved for private uses.
Does anyone know here if it's easily doable?
Maybe Sydney tried to breakout…