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Password Security: Why the horse battery staple is not correct

diogomonica.com

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Re: Password Security: Why the horse battery staple is not correct

#51
You have to be pragmatic with users and offer them a path of least resistance while implementing a greater level of security. I've only recently been able to get users to pay attention to why they need a password manager - the iCloud hack helped more in that than even Snowden did.

That path of least resistance right now, I find, is installing a password manager and securing it with a primary password that is generated from four or five dictionary words. Combine that with two-factor authentication for the most important accounts (Google Authenticator is surprisingly easy to teach people to use).

You find corner cases that cause problems: apps that don't support automatically having the password entered, or pasting the password in, mobile apps that become frustrating to enter long random passwords into so users just change them to something simple (including Apple ID's).

Four random words is beyond 'good enough' and far better than what most users are doing now. Rolling out and advocating new security measures is much about compromise and pragmatism. When somebody who is an ordinary computer users asks you what a good password technique is, do you spend 60 minutes explaining entropy and how people are bad at generating passwords (putting them to sleep), or do you just point them to a comic and one of the random xkcd password generators?

The iCloud hacks have done more for security awareness than what a million blog posts could ever have. It would be good to take advantage of it with a common approach rather than mixed signaling (I just know that at some point i'm going to hear someone say "but I saw something on hacker news about how those xkcd passwords aren't secure" - and I will have to take a deep breath).

Advocacy now could be focused on developers, where there is some catching up to do - a common protocol for password managers, allowing copy and paste, hooks in apps, agreeing on a set of weak passwords that should be not allowed (a lot of services already do this, most use top x from RockYou), removing those silly character restrictions (example: apple ID's can't be XKCD passwords since they enforce a capital letter and number), building password generating into more systems (based on an open spec - it should be an OS feature, not an app)

Re: Password Security: Why the horse battery staple is not correct

#52
I don't agree with everything in this article and he glosses over some complex issues too quickly, but it is good to see such a reasonable discussion about actual password security in contrast to the pants-on-head mouth-breathing "security" standards of "enforce changing your password every 12 weeks" and "your password must contain an upper and lower case letter, number, and special character."

There are people that believe those practices have positive effects on authentication security. Those people should be identified and prevented from ever making a security-related decision again.

Re: Password Security: Why the horse battery staple is not correct

#53
Password managers, combined with randomly-generated passwords, solve the most serious problems afflicting user-selected passwords. Adding two-factor authentication solves yet more problems. And yet both password managers and 2FA are not widely adopted by users. Where do we go from here?

I use a password manager, and the UX of registering to a new website is just awful. On the registration page I need to check what sort of password is being asked for (e.g. 'no longer than 15 characters'), and configure the password generator accordingly. After registration I need to manually convert the password into a login; my password manager can try to do it automatically, but it often fails because it doesn't know how to translate fields from the registration page to the login page. Compare this with what most users do: just enter the same password everywhere. Much less friction.

I think we can make using password managers easier than entering the same password everywhere. We can do this by introducing a standard web interface for password managers. This interface will let browsers fill in usernames and passwords on registration and login pages, automatically. It may include password specifications, such as 'password should be between 10-15 characters long'.

Here's the use case: imagine the password manager is integrated with the browser (say as an extension). When it detects this interface on a web page, the password manager hides the password field, replacing it with a message like 'secure password is auto-generated'. Similarly, login pages that support the interface will not show a password field at all. From time to time, the user has to enter their single password (to allow the password manager to access its database). In this scenario, the user has to do less work (on average) than when they enter their password manually. When no password manager is installed, the browser simply displays the same old password field.

Given a standard interface, implementation is simple: on the server side, it's just a few tags that specify user and password fields on registration and login pages, and what to replace them with when the password manager works. There should probably also be a site identifier to let the password manager know which registration page corresponds to which login page. (Currently password managers rely on URLs to figure this out, and this heuristic sometimes fails.) The whole architecture of storing passwords stays the same. On the client side, password managers already do much of this work anyway, including trying to heuristically figure out which fields correspond to the username and the password. This sort of interface makes things much simpler for them.

Re: Password Security: Why the horse battery staple is not correct

#54

This article includes some good points, but puts them together into something inane. It's true that silly constraints lead to trivial changes that lead to crackable passwords. It's also true that assuming brute force over all character classes included in a password is wrong. Those are precisely what the "correct horse battery staple" comic was getting at. Picking words at random (that is, based on a PRNG - not "rand…

His primary point is that people should not be choosing passwords at all, and should instead use a password manager, except for a select few passwords such as logins for computer and phone, and the password manager master password itself.

