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Cybersecurity looks like proof of work now

dbreunig.com

51–60 of 230 posts

Re: Cybersecurity looks like proof of work now

#51
post #44

Please. Are we going to rely now in Anthropic et al to secure our systems? Wasn’t enough to rely on them to build our systems? What’s next? To rely on them for monitoring and observability? What else? Design and mockups?

The nice thing about vulnerability research is that you either have a vulnerability or you don't. There's no such thing as a "slop vulnerability".

"We burned 10 trillion tokens and the Amazon rain forest is now a desert, but our stochastic parrot discovered that if a user types '$-1dffj39fff%FFj$@#lfjf' 10 thousand times into a terminal that you can get privilege escalation on a Linux kernel from 10 years ago. The best part? We avoided paying anyone outside of the oligarchy for the discovery of this vulnerability."

In your embarrassingly reductive binary vulnerability state worldview? Have.

Re: Cybersecurity looks like proof of work now

#52
post #44

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The nice thing about vulnerability research is that you either have a vulnerability or you don't. There's no such thing as a "slop vulnerability".

"We burned 10 trillion tokens and the Amazon rain forest is now a desert, but our stochastic parrot discovered that if a user types '$-1dffj39fff%FFj$@#lfjf' 10 thousand times into a terminal that you can get privilege escalation on a Linux kernel from 10 years ago. The best part? We avoided paying anyone outside of the oligarchy for the discovery of this vulnerability." In your embarrassingly reductive binary vulner…

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Re: Cybersecurity looks like proof of work now

#53

There's still the question of access to the codebase. By all accounts, the best LLM cyber scanning approaches are really primitive - it's just a bash script that goes through every single file in the codebase and, for each one and runs a "find the vulns here" prompt. The attacker usually has even less access than this - in the beginning, they have network tools, an undocumented API, and maybe some binaries. You can d…

On that latest episode of 'Security Cryptography Whatever' [0] they mention that the time spent on improving the harness (at the moment) end up being outperformed by the strategy of "wait for the next model". I doubt that will continue, but it broke my intuition about how to improve them

[0] https://securitycryptographywhatever.com/2026/03/25/ai-bug-f...

Re: Cybersecurity looks like proof of work now

#54
> to harden a system you need to spend more tokens discovering exploits than attackers will spend exploiting them.

If we take this at face value, it's not that different than how a great deal of executive teams believe cybersecurity has worked up to today. "If we spend more on our engineering and infosec teams, we are less likely to get compromised".

The only big difference I can see is timescale. If LLMs can find vulnerabilities and exploit them this easily (and I do take that with a grain of salt, because benchmarks are benchmarks), then you may lose your ass in minutes instead of after one dedicated cyber-explorer's monster energy fueled, 7-week traversal of your infrastructure.

I am still far more concerned about social engineering than LLMs finding and exploiting secret back doors in most software.

Re: Cybersecurity looks like proof of work now

#56
post #32

I discussed this in more detail in one of my earlier comments, but I think the article commits a category error. In commercial settings, most of day-to-day infosec work (or spending) has very little to do with looking for vulnerabilities in code. In fact, security programs built on the idea that you can find and patch every security hole in your codebase were basically busted long before LLMs.

Commercial infosec is deleting firefox from develop machines, because it's not secure and explaining to muggles why they shouldn't commit secret material to the code repository. That and blocking my ssh access to home router of course.

I mean, often, yep. The real reason why they are unhappy with you having an unsupported browser is simply that it's much harder to reason about or enforce policies across bespoke environments. And in an enterprise of a sufficient scale, the probability that one of your employees is making a mistake today is basically 1. Someone is installing an infostealer browser extension, someone is typing in their password on a phishing site, etc. So, you really want to keep browsers on a tight leash and have robust monitoring and reporting around that.

Yeah, it sucks. But you're getting paid, among other things, to put up with some amount of corporate suckiness.

Re: Cybersecurity looks like proof of work now

#57

Please. Are we going to rely now in Anthropic et al to secure our systems? Wasn’t enough to rely on them to build our systems? What’s next? To rely on them for monitoring and observability? What else? Design and mockups?

If we rely on Anthropic to write our system, it's only natural to rely on them to secure it. Seriously, at the big tech companies were rapidly approaching all code being written by LLMs... so at least we have the close the security chain quickly.

Re: Cybersecurity looks like proof of work now

#58
post #11

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Yes, and it apparently burns lots of tokens. But what I've heard is that the outcomes are drastically less expensive than hand-reversing was, when you account for labor costs.

Can confirm. Matching decompilation in particular (where you match the compiler along with your guess at source, compile, then compare assembly, repeating if it doesn't match) is very token-intensive, but it's now very viable: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=46080498 Of course LLMs see a lot more source-assembly pairs than even skilled reverse engineers, so this makes sense. Any area where you can get unlimited…

My own experience has been that "ghidra -> ask LLM to reason about ghidra decompilation" is very effective on all but the most highly obfuscated binaries.

Burning tokens by asking the LLM to compile, disassemble, compare assembly, recompile, repeat seems very wasteful and inefficient to me.

Re: Cybersecurity looks like proof of work now

#59

> Cybersecurity looks like proof of work now Imo, cybersecurity looks like formally verified systems now. You can't spend more tokens to find vulnerabilities if there are no vulnerabilities.

Every formal verification depends highly on requirements. It's pretty easy to make a mistake in defining the task itself. In the end, you'd want to verify system behavior in real world, and it's impossible to completely define real world. You always make some assumptions/models to reason within, and it impossible to verify the assumptions are correct.
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