A pilot might fire up that inference engine between his ears and make a very well educated guess when two sensors disagree, based on which one reacts more in line with how it should react to some exploratory control inputs or the recent control history.
A control loop cannot do that, it is a stupid fact processor that we prefer to do one simple thing reliably than to venture off on inscrutably deep reasoning adventures. A general flight AI would be an entirely different beast than the arsenal of pilot assistance systems currently employed. And just two sensors, simply disengaging the control loop when they disagree, seem insufficient to me when we deemed the control loop necessary in the first place. And this is the easily overlooked bit here: disengaging the MCAS isn't the final step, then you still need to fly the plane that it's manufacturer did not trust pilots to safely operate unassisted by MCAS.
(a general flight AI able to do the sensor trust inference could be an interesting game of adversarial programming though: plug it into a flight simulator, then try to down it with the smallest set of simulated malfunctions and weather)
> It appears that the AOA disagree alert exists on the plane but is an optional paid feature (!).
Oh, that is just crazy. And considering that a bad safe record is just as damaging for Boeing as for the airline, it doesn't seem particularly clever to leave that choice to the customers. Do you have an easily digestible source for that?