Nightshade: An offensive tool for artists against AI art generators

I see the dark arts of rhetoric used here, and it is shameful. The portion I quoted above is incredibly confused. I would almost call it a straw man, but it is worse than that.

Copyright law says no such thing. Of course you _could_ copy something. Copyright law exists precisely because you can do that. The law says i.e. "if you break copyright law, you will be at risk of a sufficiently motivated prosecutor."

## "Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law" by Stewart E. Sterk

Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. https://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article...

> Why give authors an exclusive right to their writings? Copyright rhetoric generally offers two answers. The first is instrumental: copyright provides an incentive for authors to create and disseminate works of social value. By giving authors a monopoly over their works, copyright corrects for the underincentive to create that might result if free riders were permitted to share in the value created by an author's efforts. The second answer is desert: copyright rewards authors, who simply deserve recompense for their contributions whether or not recompense would induce them to engage in creative activity.

> The rhetoric evokes sympathetic images of the author at work. The instrumental justification for copyright paints a picture of an author struggling to avoid abandoning his calling in order to feed his family. By contrast, the desert justification conjures up a genius irrevocably committed to his work, resigned - or oblivious - to living conditions not commensurate with his social contributions. The two images have a common thread: extending the scope of copyright protection relieves the author's plight.

> Indeed, the same rhetoric· - emphasizing both incentives and desert - consistently has been invoked to justify two centuries of copyright expansion. Unfortunately, however, the rhetoric captures only a small slice of contemporary copyright reality. Although some copyright protection indeed may be necessary to induce creative activity, copyright doctrine now extends well beyond the contours of the instrumental justification. ...

## "Copyright Nonconsequentialism" by David McGowan

Missouri Law Review. https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?art...

> This Article explores the foundations of copyright law. It tries to explain why those who debate copyright often seem to talk past each other. I contend the problem is that copyright scholars pay too much attention to instrumental arguments, which are often indeterminate, and too little to the first principles that affect how one approaches copyright law.

> Most arguments about copyright law use instrumental language to make consequentialist arguments. It is common for scholars to contend one or another rule will advance or impede innovation, the efficient allocation and production of expression, personal autonomy, consumer welfare, the "robustness" of public debate, and so on.' Most of these instrumental arguments, though not quite all of them, reduce to propositions that cannot be tested or rejected empirically. Such propositions therefore cannot explain existing doctrine or the positions taken in debate.

> These positions vary widely. Consumer advocates favor broad fair use rights and narrow liability standards for contributory infiringement; producer advocates favor the reverse.' Most of the arguments for both consumers and producers prove too much. It is easy to say that the right to exclude is needed to provide incentives for authors. It is hard to show that any particular rules provide optimal incentives. It is easy to point to deviations from the model of perfect competition. It is hard to show why these deviations imply particular rules.

> ...

> [Nation editor Victor Navasky] hastily put together what he believed was "a real hot news story" composed of quotes, paraphrases, and facts drawn exclusively from the manuscript. Mr. Navasky attempted no independent commentary, research or criticism, in part because of the need for speed if he was to "make news" by "publish[ing] in advance of publication of the Ford book." [...] The Nation effectively arrogated to itself the right of first publication, an important marketable subsidiary right.

The Nation lost this case in large part because it was not a review, but instead an attempt to beat Time Magazine's article that was supposed to be an exclusive first serial right. If it had, in fact, just been a review, there wouldn't have been a case here, because it wouldn't have been stealing.

Anyway, I don't think you're going to be convinced you're interpreting this wrongly, and I don't think I'm going to be convinced I'm interpreting it wrongly. But I am going to say, with absolute confidence, that you're simply not going to find many cases of reviewers being sued for reviews -- which Harper & Row vs. Nation is, again, not actually an example of -- and you're going to find even fewer cases of that being successful. Why am I so confident about that? Well, I am not a lawyer, but I am a published author, and I am going to let you in a little secret here: both publishers and authors do, in fact, want their work to be reviewed, and suing reviewers for literally doing what we want is counterproductive. :)