61–70 of 74 posts
Earlier quoted context omitted.
You'd also get no new airplane designs.
Airbus A380 sustained a catastrophic uncontained engine failure due to a Rolls Royce flaw. Landed and everybody went home. Maybe they can help.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Southwest_Airlines_Flight_1380
Airbus has hardly been free of dangerous flaws. Watch "Air Disasters" on the Smithsonian channel.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
Buggy software will happen. Buggy software that isn't reported when it should be, that isn't fixed, reviewed and tested shouldn't happen. Software development for aviation is pretty good, that's not where the issue lies here. The issue is a systematic attempt to circumvent proper type certification for a new aircraft, and downright trickery in order to pretend it's just a minor change to an existing aircraft when in…
It is a minor change. There is nothing inherently wrong with adjusting the flight controls so one airplane flies like another. In fact, engineers try to do it, as it reduces both costs and accidents. (There have been many aircraft accidents where the pilot did the right thing for airplane X, but unfortunately was flying airplane Y. These happen even when the pilot is experienced and properly trained to fly Y.) > Soft…
Earlier quoted context omitted.
I'm making the point that for for US flying (with US levels of maintenance / pilot training etc) boeing and even the 737MAX has a safety record that is incredible. Not only that, it beats almost all other regulated modes of transit and even other regulated hazards (OSHA controlled worksites etc). As always, it could be better - but it's actually amazingly good already - these planes are incredible safe in a challengi…
If it were safe to fly the Max in the US, and the problem were the pilots, it would be in the air now. It isn't, as the problem is clearly with the plane. It was likely just a matter of time before another Max fell out of the sky somewhere in the US, Europe or elsewhere.
And part 121 planes in the US do not fly multiple legs with the problems described on these planes.
I know it's partly a labor issue, but mechanics at united will take a plane out of service for practically any reason.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
What op seems to imply is that airplane incidents rates actually have a stronger track record as opposed to the opioid epidemic, road fatality, etc. And that if society believes that this individual/group should go to prison based on this mistake and in hindsight, without account for all the other factors that were a part of the decision making process, then society should start reconsidering the way it treats opioid…
Has anybody argued that nobody else should be punished, ever? Otherwise "but there's drug addiction and car accidents! We shouldn't pass judgement on Boeing until everything else is perfect" is a really strange argument.
If you wanted to reduce auto accident rates, opiod deaths etc you'd put these folks in charge, not put the law enforcement lobby in charge (yes, they will arrest lots of low level offenders but will not systematically address the issues and do not chase the folks at the top).
Earlier quoted context omitted.
There record is not dismal with the 737MAX. If you look at where fault lies part lies with boeing and part lies elsewhere in the safety chain. In contrast to many other areas - the evidence of ill intent is relatively weak here. Even without prison Boeing is facing major financial impacts as a result of this issue (as it should). It's looking like evidence from the airlines that proper maintenance was done may have b…
> the evidence of ill intent is relatively weak here Most people are referring to negligence, not ill intent. "Let's make more money and rush this thing out! (Even though this could kill people)", not "Let's deliberately design a system to kill people". Regardless, one sensor failing should not induce a plane to fly itself into the ground, despite the best efforts of the pilots to recover (and despite the fact they w…
Absolutely - Boeing is going to be designing much safer planes in future to accommodate different pilot populations. That is clear and necessary. This will make us all safer. Boeing obviously screwed up with a primarily US based mentality.
This system was PARTICULARLY fragile in the face of poor maintenance and reliance on automation - which boeing was unreasonably dependent given a US centric view.
Look into history of comets and concorde if you want to look at hull loss rates (note - both stopped flying forever when safety issues became clear). I predict almost no chance that the max will be taken out of flying forever.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
> the evidence of ill intent is relatively weak here Most people are referring to negligence, not ill intent. "Let's make more money and rush this thing out! (Even though this could kill people)", not "Let's deliberately design a system to kill people". Regardless, one sensor failing should not induce a plane to fly itself into the ground, despite the best efforts of the pilots to recover (and despite the fact they w…
These were not the "best efforts" to recover - stab trim cutout is a memory item. Absolutely - Boeing is going to be designing much safer planes in future to accommodate different pilot populations. That is clear and necessary. This will make us all safer. Boeing obviously screwed up with a primarily US based mentality. This system was PARTICULARLY fragile in the face of poor maintenance and reliance on automation -…
I think evidence will show you're wrong. The MCAS is a terrible design no matter where you intend to fly it.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
I don’t really understand the context of these messages. The one about MCAS running rampant is clear enough but what does he mean saying that he sucks at flying? What is egregious?
