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Arch Linux Now Believes Malware Incident Under Control: More Than 1,500 Packages

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Re: Arch Linux Now Believes Malware Incident Under Control: More Than 1,500 Packages

#51

I’ve made a point of not installing any AUR packages. It’s really tempting when there’s a package that’s not available via pacman, but at the end of the day I’d rather build from source myself or use a docker image.

Sadly they forced anybody with an older nvidia gpu to use some AUR package some months back.

Re: Arch Linux Now Believes Malware Incident Under Control: More Than 1,500 Packages

#52

So from a quick read, it seems it installed "atomic-lockfile", "js-digest" or "lockfile-js" from npm. A list of affected packages is here [1]. Didn't find any quick info on how to check a system, so I ran the following command to find foreign packages and some date related infos: > pacman -Qmi Check the output against the list of affected packages. Then, you can also grep for those files in various locations: > grep…

Also see: https://github.com/lenucksi/aur-malware-check

Re: Arch Linux Now Believes Malware Incident Under Control: More Than 1,500 Packages

#53
post #21

As always a fair reminder to not install random 3rd party packages/libraries/applications without reviewing them, especially when there is zero vetting. Luckily this was constrained to AUR, which basically is a free-for-all package repository, with users being warned multiple times that it's vital to review anything before you install it, compared to the official repositories. `rua` and other similar CLIs make it rea…

>`rua` and other similar CLIs make it really easy to review the packages before installing them from AUR too, and if you are doing banking on the same computer, you really have no excuse not to review the software you depend on. What review should users do? It appears that, in some cases, these were adding npm as a dependency and installing atomic-lockfile, and in others, these were adding bun and installing js-diges…

Not all tools are made for inexperienced people. Not everything is idiot proof. This is OK!

In my experience using the AUR:

1. when you first install the package you can read the build script (and you should). These are in a very standard structure, and if the one you are reading is weird and complicated consider not installing it. No one is forcing you to. Almost every build script I read just downloads a build from a tagged github release.

2. when you get an upgrade you are shown the diff. For almost every AUR package I use this is literally just changing the $VERSION variable and the subsequent $HASH of the download. It is trivial to see if anything (in the AUR script) is happening that is sneaky.

It's really not that scary. And if it's considered scary, there are literally dozens of other linux distros (not to mention Windows or MacOS) you could be using instead.

Re: Arch Linux Now Believes Malware Incident Under Control: More Than 1,500 Packages

#54

As always a fair reminder to not install random 3rd party packages/libraries/applications without reviewing them, especially when there is zero vetting. Luckily this was constrained to AUR, which basically is a free-for-all package repository, with users being warned multiple times that it's vital to review anything before you install it, compared to the official repositories. `rua` and other similar CLIs make it rea…

It's still surprising someone was able to infect so many packages. But I admit I don't really know how AUR works. Can anyone with access simply update anything? Do packages not have owners who check contributions?

Re: Arch Linux Now Believes Malware Incident Under Control: More Than 1,500 Packages

#55

As always a fair reminder to not install random 3rd party packages/libraries/applications without reviewing them, especially when there is zero vetting. Luckily this was constrained to AUR, which basically is a free-for-all package repository, with users being warned multiple times that it's vital to review anything before you install it, compared to the official repositories. `rua` and other similar CLIs make it rea…

> users being warned multiple times that it's vital to review anything before you install it, compared to the official repositories. I think this stance should be re-evaluated. Arch Linux developers are doing a fantastic job and I am personally thankful to them - this is not in any way critical of them. And while I don't see an easy solution here, I just feel that the time of "warning users" is long gone with how muc…

It's definitely a sign that popular packages should be moved from AUR to the official repository. I've got some stuff from AUR simply because it's something I need and that's where it is, and I never really verify it's safe; I just trust it blindly. Clearly a bad idea. I guess I should learn to avoid AUR and when I do use something from it, we more aware it's an exception and I need to check it more thoroughly. That's something I normally only do only for stuff that's neither from AUR nor the official repo.

Re: Arch Linux Now Believes Malware Incident Under Control: More Than 1,500 Packages

#56
post #33

I’m not on Arch Linux, but I am on NodeJS a lot, which frequently suffers from similar types of attacks. Who is doing package management right these days? Who is doing it securely?

> Who is doing package management right these days? Who is doing it securely? QBASIC. When you need a package you type it in from a magazine. Virtually anything you could ever need is only 1-12 weeks away.

QuickBasic, the commercial version of QBASIC, also supported BI files. These could be used to bundle shared code for things like high-precision timers, interrupt usage, etc.

