Speaking as an infosec guy myself, I'd dearly love to see the TrustedBSD MAC Framework or the Audit Implementation (OpenBSM) being used by default. I'm surprised the author didn't mention it.
FreeBSD – a lesson in poor defaults
61–67 of 67 posts
Re: FreeBSD – a lesson in poor defaults
#62Earlier quoted context omitted.
I've never seen or expected to see "limit yourself to one processor for better security" as actual advice. Maybe this is sarcasm that I'm misreading?
Not at all, SMP opens a huge can of worms both for userland and kernel security. Suddenly you have all sorts of weird race conditions to deal with and in some kernels ( cough XNU) logic bugs that stem directly from how kernel subsystems interact with threads. I don't blame OpenBSD for not going down that route.
Re: FreeBSD – a lesson in poor defaults
#63Earlier quoted context omitted.
I've never seen or expected to see "limit yourself to one processor for better security" as actual advice. Maybe this is sarcasm that I'm misreading?
OpenBSD supports multiple cores fine as far as userland goes. If you have 8 cores and start 20 userland processes, they'll be scheduled on all 8 cores. But yes, the kernel itself is not as fine-grain multithreaded as some others. Whether that matters depends on whether waiting on the kernel turns out to be a bottleneck for your workload.
Re: FreeBSD – a lesson in poor defaults
#64Earlier quoted context omitted.
And let's not forget that OpenBSD doesn't make use of modern hardware as well as Linux and FreeBSD or DragonflyBSD. SMP incompleteness is one of the issues.
Given the focus on security, don't expect to see SMP anytime soon if ever. It's a huge source of potential security bugs and attacks on the kernel.
Re: FreeBSD – a lesson in poor defaults
#65A lot of good points, but several ignorant ones, too (what's wrong with tcp_wrappers or PAM? also OpenNTPD is _not_ a drop-in replacement for ntpd). And if the author is someone coming from OpenBSD, they ought to know at least something of the history behind IPFilter, as it is the raison d'etre for OpenBSD's pf. Speaking as an infosec guy myself, I'd dearly love to see the TrustedBSD MAC Framework or the Audit Implem…
(this would attenuate many of the OP's complaints)
Re: FreeBSD – a lesson in poor defaults
#66Earlier quoted context omitted.
So the guy is talking utter nonsense and you'd rather not "feed the trolls" so to speak? Genuine q, security isn't my speciality
It's not all utter nonsense. Some things fall into the category of "we can't change this overnight because we have users, but it will be changing in the future".
Re: FreeBSD – a lesson in poor defaults
#67It seems that a lot f the issues the author has they can fix by moving over to OpenBSD. I'd be curious to hear what makes them stick with FreeBSD instead considering the complaint.
I'm not the OP but OpenBSD is missing some pretty key features. My reasons to use FreeBSD over OpenBSD are: - Virtualization (jails, bhyve) - Filesystems (ZFS) - beadm (which requires ZFS) - Linuxulator Which really is a shame because philosophically I think I'd prefer the OpenBSD camp
I have not used beadm though - what's the kicker?