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Five decades of majestic failure to explain consciousness

thenewatlantis.com

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Re: Five decades of majestic failure to explain consciousness

#61
post #48
post #42

Earlier quoted context omitted.

If you're willing to draw a distinction between "denying the existence of qualia" and "denying the existence of subjective experience", then yes, I agree that "denying the existence of qualia" can be taken in its usual sense--"they aren't a thing", as you say. Everything Dennett says about qualia has to be interpreted with this distinction in mind. However, I'm not sure the poster I was responding to would agree with…

> However, I'm not sure the poster I was responding to would agree with allowing that distinction. Certainly many commentators on Dennett have interpreted "denying the existence of qualia" as "denying the existence of subjective experience", which Dennett does not do. For a person who refuses to allow the distinction, I think one has to simply disagree that Dennett denies the existence of qualia; he just says they ar…

> no one argues that Dennett doesn't think subjective experiences exist

I don't know if anyone has stated that directly. But I've seen plenty of responses to Dennett that basically amount to saying that the only way they can make sense of his statement that qualia don't exist is that he means subjective experiences don't exist. So even if they don't think he actually believes that, they certainly seem to be unable to interpret his philosophical claims any other way.

Re: Five decades of majestic failure to explain consciousness

#62
post #60

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It's a bit tricker than it sounds, though. We cannot be aware of the absence of awareness. This could imply that we can only be aware of a sense of 'awareness' insofar as it was in fact differentiated from awareness itself, though a missing second step that is probably familiar to you (but it's a bit late at night for me to articulate it coherently).

Are you referring to nothingness? I think that most of us can remember being 'nothing' (this might be wrong), and it baffles me why people are afraid to die, which is simply returning to 'nothing'.

That’s a preposterous claim. You obviously can’t remember not existing. Memory is not magical, it is a biological process that records information during your life and allows you to reexperience it.

Re: Five decades of majestic failure to explain consciousness

#63
post #60

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Are you referring to nothingness? I think that most of us can remember being 'nothing' (this might be wrong), and it baffles me why people are afraid to die, which is simply returning to 'nothing'.

That’s a preposterous claim. You obviously can’t remember not existing. Memory is not magical, it is a biological process that records information during your life and allows you to reexperience it.

It's a boundary condition. I expressed myself badly.

EDIT: If you are a physicalist. Some people are not.

EDIT2: "The Truth" has nothing to do with whether one is a physicalist or not, but the interpretation of some various sub-sets of the facts inform various ... schools of thought.

Re: Five decades of majestic failure to explain consciousness

#64
post #63

Earlier quoted context omitted.

That’s a preposterous claim. You obviously can’t remember not existing. Memory is not magical, it is a biological process that records information during your life and allows you to reexperience it.

It's a boundary condition. I expressed myself badly. EDIT: If you are a physicalist. Some people are not. EDIT2: "The Truth" has nothing to do with whether one is a physicalist or not, but the interpretation of some various sub-sets of the facts inform various ... schools of thought.

[deleted]

Re: Five decades of majestic failure to explain consciousness

#65
post #47

Earlier quoted context omitted.

That article is in no way an attack on materialism. Quantum chromodynamics still constitutes a materialist understanding of the universe. Are you perhaps confusing "matter" and "mass"?

My point was that this old Philosophy is preventing progress. The stranglehold is most evident, to me, when self-appointed thought-leaders apply Materialism/Reductionism to medicine.

Do you have an example of what you're talking about?

Re: Five decades of majestic failure to explain consciousness

#66
post #61
post #48

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> However, I'm not sure the poster I was responding to would agree with allowing that distinction. Certainly many commentators on Dennett have interpreted "denying the existence of qualia" as "denying the existence of subjective experience", which Dennett does not do. For a person who refuses to allow the distinction, I think one has to simply disagree that Dennett denies the existence of qualia; he just says they ar…

> no one argues that Dennett doesn't think subjective experiences exist I don't know if anyone has stated that directly. But I've seen plenty of responses to Dennett that basically amount to saying that the only way they can make sense of his statement that qualia don't exist is that he means subjective experiences don't exist. So even if they don't think he actually believes that, they certainly seem to be unable to…

They are attacking a weak interpretation of his argument. It's a pretty good tactic (that might have some merit), but it's pretty uncharitable.

Re: Five decades of majestic failure to explain consciousness

#67
post #48

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> However, I'm not sure the poster I was responding to would agree with allowing that distinction. Certainly many commentators on Dennett have interpreted "denying the existence of qualia" as "denying the existence of subjective experience", which Dennett does not do. For a person who refuses to allow the distinction, I think one has to simply disagree that Dennett denies the existence of qualia; he just says they ar…

> Qualia are phenomenal properties of experience. Presumably, one could have subjective experiences without these phenomenal properties. Care to elaborate on this? From my angle, arguments if this sort tend to veer towards wild speculation. I understand others feel differently. I usually can't help but read it as unnecessary leaps of logic spurred by some presupposed metaphysics. I hope I'm not projecting too much he…

> Care to elaborate on this?

