Earlier quoted context omitted.
I’m saying it doesn’t matter how innocuous you try to make the patch when there are known bad actors directly evaluating every commit for “so did this close a vuln”, using both AI and human expertise. This is true no matter what, but the comment I’m replying to was also pitching that maintainers actively call out that the patch includes a high sev security fix: > for kernel maintainers to announce when a version cont…
I'm suggesting that less information about the vulnerability could be circulated than the current process, not more, due to distro maintainers being able to trust just "version X contains a fix for a high-impact security vulnerability" coming from a kernel maintainer - whereas they'll need some information/proof of that claim when coming from an outsider.
In the current model, attackers are actively looking at all commits as potential vulnerabilities, regardless of what anybody says or doesn’t say about them.
You can’t make the commits not exist, or not be visible, because that’s a core part of how the kernel is developed and released.
So anything you do with notifications to distro maintainers about the vuln, or the existence of a vuln, or a nudge to patch with no context, or whatever, is totally irrelevant and does not change the calculus: the moment the fix is committed, bad actors who were not already aware notice it.
This is, of course, to say nothing of bad actors who had already found the vulnerability on their own.