> $0.40/secret/month WOWZER. I get having a managed solution is great, but you don't have to store many secrets before running your own Vault server makes sense.
FTFU - Valut service .... You need more than one server, it'll need to have 100% uptime too, backed up and available in multiple regions. No security team want to own this infrastructure.
AWS Secrets Manager – Store, Distribute, and Rotate Credentials Securely
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Re: AWS Secrets Manager – Store, Distribute, and Rotate Credentials Securely
#62If so, thats pretty damn cool.
Re: AWS Secrets Manager – Store, Distribute, and Rotate Credentials Securely
#63Does the Secret Rotation for the RDS-integrated credential store actually update the password for the user in the SQL database? If so, thats pretty damn cool.
Re: AWS Secrets Manager – Store, Distribute, and Rotate Credentials Securely
#64Does the Secret Rotation for the RDS-integrated credential store actually update the password for the user in the SQL database? If so, thats pretty damn cool.
Re: AWS Secrets Manager – Store, Distribute, and Rotate Credentials Securely
#65Re: AWS Secrets Manager – Store, Distribute, and Rotate Credentials Securely
#66How is this different than KMS? “Key Management Service” is practically synonymous with the name of this new product, so how exactly do the two differ/interact?
1. Use a KMS key to encrypt a secrets file (obviously, never check this into source control)
2. Store the encrypted secrets file in an S3 bucket
3. Tie a new IAM role with kms:Decrypt and s3:GetObject policies for the relevant resources to your EC2 instance
4. On app start, get the KMS key and secrets file, decrypt, and set environment variables
In practice, rotating using this scheme just means creating a new KMS key, re-encrypting the file and pushing the updated copy to S3, and updating the IAM role's kms:Decrypt policy. It's not too bad unless you have a million services.
Re: AWS Secrets Manager – Store, Distribute, and Rotate Credentials Securely
#67Earlier quoted context omitted.
It'd be cheaper than running Vault with a backing Consul cluster which also provides rotation and other features. There is a point where Vault is more cost effective, but I believe it'd require a ton of requests and secrets to justify min 6 machines of at least t2.micro that also need to managed and secured.
Depends on how many secrets you're storing. You can also back Vault with something other than Consul. You can back it with DynamoDB, which would be much cheaper than managing your own Consul cluster. You can even back it with S3, which would be dirt cheap (cost of the vault instance + a few cents for storage).
Re: AWS Secrets Manager – Store, Distribute, and Rotate Credentials Securely
#68Earlier quoted context omitted.
It'd be cheaper than running Vault with a backing Consul cluster which also provides rotation and other features. There is a point where Vault is more cost effective, but I believe it'd require a ton of requests and secrets to justify min 6 machines of at least t2.micro that also need to managed and secured.
What if you're already running a nomad/consul cluster? Is vault a particularly hard thing to implement/scale at that point?
Re: AWS Secrets Manager – Store, Distribute, and Rotate Credentials Securely
#69Re: AWS Secrets Manager – Store, Distribute, and Rotate Credentials Securely
#70You do still have to figure out a way to securely provide the root credential to your service so that it can fetch the secrets from the secret manager, correct? Otherwise this would be magic of a kind I think is impossible.
If my questions aren't too far off in the weeds, then this service sounds like a personal password manager but for a service rather than a person, though I'm sure AWS's service has finer-grained controls than just the all-or-nothing master passphrase. Similar risks apply: an attacker obtaining the master passphrase is a major issue, losing the master passphrase is devastating (though recoverable here because you probably didn't lose your personal AWS login credentials), and unavailability of the password database is catastrophic. But the usability benefits of having everything in one secure place, behind a service managed by experts, should outweigh those risks.
I have more questions about the credential-rotation feature, but this is enough for now.