Earlier quoted context omitted.
Please don't rely on my judgement for this being safe for production, but after blacklisting the modules, the provided python exploit failed. Check if the following are modules grep CONFIG_CRYPTO_USER_API /boot/config-$(uname -r) If they are, you can try blacklisting them /etc/modprobe.d/blacklist-crypto-user-api.conf """ blacklist af_alg blacklist algif_hash blacklist algif_skcipher blacklist algif_rng blacklist alg…
over 500 servers with very varied workload i manage didn't had this module loaded so my guess is "near zero" also only algif_aead is vulnerable
Copy Fail
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Re: Copy Fail
#532Earlier quoted context omitted.
The lesson here being... compile your own kernel from git sources every few days? Give up entirely on non-virtualized container security? This is not sarcasm. I'd finally given in and started learning about docker/podman-style OCI containerization last week.
are you sure containerization would be more secure? this is also a rootless podman escape. the lesson here is to not give random people shell access to your systems.
I have amazing timing.
Re: Copy Fail
#533Re: Copy Fail
#534Re: Copy Fail
#535Earlier quoted context omitted.
I would absolutely expect a sysadmin in particular to know and understand the term and acronym.
It's still just courteous to define acronyms on first use, it doesn't take any real effort to do that.
Re: Copy Fail
#536Re: Copy Fail
#537Earlier quoted context omitted.
Is it built as a module in most distros?
It is built as a module in Debian. lsmod shows it is not loaded on any of the Trixie or Bookworm machines I have checked, Intel or AMD.
Re: Copy Fail
#538Earlier quoted context omitted.
> Dom0 (the admin Qube) is running the Linux kernel and is vulnerable Yes, it is vulnerable, except there is no attack vector, as you don't run any software there: https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/r4.3/user/downloading-installing... > DomU (App Qubes) also run the Linux kernel and are just as vulnerable. I think you misinterpret the Qubes approach to security. If you do everything in one VM, you get no protection from the…
So, not being vulnerable is dependent on not doing something that can make you vulnerable? That doesn't seem right. If you can do something to make yourself vulnerable, you are vulnerable. > https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2026/04/28/xsas-released-on-20... Looking at just that small list, they mark some vulnerabilities as not vulnerable because it's "In-VM attack only". That's disingenuous. > There is no way to use the…
With that being said, yeah, he's being disingenuous as per usual for sure. Part of Qubes hardening is trying to not allowing an attacker to gain root to make it harder to attack Xen, but our evangelist here claims it doesn't matter if an attacker has root :)
Re: Copy Fail
#539Earlier quoted context omitted.
I'm also wondering if it couldn't be rewritten to use io_uring interfaces.
That's really orthogonal (and you can already do io_uring with AF_ALG, at the end of the day AF_ALG is just recvmsg() and sendmsg(), which work just fine in io_uring...)