This is likely a minority view, but I have no problem with the NSA being able to break encryption, that's in fact part of their job. Decoding encryption has long been part of their mission. I also suspect they're not alone in terms of signals intelligence groups in having this capability. The issue to me has always been how and what data they access and store, and how it is used.
> I have no problem with the NSA being able to break encryption, that's in fact part of their job. Their "breaking" of encryption is a combination of purposefully introducing vulnerabilities into standards, surreptitiously altering software and hardware to give the NSA a backdoor, hacking into private systems and stealing keys, etc etc. I'm cool with an NSA super computer trying to brute force my VPN traffic to YouTu…
If the NSA recommends AES to the US government, but knows there's a vulnerability, then they have to assume that any adversary may be as good as whoever designed it. Which means an adversary would be perfectly capable of discovering and exploiting the weakness. Which in turn means the NSA has just made the entire US government vulnerable to foreign or non-state actors.
The same applies to anything you might imagine doing to chipmakers. Not only is there the risk of being found out (how do you explain to a talented engineer spotting a flaw in a schematic, how high up do you have to go to try and stop that leaking?) but there's the more serious risk that you've just added a backdoor to hardware you yourself need to be secure. Which again, could be discovered by an adversary and used against you.
This whole line of argument has always been speculative fiction on the part of the internet: it's looking for unicorns because you heard hoofs.