Elaborate on what, exactly? Qualia being phenomenal properties of experience? I think that's a pretty atomic claim.

Basically, your experience E (a headache, for example) has some physical properties attached to it (maybe being caused by blood vessels expanding and putting pressure on certain nerves), but also some phenomenal properties (the feeling of getting a headache). The instance of this feeling is a quale. It's debated whether or not qualia are the same across people[1] (but my intuition is yes). Empiricists like Dennett argue that you don't need qualia and that they are a sort of unnecessary hand-wavy magic.

[1] http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/courses/gradmind01/newpap...

Re: Five decades of majestic failure to explain consciousness

#68
post #67

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> Qualia are phenomenal properties of experience. Presumably, one could have subjective experiences without these phenomenal properties. Care to elaborate on this? From my angle, arguments if this sort tend to veer towards wild speculation. I understand others feel differently. I usually can't help but read it as unnecessary leaps of logic spurred by some presupposed metaphysics. I hope I'm not projecting too much he…

> Care to elaborate on this? Elaborate on what, exactly? Qualia being phenomenal properties of experience? I think that's a pretty atomic claim. Basically, your experience E (a headache, for example) has some physical properties attached to it (maybe being caused by blood vessels expanding and putting pressure on certain nerves), but also some phenomenal properties (the feeling of getting a headache). The instance of…

> Basically, your experience E (a headache, for example) has some physical properties attached to it (maybe being caused by blood vessels expanding and putting pressure on certain nerves), but also some phenomenal properties (the feeling of getting a headache). The instance of this feeling is a quale.

Hmm. Does the nature of this particular "headache quale" depend in any way on the totality of current conceptions the subject has built up over the years their life?

My understanding and intuition tells me such "quale" are nothing more than the current instantaneous sensations being filtered through the accumulated mental conceptions, associations, and patterns that the entity has acquired over time (caveat: there are likely some very basic "pre-installed" conceptions that new-borns have from their genetics).

What is the argument to differentiate "quale" from mere momentary, initial perceptions, the raw sensation + initial neural processing? E.g. the first actual conscious awareness of some stimuli, framed and grounded by some initial mental conception of the sensation?

At the risk of being redundant: I have trouble imagining what it would mean, or that it is possible, or makes any sense at all, for a sentient being to be aware of some raw stimuli without it being grounded in some pre-existing conceptual framework. To me, that sounds like trying to play a video game by looking at the raw bits, the 1s and 0s, of the game data.

I realize that my interpretation of qualia doesn't provide a way to distinguish between the initial perception and any immediately subsequent integration/contemplation/reflection that may happen in the first second or two after the perception. I would argue that it may never be possible to draw a clear line, at least when talking about anything that has reached the level of conscious awareness. My view of the fundamental nature of conscious awareness does not seem compatible with any clear line between conscious sensation and conscious perception. I haven't read Dennett, but maybe this is similar to what he is getting at.

Edit: Almost forgot. Memory, especially short-term, plays a critical role here. My most immediate perception should "fit" with all of the perceptions that occurred over the past few seconds. I imagine that the initial neural processing which attempts to ground the stimuli and integrate it with the brain's acquired conceptual framework is also seeking to preserve "continuity". I think we all have experienced the jarring and sometimes unpleasant effect of when that process goes astray.

Re: Five decades of majestic failure to explain consciousness

#70
post #69

Earlier quoted context omitted.

But that's a different problem.

It doesn't explain whether the neuronal firings cause the subjective experience or visa versa.

Why can't they be the same thing? All my experience is processed information (see my other comment in this thread about qualia [1]); information processing requires hardware; the hardware is the brain. My report of my experiences is itself changes in a pattern of neuronal activity which is determined by changes in what it and other patterns are doing. I say 'changes' to emphasise that the precise medium I'm running on is not fundamentally important and I cannot perceive it (the neurons) without the aid of a brain scanner. In principle I could be scanned and modelled by a brain scientist whose 3rd person description of what's going on exactly matches my 1st person description. Would that convince you?

[1] though I didn't mention it there, a quale can't usually be pinned down exactly because most of the associated ideas are inexplicit (cannot be reduced to propositions in English). I think this is why people consider their experiences to be ineffable in some way. Daniel Dennett's talk on Edge.org provides a discussion ("A Difference That Makes a Difference", Nov 2017)

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