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Microsoft gave FBI set of BitLocker encryption keys to unlock suspects' laptops

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Re: Microsoft gave FBI set of BitLocker encryption keys to unlock suspects' laptops

#561

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> "Apple lies about a fundamental security practice consistently and with malice" Uploading passwords to the cloud should count. Also this: https://sneak.berlin/20231005/apple-operating-system-surveil...

That link you provided is a "conspiracy theory," even by the author's own admission. That article is also outdated; OCSP is as dead as a doornail (no doubt in part because it could be used for surveillance) and they fixed the cleartext transmission of hardware identifiers. Are you expecting perfection here? Or are you just being argumentative?

> That link you provided is a "conspiracy theory," even by the author's own admission.

"Conspiracy theory" is not the same as a crazy, crackhead theory. See: Endward Snowden.

Full quote from the article:

> Mind you, this is definitionally a conspiracy theory; please don’t let the connotations of that phrase bias you, but please feel free to read this (and everything else on the internet) as critically as you wish.

> and they fixed the cleartext transmission of hardware identifiers

Have you got any links for that?

> Are you expecting perfection here? Or are you just being argumentative?

I expect basic things people should expect from a company promoting themselves as respecting privacy. And I don't expect them to be much worse than GNU/Linux in that respect (but they definitely are).

Re: Microsoft gave FBI set of BitLocker encryption keys to unlock suspects' laptops

#562
post #300

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Of course. But I suppose you run Teams on a company provided/managed, or at least paid for by the company, device? Just don’t use that machine for anything private. Is anyone using their private devices for work? (Also there is teams for Linux and on the web, if that is not prevented by the policy of your org.)

In the startup world, BYOD is/was exceedingly common. All but two jobs of my career were happy to allow me to use my own Linux laptop and eschew whatever they were otherwise going to give me. Obviously enterprises aren’t commonly BYOD shops, but SMBs and startups certainly can be. … whether the people who would do such BYOD things are at all likely to be Windows users who care about this Bitlocker issue, is a differe…

I know BYOD was common (although getting a fully specced MacBook Pro was often one of the “perks”), but typically you did get (some) budget or reimbursement for using your own device. So in a sense the company was paying for your device which allows you to buy a dedicated machine.

I also notice that it helps in segmenting in the brain to use separate devices for private and business use.

Re: Microsoft gave FBI set of BitLocker encryption keys to unlock suspects' laptops

#563
post #5

FYI BitLocker is on by default in Windows 11. The defaults will also upload the BitLocker key to a Microsoft Account if available. This is why the FBI can compel Microsoft to provide the keys. It's possible, perhaps even likely, that the suspect didn't even know they had an encrypted laptop. Journalists love the "Microsoft gave " framing because it makes Microsoft sound like they're handing these out because they lik…

The "Microsoft gave" framing is the exact right wording!, because Microsoft should never have had these keys in the first place. This is a compromise on security that sidesteps back doors on the low level and essentially transforms all Windows installations into Clipper-chip products.

Re: Microsoft gave FBI set of BitLocker encryption keys to unlock suspects' laptops

#564
I see a lot of comments recommending TrueCrypt/VeraCrypt here, which is fine, but did you know there is something even more interesting? ;)

Shufflecake ( https://shufflecake.net/ ) is a "spiritual successor" to TrueCrypt/VeraCrypt but vastly improved: works at the block device level, supports any filesystem of choice, can manage many nested layers of secrecy concurrently in read/write, comes with a formal proof of security, and is blazing fast (so much, in fact, that exceeds performances of LUKS/dm-crypt/VeraCrypt in many scenarios, including SSD use).

Disclaimer: it is still a proof of concept, only runs on Linux, has no security audit yet. But there is a prototype for the "Holy Grail" of plausible deniability on the near future roadmap: a fully hidden Linux OS (boots a different Linux distro or Qubes container set depending on the password inserted at boot). Stay tuned!

Re: Microsoft gave FBI set of BitLocker encryption keys to unlock suspects' laptops

#565
post #396

Earlier quoted context omitted.

People really pay too little attention to this attack avenue. It's both extremely convenient and very unlikely to be detected; especially given that most current systems are associated to an account. I'd be surprised if it's not widely used by law enforcement, when it's not possible to hack a device in more obvious ways. Please check theupdateframework.io if you have a say in an update system.

Isn't it the same with many Linux distros? Updates are using root to run?

Not really, but it's quite complex for Linux because there are so many ways one can manage the configuration of a Linux environment. For something high security, I'd recommend something like Gentoo or NixOS because they have several huge advantages:

- They're easy to setup and maintain immutable and reproducible builds.

- You only install the software you need, and even within each software item, you only build/install the specific features you need. For example, if you are building a server that will sit in a datacentre, you don't need to build software with Bluetooth support, and by extension, you won't need to install Bluetooth utilities and libraries.

