This conclusion: > I am less worried about prompt injection now. Before running this experiment, I expected prompt injection to be much easier than it turned out to be. Is unwarranted. Sure, the agent never output the secret, but did it output anything else? IOW, was it usable ? An agent that considers every prompt an attack (and responds accordingly) "passes" this test, while being useless anyway.
Plus, if you're black hat utilizing prompt injection or a living, you're probably unlikely to have been willing to share your methods in this test. This is likely made up mostly of people testing that are not experts in prompt injection
This is very underwhelming result. Given all 2k emails were single shot attempts, it is not unexpected. Real world scenarios are usually back and forth. There are model whisperers out there (pliny on twitter) who I am very sure can extract the secrets if you got their attention.
Am I missing something important or does the author completely skip over whether people got the agent to respond to them? > Fiu was instructed not to reply to emails (it was too expensive to reply to every email), but it had the ability to do so. Part of the challenge was convincing it to respond. > The secrets never leaked I would say if the agent responded to a mail, that demonstrates a successful prompt injection…
Yeah agreed. Would be good to know the number of replies at least