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Improved Authentication for Email Encryption and Security

protonmail.com

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Re: Improved Authentication for Email Encryption and Security

#61

Post by sleepingeights »

smnscu wrote: post #33

We had this at Lavaboom (German encrypted email, bankrupt) 2 years ago. Our designer came up with this idea, I initially wanted to implement the classic 2 password design. The tricky bits are (1) explaining to the users that they can't reset their password and (2) supporting users who opt for manual key management (e.g. I own name@mydomain.com and I want to move from Google Apps + GPGtools to Lavaboom/Protonmail/etc)…

With as many SHA1/SHA256 etc ASICs, hopefully they change some of the hashing parameters to make this secure. The downside is the server has to match the hashing iterations.

Considering how emails can stay in service storage for decades , (even longer if archived by spies, etc), their security is now reaching the requirements of data on Hard Drives.

Re: Improved Authentication for Email Encryption and Security

#62

Post by sleepingeights »

polack wrote: post #4

So how does one migrate from the two password to the one? I like the idea of protonmail, but since they made it incompatible with normal public key encrypted mail it's pretty useless for many of us, unfortunately...

Email is becoming obsolete, and today's generations are using messaging apps which also provide PFS (fwd secrecy). PGP et. al. don't provide any of that.

Today's messaging services (Signal, Wire, Telegram, etc...) outpace email by a significant margin.

Re: Improved Authentication for Email Encryption and Security

#63

Post by LeoPanthera »

hobarrera wrote: post #34
vabmit wrote: post #25

Earlier quoted context omitted.

IMAP support is coming very soon. Engineers are working on the code, now. It's a more difficult task than people would imagine because the implementations of the IMAP standards by some clients (like Outlook) is a bit... "interesting".

How would this IMAP implementation work? Some kind of local proxy that does the decryption on-the-fly?

Since they use GPG internally I would imagine it simply presents GPG-encrypted mail to you and relies on the client having GPG support.

Re: Improved Authentication for Email Encryption and Security

#64

Post by LeoPanthera »

piotrjurkiewicz wrote: post #45

It should be reminded that emails exchanged between Protonmail and any recipient who use ordinary email server are not secure. In order to achieve security you have to mail with other Protonmail user or use PGP.

They have an option to send a secure email to "normal" email addresses which works by sending them an https link to click. You must have a pre-arranged password with the other person for this to work, but it is possible.

Re: Improved Authentication for Email Encryption and Security

#65

Post by jimktrains2 »

bartbutler wrote: post #51
jimktrains2 wrote: post #39

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> Nobody says it's different They why do all the extra work for no gain in security? I think the sibling comment address your next comment well.

There's a difference between an active attacker and a passive MITM attacker. Doing this for the web app in addition to the native apps helps prevent a passive MITM attack from stealing login credentials.

A mitm is an active attacker. If TLS fails, then the mitm could modify the code sent to the end user.

Re: Improved Authentication for Email Encryption and Security

#66

Post by thelittleone »

ShinyCyril wrote: post #10
Wonnk13 wrote: post #3

how practical is it to drop GMail for these guys? I'm tied fairly heavily to the Google ecosystem (Chome, Play, Finance, etc etc). They already have a mountain of data on me, but I really want to start taking encryption and privacy more seriously.

I didn't miss anything when I left Gmail, but I imagine it depends a lot on how you use email. I switched to Fastmail on my own domain and actually prefer the webmail interface over Gmail. I mainly use IMAP via Mail.app on my laptop and phone, Pantheon Mail (formerly Geary) on my desktop. I use PGP wherever I can. I haven't received any spam at all yet, so I can't comment on how their spam filters compare to Gmail. I…

For others interested in Gmail -> Fastmail, Fastmail also has an inbuilt IMAP migration tool:

https://www.fastmail.com/help/receive/migratemail.html

Re: Improved Authentication for Email Encryption and Security

#67

Post by kimburgess »

ShinyCyril wrote: post #10
Wonnk13 wrote: post #3

how practical is it to drop GMail for these guys? I'm tied fairly heavily to the Google ecosystem (Chome, Play, Finance, etc etc). They already have a mountain of data on me, but I really want to start taking encryption and privacy more seriously.

I didn't miss anything when I left Gmail, but I imagine it depends a lot on how you use email. I switched to Fastmail on my own domain and actually prefer the webmail interface over Gmail. I mainly use IMAP via Mail.app on my laptop and phone, Pantheon Mail (formerly Geary) on my desktop. I use PGP wherever I can. I haven't received any spam at all yet, so I can't comment on how their spam filters compare to Gmail. I…

I've recently made a similar switch to a few of my 'core' services. Aside from a strong privacy bent, one of my core requirements has been to lessen my dependency on US based companies and infrastructure.

One the search front, I've been finding https://www.startpage.com/ to be a really nice alternative to DDG.

Re: Improved Authentication for Email Encryption and Security

#68

Post by bartbutler »

jimktrains2 wrote: post #65
bartbutler wrote: post #51

Earlier quoted context omitted.

There's a difference between an active attacker and a passive MITM attacker. Doing this for the web app in addition to the native apps helps prevent a passive MITM attack from stealing login credentials.

A mitm is an active attacker. If TLS fails, then the mitm could modify the code sent to the end user.

That's a limited definition of MITM. That would be an active attack, and yes, this does nothing for that for the web app--the native apps are a different story. However, there are plenty of corporate PCs and other machines with root certs installed in a way that a third party could, and often does, passively record traffic without modification for analysis later. SRP prevents those dumps from containing information that can be used to compromise an account.

Re: Improved Authentication for Email Encryption and Security

#69

Post by Whitestrake »

thelittleone wrote: post #66
ShinyCyril wrote: post #10

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I didn't miss anything when I left Gmail, but I imagine it depends a lot on how you use email. I switched to Fastmail on my own domain and actually prefer the webmail interface over Gmail. I mainly use IMAP via Mail.app on my laptop and phone, Pantheon Mail (formerly Geary) on my desktop. I use PGP wherever I can. I haven't received any spam at all yet, so I can't comment on how their spam filters compare to Gmail. I…

For others interested in Gmail -> Fastmail, Fastmail also has an inbuilt IMAP migration tool: https://www.fastmail.com/help/receive/migratemail.html

During my migration from GApps (prior to G Suite), I used this tool. I performed an initial migration before changing my MX records, then followed up a few days later with a second (partial) migration to pick up a few slackers.

I found the tool to be fast, comprehensive, and the partial migration was very effective.

Re: Improved Authentication for Email Encryption and Security

#70

Post by someguydave »

nickpsecurity wrote: post #54
mark_l_watson wrote: post #28

"In ProtonMail’s one-password mode, the mailbox password is derived from the login password via a one-way cryptographic password hash." I wondered why they didn't do this. As a customer, this is a welcome change. One thing that is of general concern to me: I tend to use a lot of encrypted traffic because much of my work is done on SSH shells to servers, and some of my customers request encrypting work files and use V…

"What our government should do is a moon-shot level of effort to promote strong encryption and very robust digital infrastructure." They did. It was called the Computer Security Initiative. It was the culmination of efforts starting with Anderson Report that collectively invented INFOSEC and deployed high-assurance versions. Early releases were secure messaging, the BLACKER VPN, MLS endpoints, private databases, and…

The failure of USG to fund secure alternatives to existing computer hardware and software is a black mark. I do not think it will be judged well by future historians of this era.
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