- Both have a monolithic Git repository for packages, which is advantageous because you gain the benefit of a giant distributed Merkle tree for verifying you have the same packages everyone else has. As observed with xz-utils, you want a supply chain attacker to be forced to infect as many people as possible so more people are likely to detect it.

- Sandboxing is used to minimise the lines of code during build/install which need to have any sort of privileges. Most packages are built and configured as "nobody" in an isolated sandbox, then a privileged process outside of the sandbox peeks inside to copy out whatever the package ended up installing. Obviously the outside process also performs checks such as preventing cool-new-free-game from overwriting /usr/bin/sudo.

- The time between a patch hitting an upstream repository and that patch being part of a package installed in these distributions is fast. This is important at the moment because there are many efforts underway to replace and rewrite old insecure software with modern secure equivalents, so you want to be using software with a modern design, not just 5 year old long-term-support software. E.g. glycin is a relatively new library used by GNOME applications for loading of untrusted images. You don't want to be waiting 3 years for a new long-support-support release of your distribution for this software.

No matter which distribution you use, you'll get some common benefits such as:

- Ability to deploy user applications using something like Flatpak which ensures they are used within a sandbox.

- Ability to deploy system applications using something like systemd which ensures they are used within a sandbox.

Microsoft have long underinvested in Windows (particularly the kernel), and have made numerous poor and failed attempts to introduce secure application packaging/sandboxing over the years. Windows is now akin to the horse and buggy when compared to the flying cars of open source Linux, iOS, Android and HarmonyOS (v5+ in particular which uses the HongMeng kernel that is even EAL6+, ASIL D and SIL 3 rated).

Re: Microsoft gave FBI set of BitLocker encryption keys to unlock suspects' laptops

#566
post #20

This is by far one of the best advertisements for LUKS/VeraCrypt I've ever seen.

Sadly VeraCrypt is not optimized for SSDs and has a massive performance impact compared to Bitlocker for full disk encryption because the SSD doesn't know what space is used/free with VeraCrypt.

Forgive me this shameless ad :) with the latest performance updates, Shufflecake ( https://shufflecake.net/ ) is blazing fast (so much, in fact, that exceeds performances of LUKS/dm-crypt/VeraCrypt in many scenarios, including SSD use.

Re: Microsoft gave FBI set of BitLocker encryption keys to unlock suspects' laptops

#567

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Lenovo T and X series are excellent and cheap as dirt used. There is also System 76. Or you could get a MacBook and boot Linux on that. Some older ones work well, I hear.

> Or you could get a MacBook and boot Linux on that. Some older ones work well, I hear. Is linux support on the M1/M2 models as good as linux support on x86 laptops? My understanding was that there's still a fair bit of hardware that isn't fully supported. Like, external displays and Bluetooth.

https://asahilinux.org/fedora/#device-support

Or more detailed results at:

https://asahilinux.org/docs/platform/feature-support/overvie...

Re: Microsoft gave FBI set of BitLocker encryption keys to unlock suspects' laptops

#568
post #235
post #205

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Why would you need to create a local account? You can just not choose to store the keys in your Microsoft account during BitLocker setup: https://www.diskpart.com/screenshot/en/others/windows-11/win... Admittedly, the risks of choosing this option are not clearly laid out, but the way you are framing it also isn't accurate

All "Global Reader" accounts have "microsoft.directory/bitlockerKeys/key/read" permission. Whether you opt in, or not, if you connect your account to Microsoft, then they do have the ability fetch the bitlocker key, if the account is not local only. [0] Global Reader is builtin to everything +365. [0] https://github.com/MicrosoftDocs/entra-docs/commit/2364d8da9...

What do Entra role permissions have to do with Microsoft's ability to turn over data in its possession to law enforcement in response to a court order?

Re: Microsoft gave FBI set of BitLocker encryption keys to unlock suspects' laptops

#569
post #461

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It's a good start, but FDE alone is still fairly easy to compromise in many cases. If you ever type the password under a camera, it may be leaked. If the device ever leaves your possession and you don't have secure boot, your bootloader can be trivially altered to leak the password. Then there are keyloggers. And cold boot attacks can often be done if your system is running.

And finally-- there are other more "traditional" ways to get people to divulge their keys.

https://xkcd.com/538/

Re: Microsoft gave FBI set of BitLocker encryption keys to unlock suspects' laptops

#570
post #318

Earlier quoted context omitted.

And you can be sure it didn’t add a ‘recovery’ key, how?

Using the same CLI, which shows all the alternative "protectors".

Again, that is a lot of trust since it could trivially just… not show it. Which is already the default for most FDE systems for intermediate/system managed keys.
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