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Analyzing the compromised DLL file that started the Solorigate attack

microsoft.com

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Re: Analyzing the compromised DLL file that started the Solorigate attack

#61

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The relevant code was (allegedly) not part of source control, but inserted during the build process.

Hmm, interesting. I'm confused if that's how I should read this. You might be right. I assume you're referring to this paragraph? > Evidence suggests that as early as October 2019, these attackers have been testing their ability to insert code by adding empty classes. Therefore, insertion of malicious code into the SolarWinds.Orion.Core.BusinessLayer.dll likely occurred at an early stage, before the final stages of t…

SolarWinds themselves it claiming it.

https://www.solarwinds.com/securityadvisory/faq

> Our initial investigations point to an issue in the Orion software build system in which the vulnerability was insert which, if present and activated, could potentially allow an attacker to compromise the server on which the Orion Platform products run.

Under "With these processes in place how was your code compromised?"

Re: Analyzing the compromised DLL file that started the Solorigate attack

#62

Any GitHub/GitLab/etc. employees here? I think you might be able to help mitigate some of these kinds of attacks: > To have some minimal form of obfuscation from prying eyes, the strings in the backdoor are compressed and encoded in Base64, or their hashes are used instead. There needs to be a quick tool that flags strings that appear to represent binary data before a merge, maybe even decoding them when possible and…

I wrote about some mitigation steps here https://boxboat.com/2020/12/14/safeguarding-the-world-from-t...

Re: Analyzing the compromised DLL file that started the Solorigate attack

#63

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Hmm, interesting. I'm confused if that's how I should read this. You might be right. I assume you're referring to this paragraph? > Evidence suggests that as early as October 2019, these attackers have been testing their ability to insert code by adding empty classes. Therefore, insertion of malicious code into the SolarWinds.Orion.Core.BusinessLayer.dll likely occurred at an early stage, before the final stages of t…

SolarWinds themselves it claiming it. https://www.solarwinds.com/securityadvisory/faq > Our initial investigations point to an issue in the Orion software build system in which the vulnerability was insert which, if present and activated, could potentially allow an attacker to compromise the server on which the Orion Platform products run. Under "With these processes in place how was your code compromised?"

Thanks!

Re: Analyzing the compromised DLL file that started the Solorigate attack

#65
post #32

Earlier quoted context omitted.

This makes me think of a common refrain when dealing with parasite infestations: If you see one, there's way more than just one. Deterministic builds cannot come soon enough. And really, builds are not enough, we need to be able to extend confidence in the execution of the programs we write much deeper than just builds.

> Deterministic builds cannot come soon enough. This doesn't do anything for people who buy SolarWinds Orion, which is a closed-source off-the-shelf tool that gets picked up everywhere because of a combination of good sales tactics, compliance checkboxes, and ability to remove work from all involved. Going back up the chain, a technical solution probably won't solve the issues inside SolarWinds either. Systemic organ…

I haven't paid much attention to the solar winds catalog, but last I looked I did everything they offered on Linux with open source free tools.

Re: Analyzing the compromised DLL file that started the Solorigate attack

#66
post #60
post #32

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> Deterministic builds cannot come soon enough. This doesn't do anything for people who buy SolarWinds Orion, which is a closed-source off-the-shelf tool that gets picked up everywhere because of a combination of good sales tactics, compliance checkboxes, and ability to remove work from all involved. Going back up the chain, a technical solution probably won't solve the issues inside SolarWinds either. Systemic organ…

Deterministic builds can be done with closed source too. It doesn't directly help the users, but if they had setup a second build machine and noticed the build output was different, they could have addressed this sooner. Of course, if following best practices, all build machines should be equally compromised. ;p

Mdt hashes and signing could have avoided this. Open source stuff always verifies, vote closed source doesn't have that habit.

Re: Analyzing the compromised DLL file that started the Solorigate attack

#67
post #37
post #15

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I have no idea what Russia's interests are. I'm just genuinely curious and in the dark. I've never been to the country and grew up in the West during the Cold War, so when I think of Russia I was indoctrinated to think of "the bad guys". The country is an enigma to me—very good at math but from what I read a corrupt place with rule by power and not law. So yeah, I'm just genuinely asking, how are they the ones doing…

This comment, along with the original comment of the same person, is laughable at best and downright Russian astroturfing in a less favorable reading. Obviously, Russia has a policy to support whatever the US is angry about (SciHub, Snowden, ...). To paint these as altruistic is just silly - there is no chance on earth they would support Snowden if his leaks were about Russia rather than about the US. To paint the So…

On a side note. I Wonder why Snowden chose Russia as his safe haven, thinking about the politics and rulings the country is known for.

Have Snowden ever told why he chose Russia?

Re: Analyzing the compromised DLL file that started the Solorigate attack

#68
I am curious what network detection could be done to detect this sort of thing. Clearly the code needed to make outbound connections to hosts.

Some thoughts: if there is an encoded sub domain, flag this as suspicious.

Any code that uses a function to decode a base64 encoded string should be a red flag.

Any newly created thread code should be detected and checked most carefully.

Any others people can think of?

Re: Analyzing the compromised DLL file that started the Solorigate attack

#69
post #37
post #15

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I have no idea what Russia's interests are. I'm just genuinely curious and in the dark. I've never been to the country and grew up in the West during the Cold War, so when I think of Russia I was indoctrinated to think of "the bad guys". The country is an enigma to me—very good at math but from what I read a corrupt place with rule by power and not law. So yeah, I'm just genuinely asking, how are they the ones doing…

This comment, along with the original comment of the same person, is laughable at best and downright Russian astroturfing in a less favorable reading. Obviously, Russia has a policy to support whatever the US is angry about (SciHub, Snowden, ...). To paint these as altruistic is just silly - there is no chance on earth they would support Snowden if his leaks were about Russia rather than about the US. To paint the So…

> You are not genuinely curious. You are not genuinely asking. You do not genuinely wonder if there is altruism involved.

What the hell kind of comment is this? Who are YOU to make that assertion?

Re: Analyzing the compromised DLL file that started the Solorigate attack

#70
post #4

I am curious how this code actually made it in, based upon the following: > The fact that the compromised file is digitally signed suggests the attackers were able to access the company’s software development or distribution pipeline. Evidence suggests that as early as October 2019, these attackers have been testing their ability to insert code by adding empty classes. Unless this a compromise of the build machine, i…

Can’t you just run a git rebase to disguise it?
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