I know they said they didn't obfuscate anything, but if you hide imports/symbols and obfuscate strings, which is the bare minimum for any competent attacker, the success rate will immediately drop to zero. This is detecting the pattern of an anomaly in language associated with malicious activity, which is not impressive for an LLM.
When I was developing my ghidra-cli tool for LLMs to use, I was using crackmes as tests and it had no problem getting through obfuscation as long as it was prompted about it. In practice when reverse engineering real software it can sometimes spin in circles for a while until it finally notices that it's dealing with obfuscated code, but as long as you update your CLAUDE.md/whatever with its findings, it generally mo…
We hid backdoors in ~40MB binaries and asked AI + Ghidra to find them
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Re: We hid backdoors in ~40MB binaries and asked AI + Ghidra to find them
#52Re: We hid backdoors in ~40MB binaries and asked AI + Ghidra to find them
#53Earlier quoted context omitted.
When I was developing my ghidra-cli tool for LLMs to use, I was using crackmes as tests and it had no problem getting through obfuscation as long as it was prompted about it. In practice when reverse engineering real software it can sometimes spin in circles for a while until it finally notices that it's dealing with obfuscated code, but as long as you update your CLAUDE.md/whatever with its findings, it generally mo…
Is it also possible that crackme solutions were already in the training data?
Re: We hid backdoors in ~40MB binaries and asked AI + Ghidra to find them
#54Re: We hid backdoors in ~40MB binaries and asked AI + Ghidra to find them
#55And this one demonstration why these "1000 CTOs claim no effectiveness improvement after introducing AI in their companies" are 100% BS. They may have not noticed an improvement, but it doesn't mean there isn't any.
Re: We hid backdoors in ~40MB binaries and asked AI + Ghidra to find them
#56> Claude Opus 4.6 found it… and persuaded itself there is nothing to worry about > Even the best model in our benchmark got fooled by this task.
That is quite strange. Because it seems almost as if a human is required to make the AI tools understand this.
Re: We hid backdoors in ~40MB binaries and asked AI + Ghidra to find them
#57I know they said they didn't obfuscate anything, but if you hide imports/symbols and obfuscate strings, which is the bare minimum for any competent attacker, the success rate will immediately drop to zero. This is detecting the pattern of an anomaly in language associated with malicious activity, which is not impressive for an LLM.
The tasks here are entry level. So we are impressed that some AI models are able to detect some patterns, while looking just at binary code. We didn't take it for granted.
For example, only a few models understand Ghidra and Radare2 tooling (Opus 4.5 and 4.6, Gemini 3 Pro, GLM 5) https://quesma.com/benchmarks/binaryaudit/#models-tooling
We consider it a starting point for AI agents being able to work with binaries. Other people discovered the same - vide https://x.com/ccccjjjjeeee/status/2021160492039811300 and https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=46846101.
There is a long way ahead from "OMG, AI can do that!" to an end-to-end solution.
Re: We hid backdoors in ~40MB binaries and asked AI + Ghidra to find them
#58Re: We hid backdoors in ~40MB binaries and asked AI + Ghidra to find them
#59I know they said they didn't obfuscate anything, but if you hide imports/symbols and obfuscate strings, which is the bare minimum for any competent attacker, the success rate will immediately drop to zero. This is detecting the pattern of an anomaly in language associated with malicious activity, which is not impressive for an LLM.
see:
- https://github.com/QuesmaOrg/BinaryAudit/blob/main/tasks/dns...
- https://github.com/QuesmaOrg/BinaryAudit/blob/main/tasks/dro...
Re: We hid backdoors in ~40MB binaries and asked AI + Ghidra to find them
#60I know they said they didn't obfuscate anything, but if you hide imports/symbols and obfuscate strings, which is the bare minimum for any competent attacker, the success rate will immediately drop to zero. This is detecting the pattern of an anomaly in language associated with malicious activity, which is not impressive for an LLM.