If a mind is what brains do, then Mary cannot know every physical fact about even her own neural system - that is too much information for her neural system to hold. This argument, therefore, implicitly presupposes that there is something more to a mind, and so is begging the question.
The knowledge argument
51–55 of 55 posts
Re: The knowledge argument
#52To everyone insisting that the argument is silly: while in this particular case I do disagree with the conclusion, I'd encourage you to pause for a moment before dismissing it. I often find that when I approach philosophical theories with too critical a mindset, I dismiss it too quickly, and, if I spend the time afterwrd, find the issue more complicated than it appeared at first. It's something like being posed a cod…
The use of outlandish thought experiments is fraught with problems, not the least of which is philosophers' predilection to accept intuition and common sense in supposing what the outcome would be. This is particularly clearly demonstrated in Searle's Chinese Room argument, which is really just an attempt to disguise a personal opinion as a rational conclusion.
The fundamental problem here is that, unlike in science, philosophical thought experiments are not constrained by reality, so they tend to ultimately become self-referential arguments over which axioms to accept, but with no objective basis for deciding between them.
Re: The knowledge argument
#53Certain types of knowledge cannot be encoded effectively. What I mean by an encoding that's effective is one that translates my subjective experience of the idea or the thing so that you can "imagine" or "visualize" the thing by the mere act of decoding my encoding. Experiencing the thing directly does not count as an encoding in this case. Defining the precise meaning of "encoding" is left as an exercise to the read…
I often summarize it in programming: a mock class, or a very deeply copied instance, can not have the original `this` pointer and never will.
I don't think that's a good analogy. In your example, we still end up with a perfect "copy" of all the data and behavior.
When it comes to subjective perception, there's simply no way of even "copying" the information by simply writing it down. * (caveat follows below)
So, in the Mary example, no matter how much she "reads" about the color red, she really would not "know all there is to know" about it.
* Now it might be possible to encode a neural state on paper, and if you have a machine that can "apply" that state to your brain, then you can read that paper, enter codes in the machine, and let the machine "fix" some neural state in your brain so you can experience the same "thing".
At least it seems like this should be possible in principle. Although it might not be practical .. depending on how perception is "implemented" in the brain.
Re: The knowledge argument
#54I'm guessing someone smarter than me has already thought of this, but imagine another alien scientist observing Mary through this entire experiment, with the ability to inspect at the neuronal level the state of her brain at any instant.
When Mary steps out of the room, we (humans considering this problem) would intuitively expect her to say "Wow, this sensation is like nothing I could ever have predicted based on my previous knowledge. I understand this in a way I couldn't have before!" How would the alien interpreter analyze the situation?
The alien may say that these sensations activate a different part of Mary's brain and alter the structure to create memories. If she were put back into the room, she could recall what it was like to perceive color. These memories could be defined as knowledge, but the alien might not consider that knowledge important. It might just say that is an artifact of the operation of her primitive brain that these sorts of neuronal patterns can only be created by perception with her eyes. From it's perspective, the entire interaction is still entirely physical. The alien could have predicted her reaction just prior to her stepping out of the room by looking at the structure and state of her brain.
The alien may add prior to her stepping out "By the way, she's going to say that experiencing color is different than knowing of it (qualia). This is a curious artifact the way her brain works." I think it would be impossible for me (a human) to prove the alien wrong. From the aliens perspective, this wouldn't be fundamentally different than me writing a program 'printf("I feel hungry");'. It would be difficult to convince me that the computer is actually hungry. It is programmed to say that.
The reason I added the alien is because we tend to empathize with Mary when we imagine the experiment. But, if consciousness is an illusion that our brain is programmed to tell, it's difficult for us to consider this problem objectively.
Re: The knowledge argument
#55Nagel takes a slightly different approach. In an effort to make his argument more adaptable and relatable, he takes the stand of humans attempting to understand the sonar capabilities of bats. Even with the entire physical database at one's fingertips, humans would not be able to fully perceive or understand a bat's sonar system, namely what it is like to perceive something with a bat's sonar. My car emits a sound wh…
See also human echolocation (e.g. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_echolocation). The experience, however, will not be like a bat's, not only because of the latter's greater acuity but also because humans are conscious, self-aware and have language to reason about their experiences.