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How to open a safe

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61–70 of 85 posts

Re: How to open a safe

#61

Earlier quoted context omitted.

+ Means + Motive + Opportunity You want your thing to be very safe? Forget the safe, throw it in the ocean encased in a cement block. Very secure, will not be retrieved. Note - I said ocean, not a lake. Biometric and pin pad locks are quick. Less secure sure but quick. If an attacker has the triangle of means (tools, knowledge), motive and opportunity (physical access) then any lock can be defeated if only because yo…

> will not be retrieved My friend Victor would disagree. Of course, finding the block would be much harder than going down in DSV Limiting Factor to get it.

If the DSV crew ever wants some recreational challenges, I would happily create some and even give them some rough coordinates to work from.

Re: How to open a safe

#63
post #5

I am shocked... absolutely shocked, I say, that Master Lock released a security product to the market that is so badly engineered it is trivial to open.

Judging by the fact that master lock is still widely sold, it’s not common knowledge how crap they are.

The people who don't know don't care usually, or they'd be buying a lock that costs more than $5-20. Either because it's protecting something of low value, or they don't know how to quantify when something needs more value, or because it doesn't matter.

For instance, if you have a shed with windows and a hasp on it, that it has a $10 master lock on it is the least of your security problems.

If you're storing $100m in gold bars in said shed, putting the $10 master lock on it is also probably the least negligent thing you're probably doing.

Re: How to open a safe

#64
post #24
post #17

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The more hassle involved with breaking the lock the harder it is to be steal, that makes sense. Don't forget about security by obscurity, though. Let's say a criminal with a bolt cutter finds their way to an unattended gym locker room and they can only have time to snip one or two locks. The majority of the lockers have generic Master Locks, a few have some exotic "ultra-secure" locks on them. Do they randomly snip a…

Wouldn't that be a bad example? That they could still snip the better locks seems like they're not really better. In general, you would want a lock that they would need a special tool that they didn't bring. For example, maybe the thief could have cut(saw) the higher end locks, but they only brought bolt cutters because they're faster and work on 90% of the locks.

Many better locks from a picking perspective are only mildly better from a physical security perspective.

If someone has brought tools (portable angle grinder, hydraulic bolt cutters, or a prybar) sufficient to take out most locks, they'll take out most locks unless you upgrade A LOT. At which point they can usually use the same tools to defeat the hasp, and you're still compromised.

Re: How to open a safe

#65
post #2

I would really hope that people who make security tools would have the best-of-breed electronic engineers but clearly not. The crack was pretty rudimentary and would take an experienced electronics test technician about an hour by the looks of it. "No response". Understandable when you don't have any way to easily put it right, although I suppose they could have at least asked OP to keep it a secret until they could…

These are really just fire safes. They’re made to protect important documents from being destroyed in the amount of time it takes a fire truck to put your house fire out. The lock is mostly to keep kids or guests out. The biggest security vulnerability in these “safes” is not the lock. It’s that a thief can simply pick it up and walk away with it.

Well, many people bolt their safe to their house. That adds some time for the thief to abscond with it. But I don't think "not meant to be secure anyway" is an excuse for "designed with a trivial security flaw." I mean, am I still supposed to trust what the manufacturer says about its fire resistance?

Re: How to open a safe

#66
post #42

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The second one is very hard to avoid. The safe could of course have some form of tamper detection/response, but other than that, you can't put the PIN pad in a safe, so a determined attacker will be able to open it (using tools/force if necessary).

You can't put the PIN pad inside, but you can put the screw inside.

Which doesn't help if you assume the attacker has a dremel.

Re: How to open a safe

#67
post #20

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Judging by the fact that master lock is still widely sold, it’s not common knowledge how crap they are.

Same logic for basic deadbolts in the US (kiwkset/schlage/etc).

Kwikset's SmartKey deadbolts are very common in hardware stores, and quite difficult to pick.

Re: How to open a safe

#68
post #57

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I would have thought things like ISM would be top quality consumer grade.

They are, but they are far more expensive than mainstream consumer gun "safes" and very heavy. A buddy of mine's dad dealt in wholesale jewelry and my friend inherited one of his dad's safes (I don't recall the brand offhand). It's over 5,000 pounds, has a tempered glass relocking plate in the door to defeat drills, etc. It is far beyond what almost any gun owner would go for. If something were to somehow fire the re…

I would guess that would be commercial grade if he was involved in that business.

Re: How to open a safe

#69
post #42

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You can't put the PIN pad inside, but you can put the screw inside.

Which doesn't help if you assume the attacker has a dremel.

"Opening it with a dremel" is a completely different class of attacks from "opening it without leaving a trace".
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