The Strong Free Will Theorem (2009) [pdf] • Hacker News Board

Re: The Strong Free Will Theorem (2009) [pdf]

#61

Post by simonh » Wed, Nov 07, 2018, 4:56 PM UTC

esotericn wrote: post #58

tylerjwilk00 wrote: post #56

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It's not random though - it is probabilistic. And even if it was an internal 'RNG' it is is still _their's_ not someone else's.

If you take an action based on determining the probabilities of an event, you would take that action every single time because the state would be identical every time. You look at the roulette board. You bet on red. We rewind time. You still bet on red. The state is identical. Did _you_ come up with that decision? Of course you did, who else could have? My claim is not that there's no "you". It's that "free will" is…

That is true, but only for some definitions of free and will. I don't accept definitions of 'free' that exclude inputs from my personal mental state. If my mental state doesn't determine the choice, then the choice isn't mine.

Note that there could be random elements in my mental makeup. i.e. my mental state might include input from an RNG, but it's still part of me and as long as it's not the only input into any of my choices, we can still talk about responsibility.

See my comment about No Country for old Men on choosing to use randomness.

Re: The Strong Free Will Theorem (2009) [pdf]

#62

Post by yters » Wed, Nov 07, 2018, 5:23 PM UTC

simonh wrote: post #7

I really think this, along with much philosophical musing about free will, is entirely missing the point. Pre-determination is essential to free will. You literally cannot have free will without it. Random choice, or even non-predetermined correlated outcomes of entangled objects don't lead to free will, they lead to uncertain decisions and those are not the same thing. If my decisions are not a product of my prior s…

Non-determined is not the same as random. Randomness is undetermined, but not coextensive with the concept. A common error I see in these debates.

Re: The Strong Free Will Theorem (2009) [pdf]

#63

Post by tylerjwilk00 » Wed, Nov 07, 2018, 5:42 PM UTC

fjuerfilis wrote: post #29

simonh wrote: post #20

Earlier quoted context omitted.

>The prior state idea seems more accurate, but even that (at least in its extreme state) doesn't seem to me to encapsulate the idea of free will because it disallows the idea of a decision being undetermined and free to decide. I certainly think randomness comes into play for sure, but conceptually my personal prior state might include a source of randomness. It could be just one factor, and I might make choices base…

Yes, I agree that is one model, but what I wrestle with ultimately I suppose is whether indeterminism per se is what defines free will, in part or whole. If you have a prior state that is in part systematic, and part random, is the randomness per se free will? Does that encapsulate the notion of free will? Maybe? But both of those are still causally deterministic in a sense, in that even with randomness, there's some…

There is a lot to respond to here (and I think you're looking for responses) so I am just gonna stick with what I think are the key points and be brief.

> If you have a prior state that is in part systematic, and part random, is the randomness per se free will?

Let's please replace random with uncertain. If _part_ of an entangled system is uncertain the _whole_ system is uncertain [1].

> Does that encapsulate the notion of free will?

    free will [2] 
    the power of acting without the constraint of necessity or fate; 
    the ability to act at one's own discretion.

To me this subjectively means: Are my choices the result of something greater than the material sum of my parts? Yes.

> That is, I cannot make you change your choice, only you can.

Your free will attempts at influencing me to make a certain choice would seem to entangle my state with your's and perhaps change the probability I will make one choice over another.

> If an omniscient external individual cannot alter your behavior,

'omniscient external individual' is a quite an assumption here.

> Why should the non-omniscient individual seeking change be held responsible?

Free will is the _only_ way to hold the individual responsible.

> but I think at some point the notion of free will starts to lead to counterintuitive problems and/or becomes very poorly definable. At some level I suspect it implies not only autonomy but complete agency, which is suspect.

(I may be misunderstanding you here) Free will over a decision must ultimately collapse to a choice made. At that point it is determined reality and no amount of free will can undo it.

You either took the Red pill or the Blue pill. If the decision is never observed the choice was never made ergo it didn't happen, it is not real.

In the spirit of Spinoza [3] I actually find bestowing free will upon particles very intuitive. We then have free will because it is an attribute of our fundamental components. If particles have no free will and are pre-determined we have no free will and are pre-determined. If we have free will then particles must have free will.

Full disclosure, I am an armchair philosopher with an interest in the cross-section with physics.

[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schr%C3%B6dinger%27s_cat [2] https://www.google.com/search?q=define%3A+free+will [3] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ethics_(Spinoza)

Re: The Strong Free Will Theorem (2009) [pdf]

#64

Post by phkahler » Wed, Nov 07, 2018, 5:51 PM UTC

simonh wrote: post #7

I really think this, along with much philosophical musing about free will, is entirely missing the point. Pre-determination is essential to free will. You literally cannot have free will without it. Random choice, or even non-predetermined correlated outcomes of entangled objects don't lead to free will, they lead to uncertain decisions and those are not the same thing. If my decisions are not a product of my prior s…

>> Any discussion of my responsibility for my actions must take into account my personal contribution to the decision as a being.

>> again whence comes responsibility?

The only reason I can think of to assign responsibility is to "correctly" respond. Particularly in the form of reward or punishment. But if a person is not responsible for their actions, then neither is anyone responding to them. "Responsibility" comes from some sense of morality, which doesn't really exist without free will does it?