I interpreted that as “I may be a bad pilot but MCAS made my trying to fly in the simulators particularly unsuccessful”
Those are the pilots words and he’s saying the messages are being misinterpreted and cherry picked without context.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
> the evidence of ill intent is relatively weak here Most people are referring to negligence, not ill intent. "Let's make more money and rush this thing out! (Even though this could kill people)", not "Let's deliberately design a system to kill people". Regardless, one sensor failing should not induce a plane to fly itself into the ground, despite the best efforts of the pilots to recover (and despite the fact they w…
These were not the "best efforts" to recover - stab trim cutout is a memory item. Absolutely - Boeing is going to be designing much safer planes in future to accommodate different pilot populations. That is clear and necessary. This will make us all safer. Boeing obviously screwed up with a primarily US based mentality. This system was PARTICULARLY fragile in the face of poor maintenance and reliance on automation -…
1. MCAS does not behave exactly like a normal runaway trim.
2. On the Ethiopian crash, they _did_ initially follow the stab trim cutout procedure, but they didn't manage their speed correctly and thus were unable to control the plane with manual trim.
IMO point 2 is very important - pilots will not always be perfect. It's easy to armchair pilot from your couch and say that "Oh, just manage your speed correctly when your plane is trying to pitch itself into the ground just after takeoff and follow the stab trim cutout procedure. Very easy to deal with MCAS." But reality is not that easy.
> Look into history of comets and concorde if you want to look at hull loss rates
Compared to every other new plane released in the past 20 years, the 737 MAX has a terrible hull loss ratio. I don't really care about the Comet or the Concorde since it's 2019.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
These were not the "best efforts" to recover - stab trim cutout is a memory item. Absolutely - Boeing is going to be designing much safer planes in future to accommodate different pilot populations. That is clear and necessary. This will make us all safer. Boeing obviously screwed up with a primarily US based mentality. This system was PARTICULARLY fragile in the face of poor maintenance and reliance on automation -…
By US-based mentality, you mean one where it's OK to design an automation system that takes input from a single sensor? And this is somehow OK for American pilots, but not for foreigners? I think evidence will show you're wrong. The MCAS is a terrible design no matter where you intend to fly it.
In the US, efforts in last years have focused on the entire chain of safety (actually away from plane design) and the US has hit some of the BEST periods of safety in aviation. This is everything from duty / rest periods, maintenance, minimum training requirements etc.
"And this is somehow OK for American pilots, but not for foreigners?"
Let's be VERY clear here:
The requirement to fly Part 121 in US even as just a first officer requires an ATP and 1,500 hours. Most folks have a a significant amount of other flying prior to that, the US has a much bigger GA aviation scene, private flight instruction, glider, private jet / charter markets and military flying. The US has something like 12,000 pilots flying for the air force alone. The first officer on your long flight is very very likely to have a TON of experience in all sorts of situations, and particularly with manual flying.
Overseas - you can be a graduate with an academic / training background only and 250 hrs of "flight time" more broadly defined and be at the controls. Ethiopian airline pilots were 25 and 29 years old.
In the US, major carriers even more picky.
Southwest for example:
Flight Experience: 2,500 hours total or 1,500 hours Turbine total. Additionally, a minimum of 1,000 hours in Turbine aircraft as the Pilot in Command* is preferred. Southwest considers only Pilot time in fixed-wing aircraft. This specifically excludes simulator, WSO, RIO, FE, NAV, EWO, etc. "Other Time" will not be considered.
So yes, if boeing is going to sell into markets with folks getting into cockpit as co-pilots with sometimes as low as 50 hrs (1 week) of experience (in cadet / training systems) then 100% they will need to redesign and rethink things for this future pilot population - and yes, that means the systems will have to have MUCH more natural redundancy built in.
Ignoring this difference in background, opportunity and skill will lead to lots more deaths - all preventable if the thinking changes and a better understanding of future pilot populations is developed, and that includes accounting for differences in training and experience.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
These were not the "best efforts" to recover - stab trim cutout is a memory item. Absolutely - Boeing is going to be designing much safer planes in future to accommodate different pilot populations. That is clear and necessary. This will make us all safer. Boeing obviously screwed up with a primarily US based mentality. This system was PARTICULARLY fragile in the face of poor maintenance and reliance on automation -…
> stab trim cutout is a memory item 1. MCAS does not behave exactly like a normal runaway trim. 2. On the Ethiopian crash, they _did_ initially follow the stab trim cutout procedure, but they didn't manage their speed correctly and thus were unable to control the plane with manual trim. IMO point 2 is very important - pilots will not always be perfect. It's easy to armchair pilot from your couch and say that "Oh, jus…
Pilot error still #1 cause of fatalities including in the US. In this case bad maintenance also looks to be an issue and a brittle design. You have a master caution on 4 seconds into flight - you've got a terrible maintenance log book etc. I actually thought initial stab trim call wasn't unreasonably delayed - though they did let it run 4.6 to 2.1 over 10 seconds or so, which is a HUGE trim change.
And stab trim cutout wasn't followed fully or MCAS wouldn't have been able to put them into the ground at the end, though they may have already in a bad spot so thinking not unreasonable, except of course you might sit on nose up trim for a bit once reversing cutout.
The move will be I think to more automation and reducing ability to dispatch with things like a flight computer out of service (histrionically pilot skill would cover this now).
I also think they may need to move to authenticated maintenance / self test / parts life / history items. Ie, prevent dispatch on sloppy fixes / sloppy test.