Earlier quoted context omitted.
As someone who’s fairly tech-literate but has a big blind spot in cryptography, I’d love to hear any suggestions you have for articles, blog posts, or smaller books on the topic! My (rudimentary, layman) understanding is that encryption is almost like a last line of defense and should never be assumed to be unbreakable. You sound both very knowledgeable on the topic, and very confident in the safety of modern encrypt…
Whew, that's actually a hard one! It's been long enough since I was getting into it that I'm not really sure what's the best present path on it. In terms of books, JP Aumasson's "Serious Cryptography" got a 2nd edition not too long ago and the first edition was good. Katz & Lindell's "Modern Cryptography" and Hoffstein's "Introduction to Mathematical Cryptography" are both standard texts that I think a lot of courses…
Fire destroys S. Korean government's cloud storage system, no backups available
591–600 of 987 posts
Re: Fire destroys S. Korean government's cloud storage system, no backups available
#592Re: Fire destroys S. Korean government's cloud storage system, no backups available
#593Article comments aside, it is entirely unclear to me whether or not there was no backups. Certainly no "external" backups, but potentially "internal" backups. My thinking is that not actually allowing backups and forcing all data there creates a prime target for the PRK folks right? I've been in low level national defense meetings about security where things like "you cannot backup off site" are discussed but there a…
Re: Fire destroys S. Korean government's cloud storage system, no backups available
#594Earlier quoted context omitted.
First of all, you cannot do much if you keep all the data encrypted on the cloud (basically just backing things up, and hope you don't have to fetch it given the egress cost). Also, availability is exactly the kind of issue that a fire cause…
Yeah backups would’ve been totally useless in this case. All South Korea could’ve done is restore their data from the backups and avoid data loss.
You don't need the Cloud for backups, and there's no reason to believe that they would have backuped their data while using the cloud more than what they did with their self-hosting…
Re: Fire destroys S. Korean government's cloud storage system, no backups available
#595Earlier quoted context omitted.
Link? Am both curious and skeptical
Seagate Expansion drives are in this price range and can be shucked. They're not enterprise drives meant for constant operation, the big ones are Barracudas or maybe Exos, but for homelab NAS they're very popular.
If you use such consumer drives, I strongly suggest to make occasional offsite backups of large mostly static files (movies for most people I guess), and frequent backups of more volatile directories to an offsite place, maybe encrypted in the cloud.
Re: Fire destroys S. Korean government's cloud storage system, no backups available
#596Goodness, I have over 100TB at home and it cost less than a two or three thousand dollars to put in place. That's like $25 per TB. > The stored data amounts to 858TB (terabytes), equivalent to 449.5 billion A4 sheets. No, the 858TB amounts to under $25k for the government of the 10th largest economy, of one of the most sophisticated countries on the planet, to put in place. Two of those would be less than the price o…
Re: Fire destroys S. Korean government's cloud storage system, no backups available
#597Earlier quoted context omitted.
> The government official who insisted that commercial AWS/GCP/Azure couldn't possibly be trusted with keeping the information They were still right though: it's absolutely clear without an ounce of doubt that whatever you put on an US cloud is being accessible by the US government, who can also decide to sanction you and deprive you from your ability to access the data yourself. Not having backups is entirely retard…
The U.S. Government can’t decrypt data for which it does not possess the key (assuming the encryption used is good).
Also, it's much easier for an intelligence service to get the hand on a 1kB encryption key than on a PB of data: the former is much easier to exfiltrate without being noticed.
And then I don't know why you bring encryption here: pretty much none of the use-case for using a cloud allow for fully encrypted data. (The only one that does is storing encrypted backups on the cloud, but the issue here is that the operator didn't do backups in the first place…)
Re: Fire destroys S. Korean government's cloud storage system, no backups available
#598The government official who insisted that commercial AWS/GCP/Azure couldn't possibly be trusted with keeping the information will be keeping their head low for a few days then... "The Interior Ministry explained that while most systems at the Daejeon data center are backed up daily to separate equipment within the same center and to a physically remote backup facility, the G-Drive’s structure did not allow for extern…
The issue here is not refusing to use a foreign third party. That makes sense. The issue is mandating the use of remote storage and not backing it up. That’s insane. It’s like the most basic amount of preparation you do. It’s recommended to even the smallest of companies specifically because a fire is a risk. That’s gross mismanagement.
Re: Fire destroys S. Korean government's cloud storage system, no backups available
#599Earlier quoted context omitted.
My mind initially went to a government cover-up, but then: > 27th of September 2025, The fire is believed to have been caused while replacing Lithium-ion batteries. The batteries were manufactured by LG, the parent company of LG Uplus (the one that got hacked by the APT). Could the battery firmware have been sabotaged by the hacker to start the fire?
this was a plot in a Mr. Robot episode, heh. Life imitating art?
Re: Fire destroys S. Korean government's cloud storage system, no backups available
#600Earlier quoted context omitted.
The operational expenses of this stuff dwarfs the hardware cost. For the tape mountain, you need robots to confirm the tapes still work (mean time to detection of device failure and recovery are key for RAID durability computations). So, someone needs to constantly repair the robots or whatever. If I was being paid to manage that data set, I’d probably find two enterprise storage vendors, and stick two copies of the…
even with dual vendors, you'd have to still put in place a backup/restore procedures (with the associated software, which may need to be custom). Then you'd need regular testing. These operational concerns will basically double the cost yearly, probably.