Earlier quoted context omitted.
You can provide a more helpful error message by explicitly informing the user that the username they typed exists but they haven't offered the correct password for it. Unless the site searches to find out which username the entered password actually corresponds to (which is a whole new, terribly dangerous, can of worms), it can't do better than that Because any malicious player can easily check whether usernames exis…
It doesn't seem like the author is arguing that just because you can instead validate if the email exists on a platform via the signup page instead of the login page, the vague message can be removed, but rather that the signup page should remove the information leakage as well, so there is no leakage anywhere.
This way, the attacker actually has to have access to the email in question to know that an existing account is present on the service.
If you do the whole signup process on a single page and validate the email there then yea, you're gonna have a rough time.