Kaspersky: The Russian Company That Is a Danger to Our Security • Hacker News Board

Re: Kaspersky: The Russian Company That Is a Danger to Our Security

#61

Post by monochromatic » Tue, Sep 05, 2017, 5:09 PM UTC

ScottBurson wrote: post #53

junkculture wrote: post #38

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The first I've heard of this. Any citations?

Well, you could start here: [0] [0] http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_slatest/2017/09/01/did_russia...

Attempted hacking by maybe Russians. And:

> The New York Times reporters acknowledge that it is uncertain whether the problems were caused by Kremlin-directed hacking or a more innocuous mishap like software malfunctions or human error. Furthermore, an NSA analysis was unable to determine if the Russian hackers were successful in compromising the election vendors or what specific data had been accessed.

I need a little more than that before I get all riled up about the Red Scare.

Re: Kaspersky: The Russian Company That Is a Danger to Our Security

#62

Post by bayesian_horse » Sat, Sep 09, 2017, 5:38 PM UTC

0xbear wrote: post #45

bayesian_horse wrote: post #19

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Leakers, and the ensuing discussion and spread of the leaked information, is part of the western culture of transparency. Of course government agencies don't want to expose their secrets voluntarily. They have to be dragged into the open kicking and screaming. Doesn't mean that they aren't, though.

It's so much part of a "culture" that one of the leakers is only safe in Russia, another spent five years in solitary confinement, and yet another is holed up in an embassy to avoid extraordinary rendition. Some "culture" there.

Julian Assange is no leaker. He doesn't even have a good reason to pretend he is being persecuted.

Re: Kaspersky: The Russian Company That Is a Danger to Our Security

#63

Post by bayesian_horse » Sat, Sep 09, 2017, 5:41 PM UTC

UnoriginalGuy wrote: post #27

bayesian_horse wrote: post #22

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The difference is that there is a process in place with court oversight, and a judicial system which isn't completely beholden to the government. Even with the most egregious abuses of these National Security Letters, their scope is still limited and they have to have justification for whatever they demand. There is a record of such letters, which can be examined, for example by politicians in congress or the next ad…

> The difference is that there is a process in place with court oversight You mean the FISA Court that Russ Tice once described as a "kangaroo court with a rubber stamp" and that approves over 99% of applications? Is that 1% rejection rate in a closed door court where due process lives?

1% could also mean that the people trying to get the warrants know the law and don't try to get bad warrants.

Still that is a whole lot more "due process" than in Russia. And FISA only applies in relatively few circumstances.

Re: Kaspersky: The Russian Company That Is a Danger to Our Security

#64

Post by bayesian_horse » Sat, Sep 09, 2017, 5:45 PM UTC

agarden wrote: post #58

bayesian_horse wrote: post #15

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You really don't need FSB moles if the property and even personal survival of the CEO is in the hands of an authocratic regime. No Russian citizen in Russia, especially not anyone with any kind of wealth, can deny the government's requests. Whether the influence on Kasperky is from the top or only starts further down the chain, is more of a stylistic aspect of handling intelligence assets...

This, too, is not unique to Russia. Joseph Nacchio was CEO of Qwest[1] when he refused to hand things over to the NSA. Lucrative government contracts were then dropped, Qwest's earnings took a hit, and Nacchio was subsequently prosecuted for insider trading. As I understand it, the accusation was that he knew they were not going to meet their earnings forecast and his contention is that he did not because the governm…

That seems to be a rather particular case, of which the details are not publicly known. It could easily be that the NSA had a particularly good reason to withdraw the contracts, and obviously the company didn't have a right to these contracts in the first place, or the NSA wouldn't have been able to stop them.

On the other hand, the NSA is not controlled by the government, at least not to the level of individual prosecutions, investigations or contracts.