Also: it's 2016. Why is this using PBKDF2? If PBKDF2 is what you've got and you're protecting a website, that's fine, but this is a password manager.
Is the "commercial" version of this also Ruby code wrapping OpenSSL?
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Also: it's 2016. Why is this using PBKDF2? If PBKDF2 is what you've got and you're protecting a website, that's fine, but this is a password manager.
Is the "commercial" version of this also Ruby code wrapping OpenSSL?
As I see it, the main benefit of deterministic password generation is the convenience of not needing a password database. Indeed, if the scheme is simple and/or portable enough (e.g., PBKDF2) you can implement it from scratch in a minute or two, depending on what software you have handy. The convenience breaks down as you need to maintain additional state: password rotation, site-specific password rules, etc. Forgiva…
>> Spamming the input with an array of whatever OpenSSL algorithms Ruby happens to make available, rather than using a memory hard KDF like scrypt, is a bad smell. Sooner or later key-derivation schemes gets outdated and requires a better version as happened to bcrypt [1] and will happen to scrypt [2]. It is not "whatever OpenSSL provides" but just combining strong algorithms over to spread the "getting outdated" ris…
I'm reading the open source code and this thing is... odd. For instance: it has a "simple", "intermediate", and "advanced" password complexity, and depending on which you choose, it uses SHA1, SHA2-256, and SHA2-512 for the PBKDF2 hash. What does password complexity have to do with the strength of the algorithm used to generate passwords? Also: it's 2016. Why is this using PBKDF2? If PBKDF2 is what you've got and you…
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NC licenses aren't considered "Open Source": http://www.opensource.org/docs/osd
Interesting, but then what do you call something who's source is available to be viewed?
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What happens then if you want/need to rotate your password? How does it deal with stupid password format restrictions?
the salt gets changed so, either password database + master password gets stolen, or salt database + master password gets stolen
Throwing passwords at a salt db gets you... what?
How does this handle changing passwords? How can I know from the master secret that xyz.com is on the 4th password?
I'm reading the open source code and this thing is... odd. For instance: it has a "simple", "intermediate", and "advanced" password complexity, and depending on which you choose, it uses SHA1, SHA2-256, and SHA2-512 for the PBKDF2 hash. What does password complexity have to do with the strength of the algorithm used to generate passwords? Also: it's 2016. Why is this using PBKDF2? If PBKDF2 is what you've got and you…
It would be better to use more hashing rounds as changing the algorithm itself doesn't require more computational effort from the attacker.
Fortunately, Colin Percival came up with a much better solution in scrypt. It's a nice default if you want something battle-tested for a long time. Nobody should be using SHA-1, etc with solutions like scrypt available.
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And if you go that path, "theoretically" an attacker might simply guess your password on the first try when attempting to log in as you, so password "storages" and "brute-force" has nothing to do it.
You are mistaken on one think: it is not just being it "theoretically" possible but likeliness -or hardness- of it. If the possibility of an attacker guessing my password at first try is one in a billion -or trillion- chance, then we can say it pretty secure. But hacking a cloud with a possible zero-day flaw and cracking a password database is not that hard if we compare it with your example.
> all encryption methods prone to brute-force attacks
The chance of succeeding within our lifetime with a brute-force attack against modern encryption is far less than one in a trillion. So in your words, it is far better than "pretty secure".
Consider proof-reading the website: I wouldn't trust someone to do my crypto who can't spell the basics.
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It would be better to use more hashing rounds as changing the algorithm itself doesn't require more computational effort from the attacker.
I argued with that since cryptographers first told me about it. Ludicrous concept. The goal is to eliminate brute force attacks by making the process inherently slow. That technique starts with something inherently ultra-fast that everyone is trying to speed up and hardware accelerate then iterates it a bit. Better concept to get a slow process is design an algorithm that is inherently slow and hard to speed up, esp…