I wonder how many DMCA requests they will get and if the administrative overhead with it will kill the Pilot.
While they're not an exit node, none.
Tor Exit Nodes in Libraries – Pilot
51–60 of 60 posts
Re: Tor Exit Nodes in Libraries – Pilot
#52If you think the Tor project is working on an important problem, consider running a relay. It's inexpensive, easy to administer, no hassle (if not an exit) and I think the scale is such that a couple thousand additional relays would make a noticeable difference to the network. You can even have it AWS where it will get automatic updates with almost no effort: https://cloud.torproject.org/ If you want to run it on OS…
My sibling comment points out that Tor Cloud is discontinued anyway, but I have some concerns about running a relay on a cloud provider. If a lot of people do this, it seems like it could pose a risk to Tor users' anonymity. Tor works by bouncing traffic across a few nodes. In an ideal case, these nodes are run by different people in different countries, so even if a vulnerability in a server or legal action exposes…
The node constructs the path it uses. As concentration in one area becomes a concern, those nodes can be identified as Amazon based on IP so clients know not to use more than 1 or 2 nodes there.
Re: Tor Exit Nodes in Libraries – Pilot
#53If you think the Tor project is working on an important problem, consider running a relay. It's inexpensive, easy to administer, no hassle (if not an exit) and I think the scale is such that a couple thousand additional relays would make a noticeable difference to the network. You can even have it AWS where it will get automatic updates with almost no effort: https://cloud.torproject.org/ If you want to run it on OS…
> safely bypass surveillance from across the world Is this true, for a global passive adversary? If all of the nodes which route your link go through a friendly IC that shares ToR traffic patterns, I'm pretty sure traffic analysis can disclose where you are browsing or which hidden service you are visiting (or at least where it's hosted). Does anyone know more about how a ToR link is chosen, whether you can control i…
Your client constructs the whole path. You can take whatever route you desire.
Re: Tor Exit Nodes in Libraries – Pilot
#54Earlier quoted context omitted.
The NSA isn't really global, though. For example, if enough ToR traffic were routed via Asia or South America, I imagine they would not be able to perform much traffic analysis on it.
The NSA is very much global and according to the Snowden leaks tapped into a large number of major internet exchanges and sea cables, including the largest internet exchange of the world (Germany, DECIX[1]) as well as the largest exchange in Asia (Hong Kong, HKIX[3]) and South America (Brazil, BRIX[4]) respectively. From what we know the NSA has global coverage with google-style indexing[1] since at least 2012, possi…
Thanks for finding all of those sources. That is indeed a vast network of intercepts, however it's not necessarily "global" in the sense that they monitor all communication. If one could choose their Tor link to include enough paths not likely to be monitored by colluding parties, then one could be more certain they are not facing a "global adversary" in the sense that the Tor site means.
Re: Tor Exit Nodes in Libraries – Pilot
#55Earlier quoted context omitted.
So ToR is like a shitty free VPN? Who can one be hiding from that a cheap VPN to a jurisdiction of your choice won't solve much better?
No, it's not. It's also not written ToR. I recommend you venture over to their website and start reading the documentation.
Thanks for the correction, I'm not sure why I decided to upper case the R :)
To clarify what I think you meant to refer me to, the Tor client actually chooses the three nodes in the path of a circuit, doesn't use two nodes on the same subnet, nor ones the network classifies as belonging to the same "family" (although I'm having trouble determining what this means in practice).
Given that there is a hard limit of three nodes in a route, I'm still have trouble thinking of an adversary that Tor protects you against that a VPN to a jurisdiction of your choosing doesn't, and a VPN is significantly faster...
Re: Tor Exit Nodes in Libraries – Pilot
#56Earlier quoted context omitted.
The NSA is very much global and according to the Snowden leaks tapped into a large number of major internet exchanges and sea cables, including the largest internet exchange of the world (Germany, DECIX[1]) as well as the largest exchange in Asia (Hong Kong, HKIX[3]) and South America (Brazil, BRIX[4]) respectively. From what we know the NSA has global coverage with google-style indexing[1] since at least 2012, possi…
Thanks for finding all of those sources. That is indeed a vast network of intercepts, however it's not necessarily "global" in the sense that they monitor all communication. If one could choose their Tor link to include enough paths not likely to be monitored by colluding parties, then one could be more certain they are not facing a "global adversary" in the sense that the Tor site means.
however it's not necessarily "global" in the sense that they monitor all communication.