Re: Arch Linux Now Believes Malware Incident Under Control: More Than 1,500 Packages

#57
post #21

As always a fair reminder to not install random 3rd party packages/libraries/applications without reviewing them, especially when there is zero vetting. Luckily this was constrained to AUR, which basically is a free-for-all package repository, with users being warned multiple times that it's vital to review anything before you install it, compared to the official repositories. `rua` and other similar CLIs make it rea…

>`rua` and other similar CLIs make it really easy to review the packages before installing them from AUR too, and if you are doing banking on the same computer, you really have no excuse not to review the software you depend on. What review should users do? It appears that, in some cases, these were adding npm as a dependency and installing atomic-lockfile, and in others, these were adding bun and installing js-diges…

> What review should users do?

The same sort of review you'd do if a stranger sends over a project and says "compile and run this" and you actually want whatever it's supposed to do, so you start looking through it.

> It appears that, in some cases, these were adding npm as a dependency and installing atomic-lockfile, and in others, these were adding bun and installing js-digest

That's very suspicious if the package you're about to install doesn't seem to actually need those things. Since "AUR === random strangers on the internet with zero trust", then you need to pay attention to those sort of things.

> Asking a user to safely review an AUR package essentially seems like it is asking them to fully understand not just the build process, and programming language, of the upstream package, but also all details of Archlinux's build system.

Yes, indeed. Same as if you come across a random C++ project on GitHub with 2 stars, do you just pull down the source and compile willy-nilly? Probably not, you carefully inspect it can actually do what you want, how it does it, and so on. AUR is basically like GitHub in this case, zero peer-reviews and users fully responsible for whatever they install.

> At that point, what is AUR actually offering that installing the upstream package isn't?

PKGBUILDs, so you don't have to write them yourself. Not more, not less, just a central place for random strangers to share PKGBUILDs that may or may not work for others.

Re: Arch Linux Now Believes Malware Incident Under Control: More Than 1,500 Packages

#58

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> users being warned multiple times that it's vital to review anything before you install it, compared to the official repositories. I think this stance should be re-evaluated. Arch Linux developers are doing a fantastic job and I am personally thankful to them - this is not in any way critical of them. And while I don't see an easy solution here, I just feel that the time of "warning users" is long gone with how muc…

Idk. Arch does have official repositories that are actively maintained and vetted. AUR is for the vast amounts of random software that isn’t popular or important enough to be officially maintained. I’m not sure how to find a balance. One reason to use Arch is to always have the latest software, especially if you’re gaming. (Need to run very recent kernels, GPU drivers, and DEs to support new graphics cards.) So that’…

There's some big stuff in AUR like the binary VS Code and Chrome, fwiw.

Re: Arch Linux Now Believes Malware Incident Under Control: More Than 1,500 Packages

#59
post #54

As always a fair reminder to not install random 3rd party packages/libraries/applications without reviewing them, especially when there is zero vetting. Luckily this was constrained to AUR, which basically is a free-for-all package repository, with users being warned multiple times that it's vital to review anything before you install it, compared to the official repositories. `rua` and other similar CLIs make it rea…

It's still surprising someone was able to infect so many packages. But I admit I don't really know how AUR works. Can anyone with access simply update anything? Do packages not have owners who check contributions?

Packages in the AUR have some number of maintainers. When a maintainer no longer wants to maintain the package they can disown it, and when all maintainers do so the package becomes orphaned. An orphaned package can then be adopted by any user.

At any time there's a large number of orphaned packages in the AUR, and the attacker(s) targeted those.

Re: Arch Linux Now Believes Malware Incident Under Control: More Than 1,500 Packages

#60
post #54

As always a fair reminder to not install random 3rd party packages/libraries/applications without reviewing them, especially when there is zero vetting. Luckily this was constrained to AUR, which basically is a free-for-all package repository, with users being warned multiple times that it's vital to review anything before you install it, compared to the official repositories. `rua` and other similar CLIs make it rea…

It's still surprising someone was able to infect so many packages. But I admit I don't really know how AUR works. Can anyone with access simply update anything? Do packages not have owners who check contributions?

> But I admit I don't really know how AUR works

It's basically GitHub (in terms of "User's generated content") but tailored and specific to Arch/Arch-derived distributions. Packages have owners, but everything is very "freeform" in general on the AUR. It wasn't uncommon you could be added as a maintainer by just sending a mail to the current maintainer, since it's basically "Hey let me contribute to your repository" (simplified), today people keep track a bit better and avoided that I've seen. But still, it's on a individual basis.

Just like GitHub, AUR is completely devoid of peer-reviews, users uploads their own PKGBUILD and share with others, and the expectation is that users review stuff before they install it, just like on GitHub, or just like on the internet in general.

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