Trust in hardware supply chains when manufactring a PCB for a product can be quite fragile: when one component operates outside of spec, the entire device could be rendered useless. In the case of the DS18B20, the author states in the 'Warning' section that the primary way of determining counterfeit sensors is to check the ROM output compared to a known format. When counterfeit parts like this are added, it creates v…
> This anti-consumer behavior on behalf of companies I strongly disagree with this. I see no way to rationalize that a company should be responsible for ensuring that counterfeit devices work correctly by releasing drivers that are tolerant of them or do not stop them from functioning. FTDI's products are the combination of their hardware with their drivers. Both are required in order to delivery functionality and re…
There's a difference between not taking steps to ensure counterfeit devices function, and purposefully causing hardware to fail on a remote system. For example, I'm pretty sure purposefully causing the problem is illegal, if the user didn't request it, as it seems the same as hacking to me.
> Imagine counterfeit processor make it into the supply chain. Should the avionics OS do its best to work with every possible fake or should it brick it on power-up before that potentially dangerous aircraft gets off the ground?
Refusing to function is acceptable. Bricking the hardware is not.