Yes, the correct horse battery staple has more entropy than most common passwords, but the point is that we don't need a way of generating better memorable passwords. We can already just generate random, long, completely non-memorable sequences of characters and store them in a password manager, and that's what we should be doing.

Re: Password Security: Why the horse battery staple is not correct

#55

Password managers, combined with randomly-generated passwords, solve the most serious problems afflicting user-selected passwords. Adding two-factor authentication solves yet more problems. And yet both password managers and 2FA are not widely adopted by users. Where do we go from here? I use a password manager, and the UX of registering to a new website is just awful. On the registration page I need to check what so…

YES. Plus, this kind of integration would make it trivial to change a password, so that could literally be a one-click process in the case of a leak.

And as you say, password managers already have a fallback for sites that don't support the interface, so there would be backward compatibility as it gets adopted. (And likely it will take a long time before businesses like my bank, which requires a password of exactly 6 alphanumeric-only characters, catch on...)

Re: Password Security: Why the horse battery staple is not correct

#56
After reading that xkcd style password generation may not be as security proof as it sounds I decided to use Bruce Schneier's method which is just mixing the first letter of each word of a personal sentence with special characters and number to make a password. Considering the quantity on information we leave on internet I fear it might be too easy for someone to parse everything I have written, every places I have been, and everything I have done to come close to the words that I might use to compose a password worthy sentence.

Re: Password Security: Why the horse battery staple is not correct

#57

Despite the slightly linkbaity article, I agree with the article's actual premise (you shouldn't be remembering passwords in the first place). Unfortunately, it'd be tough pill to swallow for sites to push/encourage users to get a password manager—you never want to be the site which people bounce from because they don't understand what a password manager is. At the very least, I wish sites would abandon the abhorrent…

I've found banks on average to be absolutely terrible with password security. I mentioned in another comment, my bank requires a password of exactly six characters, alphanumeric only. It's like they're trying to make it as crackable as possible. (I believe the reasoning is that they want you to be able to enter it for telephone banking using a touch tone phone, but obviously it would be far better to use a separate password for that. (Especially since I expect there's little overlap between people who use automated telephone banking and people who use internet banking...))

Re: Password Security: Why the horse battery staple is not correct

#58

Linkbaity title from a PhD student with something to sell: the example cited was entirely correct about password strength, and is something the article author admits is important as it is the underpinning of using password managers. > Even if we entertained the XKCD comic and started training users to select four random words instead of a complex single-word password, I argue that it would not amount to a significant…

And may be Square should let him go as well?

Re: Password Security: Why the horse battery staple is not correct

#59
post #46
post #35

Two factor is not a good solution either. Having to lug around your phone pulling up randomly generated strings from an RNG on both ends... defeats the point. Instead of an RNG seed, have a shared secret. Of course, you need a trusted party for that, but that is how oauth and friends work. And how Persona should have worked. Logging in to anything should be clicking login and everything happening behind the scenes, b…

Uhm... The 2FA used in Google Authenticator does use a shared secret. The algorithm is TOTP (RFC 6238). It's simply a HMAC applied on the current unix timestamp with the shared secret as a key and truncated to 6,7,8 digits depending on the implementation.

My point is that you are taking what should work behind the scenes (common shared secret) and forcing a user interaction (typing or copying out a code) because synchronizing that secret across user accounts on disparate devices is considered "too hard" a problem, even though like I said the browser can be a perfectly good commonality and Persona was on the brink of fantastic innovation on that front.

Re: Password Security: Why the horse battery staple is not correct

#60

Despite the slightly linkbaity article, I agree with the article's actual premise (you shouldn't be remembering passwords in the first place). Unfortunately, it'd be tough pill to swallow for sites to push/encourage users to get a password manager—you never want to be the site which people bounce from because they don't understand what a password manager is. At the very least, I wish sites would abandon the abhorrent…

I've found banks on average to be absolutely terrible with password security. I mentioned in another comment, my bank requires a password of exactly six characters, alphanumeric only. It's like they're trying to make it as crackable as possible. (I believe the reasoning is that they want you to be able to enter it for telephone banking using a touch tone phone, but obviously it would be far better to use a separate p…

Hows this for silly: my bank has a second PIN for telephone banking (three numbers) and uses identity verification if you call over the phone... but still requires 6 alpha-numeric characters for the online banking password. Absolutely silly.

Thankfully, the damage that can be done if someone was to access my account is mitigated somewhat by the 2FA that is present; whenever a "Pay Anyone" transaction is initiated, you have to confirm it with a code that is sent via SMS to your phone.

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