It is very much global in the sense that they monitor all communication.
How about actually reading some of the sources that you were just provided with?
Re: Tor Exit Nodes in Libraries – Pilot
#57Earlier quoted context omitted.
My sibling comment points out that Tor Cloud is discontinued anyway, but I have some concerns about running a relay on a cloud provider. If a lot of people do this, it seems like it could pose a risk to Tor users' anonymity. Tor works by bouncing traffic across a few nodes. In an ideal case, these nodes are run by different people in different countries, so even if a vulnerability in a server or legal action exposes…
One interesting thing I read recently is that, when building a circuit, Tor actively avoids picking more than one relay sharing a common attack vector. Basically, it will not pick more than one relay with the same family id, router or /16 subnet. Your point is still valid, since AWS and other big web hosts like OVH obviously have a lot of /16 subnets and distinct router addresses, but it's good to see this was antici…
Yeah, that's super interesting.
To be fair, I suspect there is already a similar problem simply due to economics: running a relay costs money, so the vast majority of relays are running in the first world, which correlates well with countries that have extradition treaties with the US, for example.
Re: Tor Exit Nodes in Libraries – Pilot
#58Earlier quoted context omitted.
Thanks for finding all of those sources. That is indeed a vast network of intercepts, however it's not necessarily "global" in the sense that they monitor all communication. If one could choose their Tor link to include enough paths not likely to be monitored by colluding parties, then one could be more certain they are not facing a "global adversary" in the sense that the Tor site means.
however it's not necessarily "global" in the sense that they monitor all communication. It is very much global in the sense that they monitor all communication. How about actually reading some of the sources that you were just provided with?
Not literally all communication in the global sense that Tor refers to. For a trivial example, the wifi signal between my computer and my router is not monitored.
Your references seem to talk about major exchanges all over the globe. Practically speaking, because a Tor client can choose the routers for the link it creates, it could choose three routers behind a single major exchange that is monitored (e.g. in Asia or South America), and hence remain anonymous, because the connections between those routers are not monitored.
Re: Tor Exit Nodes in Libraries – Pilot
#59Earlier quoted context omitted.
however it's not necessarily "global" in the sense that they monitor all communication. It is very much global in the sense that they monitor all communication. How about actually reading some of the sources that you were just provided with?
Not literally all communication in the global sense that Tor refers to. For a trivial example, the wifi signal between my computer and my router is not monitored. Your references seem to talk about major exchanges all over the globe. Practically speaking, because a Tor client can choose the routers for the link it creates, it could choose three routers behind a single major exchange that is monitored (e.g. in Asia or…
because the connections between those routers are not monitored
A correlation attack[1] doesn't care about the intermediate routers. It only requires packet dumps from the entry and the exit node. Both of which, with very high probability, route through networks that are monitored by the NSA.
[1] https://blog.torproject.org/blog/traffic-correlation-using-n...
Re: Tor Exit Nodes in Libraries – Pilot
#60Earlier quoted context omitted.
Not literally all communication in the global sense that Tor refers to. For a trivial example, the wifi signal between my computer and my router is not monitored. Your references seem to talk about major exchanges all over the globe. Practically speaking, because a Tor client can choose the routers for the link it creates, it could choose three routers behind a single major exchange that is monitored (e.g. in Asia or…
because the connections between those routers are not monitored A correlation attack[1] doesn't care about the intermediate routers. It only requires packet dumps from the entry and the exit node. Both of which, with very high probability, route through networks that are monitored by the NSA. [1] https://blog.torproject.org/blog/traffic-correlation-using-n...
Good point. I wonder how useful that is in practice with the amount of traffic going through the Tor network. It seems to me that the more people use it, the harder it would be to get accurate correlations. That said, I wouldn't be surprised if some clever math can do so more accurately than has been published.