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FBI couldn't get into WaPo reporter's iPhone because Lockdown Mode enabled

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Re: FBI couldn't get into WaPo reporter's iPhone because Lockdown Mode enabled

#501
post #383
post #355

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I can atleast still voice against Israeli genocide there. I am good for now.

He was begging to go party with someone that spent time in prison for child exploitation. That in itself should make you hate the dude.

That widely-circulated ""email"" of Musk's was fake lol

Don't believe me? Go to the epstein emails and try to find it

Re: FBI couldn't get into WaPo reporter's iPhone because Lockdown Mode enabled

#502
post #499

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Settings -> lock screen -> “Require password after screen saver begins or display is turned off”

Even with that option set to "Immediately" you can still use Touch ID after locking.

I am not sure how it works on Macs, but on iPhone, after first unlock after a reboot, it’s trivial for law enforcement to break into your iPhone - the same with Android.

Re: FBI couldn't get into WaPo reporter's iPhone because Lockdown Mode enabled

#503

I find it so frustrating that Lockdown Mode is so all-or-nothing. I want some of the lockdown stuff (No facetime and message attachments from strangers, no link previews, no device connections), but like half of the other ones I don't want. Why can't I just toggle an iMessage setting for "no link preview, no attachments", or a general setting for "no automatic device connection to untrusted computers while locked"? W…

Agreed. If I know my threat model, I don’t need unnecessary restrictions.

Re: FBI couldn't get into WaPo reporter's iPhone because Lockdown Mode enabled

#504

Earlier quoted context omitted.

That's a very unusual and narrow exception involving "foregone conclusion doctrine", an important fact missed by Ars Technica but elaborated on by AP: https://apnews.com/general-news-49da3a1e71f74e1c98012611aedc...

> Authorities, citing a “foregone conclusion exception” to the Fifth Amendment, argued that Rawls could not invoke his right to self-incrimination because police already had evidence of a crime. The 3rd Circuit panel agreed, upholding a lower court decision. I do not follow the logic here, what does that even mean? It seems very dubious. And what happens if one legitimately forgets? They just get to keep you there fo…

Lawyer here - let me try to help.

This is an area that seems to confuse a lot of people because of what the 5th amendment says and doesn't say.

The reason they can't force you to unlock your phone is not because your phone contains evidence of stuff. They have a warrant to get that evidence. You do not have a right to prevent them from getting it just because it's yours. Most evidence is self-incriminating in this way - if you have a murder weapon in your pocket with blood on it, and the police lawfully stop you and take it, you really are incriminating yourself in one sense by giving it to them, but not in the 5th amendment sense.

The right against self-incrimination is mostly about being forced to give testimonial evidence against yourself. That is, it's mostly about you being forced to testify against yourself under oath, or otherwise give evidence that is testimonial in nature against yourself. In the case of passwords, courts often view it now as you being forced to disclose the contents of your mind (IE live testify against yourself) and equally important, even if not live testimony against yourself, it testimonially proves that you have access to the phone (more on this in a second). Biometrics are a weird state, with some courts finding it like passwords/pins, and some finding it just a physical fact with no testimonial component at all other than proving your ability to access.

The foregone conclusion part comes into play because, excluding being forced to disclose the contents of your mind for a second, the testimonial evidence you are being forced to give when you unlock a phone is that you have access to the phone. If they can already prove it's your phone or that you have access to it, then unlocking it does not matter from a testimonial standpoint, and courts will often require you to do so in the jurisdictions that don't consider any other part of unlocking to be testimonial. (Similarly, if they can't prove you have access to the phone, and whether you have access to the phone or not matters to the case in a material way, they generally will not be able to force you to unlock it or try to unlock it because it woudl be a 5th amendment violation).

Hope this helps.

Re: FBI couldn't get into WaPo reporter's iPhone because Lockdown Mode enabled

#505

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> Authorities, citing a “foregone conclusion exception” to the Fifth Amendment, argued that Rawls could not invoke his right to self-incrimination because police already had evidence of a crime. The 3rd Circuit panel agreed, upholding a lower court decision. I do not follow the logic here, what does that even mean? It seems very dubious. And what happens if one legitimately forgets? They just get to keep you there fo…

It means that if all the other evidence shows that the desired evidence is on the computer, then it is not a question of whether it exists, so youre not really searching for something. Youre retrieving it. That doesn't implicate the 4th amendment.

Unlocking/forced unlocking is not a 4th amendment issue, but a 5th amendment one.

The 4th amendment would protect you from them seizing your phone in the first place for no good reason, but would not protect you from them seizing your phone if they believe it has evidence of a crime.

Regardless, it is not the thing that protects you (or doesn't, depending) from having to give or otherwise type in your passcode/pin/fingerprint/etc.

Re: FBI couldn't get into WaPo reporter's iPhone because Lockdown Mode enabled

#506
post #424

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Pegasus. Jedi. SKyWIper. Rogue Actors. Rogue thief’s. Rogue governments. Your spouse. Separating corporate IT from personal IT. There’s plenty of reasons.

These are reasons to be able to secure your devices against third parties, not reasons you shouldn't be able to.

If you shouldn’t be able to lock it down, then you’re basically carrying a tracking device that anyone can spy on. Might as well set your password to password

Re: FBI couldn't get into WaPo reporter's iPhone because Lockdown Mode enabled

#507
In China, there is only one way to deal with this situation: when the police summon you for the first time, do not bring your phone. Before the second summons, get a new phone or completely format your old one. However, this does not apply in cases of ongoing crimes or when someone is already wanted by the authorities, as they will not be given a second chance.

Re: FBI couldn't get into WaPo reporter's iPhone because Lockdown Mode enabled

#508
post #7

> Natanson said she does not use biometrics for her devices, but after investigators told her to try, “when she applied her index finger to the fingerprint reader, the laptop unlocked.” Curious.

My read on this is that she tried to bluff, even though the odds were astronomically high that they'd call her on it. She didn't have anything to lose by trying a little white lie. It's what I would have done in the same situation, anyway.

Re: FBI couldn't get into WaPo reporter's iPhone because Lockdown Mode enabled

#510
post #282

Don't be idiots. The FBI may say that whether or not they can get in: 1. If they can get in, now people - including high-value targets like journalists - will use bad security. 2. If the FBI (or another agency) has an unknown capability, the FBI must say they can't get in or reveal their capabilities to all adversaries, including to even higher-profile targets such as counter-intelligence targets. Saying nothing also…

I would not recommend that one trust a secure enclave with full disk encryption (FDE). This is what you are doing when your password/PIN/fingerprint can't contain sufficient entropy to derive a secure encryption key. The problem with low entropy security measures arises due to the fact that this low entropy is used to instruct the secure enclave (TEE) to release/use the actual high entropy key. So the key must be sto…

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