Re: The Strong Free Will Theorem (2009) [pdf]

#65

Post by nine_k » Wed, Nov 07, 2018, 6:11 PM UTC

simonh wrote: post #57

dmreedy wrote: post #47

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I'd say dualism absolutely solves this problem, or at least can provide the tools to do so. (I say all of this as a devil's advocate, and nothing more) Imagine that heaven exists, and is a kind of meta-universe that our reality is a subset of. It has access to a higher order of systems than those within its subset, and they can say things about truth that the reality subset cannot (because of incompleteness; a system…

I think that's just hiding the internals of the non-physical part of us from view, but it doesn't change anything. I already addressed the status of non-material components of a person in my post - if they are part of the person then they are part of their state. Whether you can 'see into' that state or not doesn't make any difference to the fact that it's still part of you and still a precondition of and an input in…

What if an "out-of-this-world" thing is a part of the state? You can't observe its internal state, so you can't emulate its functioning, even if it's completely deterministic "in a different dimension". This can be literally compared to having a complex state variable and only being capable of observing its real part, or functions of it that are entirely real. (See quantum mechanics for examples of this.)

Re: The Strong Free Will Theorem (2009) [pdf]

#66

Post by dmreedy » Wed, Nov 07, 2018, 6:19 PM UTC

simonh wrote: post #57

dmreedy wrote: post #47

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I'd say dualism absolutely solves this problem, or at least can provide the tools to do so. (I say all of this as a devil's advocate, and nothing more) Imagine that heaven exists, and is a kind of meta-universe that our reality is a subset of. It has access to a higher order of systems than those within its subset, and they can say things about truth that the reality subset cannot (because of incompleteness; a system…

I think that's just hiding the internals of the non-physical part of us from view, but it doesn't change anything. I already addressed the status of non-material components of a person in my post - if they are part of the person then they are part of their state. Whether you can 'see into' that state or not doesn't make any difference to the fact that it's still part of you and still a precondition of and an input in…

Separating the two bits like this lets you have your cake and eat it too; it allows for a causal explanation between a person's (comprising both their physical and non-physical) state, and their actions, but that total state (and therefore, responsibility) can't be completely reasoned about in the reality that we exist in. They appear indistinguishable from the 'uncertain decisions' you mention in your first post, but are (in the whole picture) simultaneously causal/responsibility-inducing, and completely inaccessible to some Laplace's Demon.

It's why this kind of system usually is accompanied by a whole meta-set of of punishments and rewards as well. Since there's no way to perfectly reason and judge in our system, we have to hope that someone who has access to the higher system will provide the correct judgement, being able to see the total picture of responsibility.

It's also completely untestable, for the very reasons it 'works' as an explanation at all!

Re: The Strong Free Will Theorem (2009) [pdf]

#67

Post by okintheory » Wed, Nov 07, 2018, 6:43 PM UTC

simonh wrote: post #7

I really think this, along with much philosophical musing about free will, is entirely missing the point. Pre-determination is essential to free will. You literally cannot have free will without it. Random choice, or even non-predetermined correlated outcomes of entangled objects don't lead to free will, they lead to uncertain decisions and those are not the same thing. If my decisions are not a product of my prior s…

I think you're taking the wrong message away from the following simple idea: "Good decisions depend on taking the available information into account." If we take this for granted, then it's not clear why free will is a good thing.

How would you say pre-determined actions and free will are compatible? I would say they are not (and indeed randomness doesn't really help). In contrast, I would claim that the only sensible definition of free will is based on dualism: Many people seem believe there's some inherent aspect of them that is separate from the physical world and is the source of their self and will. If, like me, you don't believe in dualism, then the conclusion is that we don't have free will.

Re: The Strong Free Will Theorem (2009) [pdf]

#68

Post by simonebrunozzi » Wed, Nov 07, 2018, 7:07 PM UTC

simonh wrote: post #7

I really think this, along with much philosophical musing about free will, is entirely missing the point. Pre-determination is essential to free will. You literally cannot have free will without it. Random choice, or even non-predetermined correlated outcomes of entangled objects don't lead to free will, they lead to uncertain decisions and those are not the same thing. If my decisions are not a product of my prior s…

I had this exact discussion with my grandfather (a catholic) when I was 11 years old (I'm 41 now), and rejecting most religious stuff I was fed with at the time.

It is an incredibly fascinating debate.

Re: The Strong Free Will Theorem (2009) [pdf]

#69

Post by intralizee » Wed, Nov 07, 2018, 7:36 PM UTC

simonh wrote: post #59

fjuerfilis wrote: post #29

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Yes, I agree that is one model, but what I wrestle with ultimately I suppose is whether indeterminism per se is what defines free will, in part or whole. If you have a prior state that is in part systematic, and part random, is the randomness per se free will? Does that encapsulate the notion of free will? Maybe? But both of those are still causally deterministic in a sense, in that even with randomness, there's some…

I think randomness really is a red herring. To the extent that a decision of ours is random, it is not ours. That doesn't necessarily absolve us of responsibility. In No Country for Old Men a guy flips a coin to decide if he will kill someone. He chose to flip the coin though - delegating a choice to randomness does not abrogate us of responsibility. By doing so he created the framework in which the outcome arrises,…

He did not make the choice to murder if all the previous states, linked together to the outcome and thus it couldn’t have been different. If I’m a product of every moment, where the previous moments factor into my current moment.. I would only consider myself free if I had full control before birth into how my life plays out. Nobody is making choices is what I observe everyday, only forces are occurring and under the illusion or simply a disguise of choice.

Re: The Strong Free Will Theorem (2009) [pdf]

#70

Post by adrianN » Wed, Nov 07, 2018, 7:44 PM UTC

tylerjwilk00 wrote: post #56

esotericn wrote: post #36

Earlier quoted context omitted.

In that case, you didn't "will" the different decision, it was a result of your internal RNG.

It's not random though - it is probabilistic. And even if it was an internal 'RNG' it is is still _their's_ not someone else's.

If probabilistic outcomes are the same as having a free will, then elementary particles also have free will. That doesn't fit the intuitive fuzzy definition of free will.