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'Unfixable' security flaw in Intel boot ROM

theregister.co.uk

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Re: 'Unfixable' security flaw in Intel boot ROM

#61

Post by matheusmoreira »

outworlder wrote: post #48
matheusmoreira wrote: post #42

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> Anybody who doesn't want their data copied will be shedding tears. "Their" data? What a ludicrous concept. It's analogous to saying people own numbers. > Just don't expect people to give you copies of data they don't want shared by you. I fully expect people to distribute "their" data far and wide to anybody who asks for it. That's what copyright is all about: giving people the illusion they're in control of what h…

> "Their" data? What a ludicrous concept. It's analogous to saying people own numbers. Oh. In that case, where have you posted your bank credentials?

I haven't posted them. The fact that data is private means I'm currently the only one in possession of it. It doesn't mean it's mine. Should they leak, the solution is to invalidate those credentials and get new ones, not to invoke copyright and try to get all copies off the internet.

Re: 'Unfixable' security flaw in Intel boot ROM

#63

Post by mindslight »

ngneer wrote: post #59
mindslight wrote: post #7

> This is used for things like providing anti-piracy DRM protections, and Internet-of-Things attestation "Internet-of-Things attestation" ?? A poor attempt to stick a refreshing buzzword in front of a fundamentally unwanted user-betraying open-society-undermining technology. Remote attestation does away with the basic foundation of protocols for mediating between mutually-untrusting parties, making it so users must t…

Agreed about the evil of DRM and treacherous computing, but do not conflate the shift in trust to a remote party with the attestation mechanism itself, which can be neutral. The idea behind attestation is that hardware signs a quote regarding that which is running on the device, one that is cryptographically verifiable. Verifiable for what purpose is a separate question.

The purpose depends entirely on who creates/vouches for the attestation key. If the attestation key can be generated by the owner and then loaded into the secure element, then the owner can prove to themselves that the system has not been tampered with. But they cannot prove to anybody else what code is running on the system, as the owner can use a copy of the attestation key outside of the secure element to sign whatever they like. This is a good thing.

If the attestation key has been created by Intel (or within the secure element and signed by Intel), then the system can verify to arbitrary parties that the owner has not "tampered" with their own system. This creates a security vulnerability, as now overly aggressive (aka hostile) parties can demand that the owner gives up control of their own system as a condition of interacting with them.

Given the extreme power imbalance in B2C relationships, if this vulnerability exists it will eventually be abused in lockstep. Remember the days of dual-booting Windows to run some proprietary crapware? Yeah, that again, but with websites. And you couldn't just run a headless second machine with VNC, or even use too old of a monitor, depending on the business whims of the proprietary OS!

Re: 'Unfixable' security flaw in Intel boot ROM

#64

Post by wayoutthere »

anthk wrote: post #47
wayoutthere wrote: post #27

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> When will it stop? How deep run the flaws in Intel's platform? Is AMD equally exposed? We're seeing the tide turn from x86 to ARM pretty quick in both the datacenter and laptop markets. AMD should come through relatively unscathed as they're pretty diversified, but Intel is fucked. Graviton2 (Amazon's proprietary ARM stack) absolutely crushes x86 from a $/performance perspective, and there are plenty of other compa…

ARM is a joke on raw computing. Also, RISC-V will crush down ARM on servers once it begins to grow a little.

ARM is shit compared to x86 for single-threaded computing; you're right about that. But ARM is great at the types of hypervisor-driven cloud workloads that most applications fit into. Most cloud workloads are limited by network latency far more than single-threaded performance.

x86 will still exist for high-performance workloads, and companies will happily pay a premium where they need it like they already do with GPU instances. But I do think we'll see the vast majority of cloud usage shift to ARM over the next 5 years. RISC-V may come in and replace it some time after that, but not without major cost advantages over both ARM and x86.

Re: 'Unfixable' security flaw in Intel boot ROM

#65

Post by ngneer »

mindslight wrote: post #63
ngneer wrote: post #59

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Agreed about the evil of DRM and treacherous computing, but do not conflate the shift in trust to a remote party with the attestation mechanism itself, which can be neutral. The idea behind attestation is that hardware signs a quote regarding that which is running on the device, one that is cryptographically verifiable. Verifiable for what purpose is a separate question.

The purpose depends entirely on who creates/vouches for the attestation key. If the attestation key can be generated by the owner and then loaded into the secure element, then the owner can prove to themselves that the system has not been tampered with. But they cannot prove to anybody else what code is running on the system, as the owner can use a copy of the attestation key outside of the secure element to sign wha…

Second that. And yet, the B2C asymmetry was and is there regardless of whether one is "forced" to relinquish control over part of their machine. The current attestation models are an extension of the power imbalance. Intel, being a profit driven company, sought to meet its customers' demands.
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