Now consider that your average Linux distribution pulls in tens of thousands of packages, each of which can be similarly compromised. Pretty scary to think about.
Backdoor in upstream xz/liblzma leading to SSH server compromise
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Re: Backdoor in upstream xz/liblzma leading to SSH server compromise
#562Candidly how would someone protect against a vulnerability like this?
Compile all your packages from source would be a start.
Re: Backdoor in upstream xz/liblzma leading to SSH server compromise
#563Very annoying - the apparent author of the backdoor was in communication with me over several weeks trying to get xz 5.6.x added to Fedora 40 & 41 because of it's "great new features". We even worked with him to fix the valgrind issue (which it turns out now was caused by the backdoor he had added). We had to race last night to fix the problem after an inadvertent break of the embargo. He has been part of the xz proj…
because of it's "great new features" "great" for whom? I've seen enough of the industry to immediately feel suspicious when someone uses that sort of phrasing in an attempt to persuade me. It's no different from claiming a "better experience" or similar.
Re: Backdoor in upstream xz/liblzma leading to SSH server compromise
#564Re: Backdoor in upstream xz/liblzma leading to SSH server compromise
#565Safety through obscurity and weirdness! If you disable ifunc, like any sensible person, this backdoor disables itself.
Re: Backdoor in upstream xz/liblzma leading to SSH server compromise
#566Earlier quoted context omitted.
And, Joey Hess has counted at least 750 commits to xz from that handle. https://hachyderm.io/@joeyh/112180715824680521 This does not look trust-inspiring. If the code is complex, there could be many more exploits hiding.
750 commits... is xz able to send e-mails yet?
Re: Backdoor in upstream xz/liblzma leading to SSH server compromise
#567Is there already a list of distributions that included the affected versions in non-prereelase channels?
Re: Backdoor in upstream xz/liblzma leading to SSH server compromise
#568pRoBaBlY a StaTe AcToR zero definition of what that means... egos of people who just like to say cool words they don't understand lol this comment will probably get deleted, but let the action of this comment being deleted stand that in 2024 we're all allowed to use big words with no definition of what they mean -> bad state actor? who? what motive? what country? all comments involving "state actor" are very broad an…
For example, the malicious code circumvents a hardening technique (RELRO) in a clever way, which would otherwise have blocked it from manipulating the sshd code in the same process space at runtime. This is not something that script kiddies usually cook up in an afternoon to make a quick buck. You need experts and a lot of time to pull off feats like that.
This points to an organization with excellent funding. I’m not surprised at all that people are attributing this to some unknown nation-level group.
Re: Backdoor in upstream xz/liblzma leading to SSH server compromise
#569Interesting commit in January where the actual OpenPGP key was changed: https://github.com/tukaani-project/tukaani-project.github.io...
Re: Backdoor in upstream xz/liblzma leading to SSH server compromise
#570Maybe it's finally time to start sunsetting LZMA and xz all together in favor of newer algorithms like Zstandard that also offer better performance but compression rates on par with LZMA.