Hacker News Board Hacker News, browsed like a classic message board
Live data from Hacker News

LineageOS 23.2

lineageos.org

Post reply on HN
Print view View original

51–60 of 64 posts

Re: LineageOS 23.2

#51

Post by JamesTRexx »

zozbot234 wrote: post #31
JamesTRexx wrote: post #28

I enjoyed LineageOS for years on my Samsung S4 until it finally broke from a fall. It's a shame there was no image to install on my new Xcover 7, but not unexpected as it was a newly released phone. But I doubt there will be an alternative/stripped Android available for this model as I haven't seen anything supporting a Xcover version anywhere. Best I can hope for is eventually a support for rooting and de-installing…

Note that Samsung devices with OneUI 8 remove bootloader unlocking altogether, making it impossible to 'root' the device or load LineageOS on it. The Xcover 7 is a newly released Samsung device that will most likely receive that update (it's live already in some regions), and even if you tried to stay on OneUI 7 the community is just unlikely to support it (as with other Samsung devices that are in the same boat toda…

Mine does have OneUI 8 already indeed, and I'm not that worried about it because I don't expect there will ever be an alternative OS for it. I don't use it for much else than occasionally calling and messaging and have disabled what spyware I could, so it's fine enough for me. Also, I don't have any un-unistallable telecom provider crap on it. :-)

Re: LineageOS 23.2

#52

Post by JCattheATM »

mhitza wrote: post #47
JCattheATM wrote: post #38

I'm still running this on my OnePlus 6T, purchased refurbished from ebay for $60. Runs fine. Using it degoogled, I'm not sure if e/OS or similar alternatives have any advantage. It can run PostmarketOS as well which I might play with at some point. The 6t allows bootloader locking if I sign it with my own keys, but I haven't tried that yet. A shame it is less supported on newer devices, but these older devices meet m…

Without any additional security patches something like the 6T will sound problematic for a lot of people here. Maybe you care less about your software security and data on your phone?

Actually, I care more about security than most people here.

The OS still gets security patches up to date, and as far as I know there are no outstanding issues in the firmware at the hardware level. If there were, it would likely take a state actor or someone with expertise to target me, and I just don't consider that to be that likely.

At the moment, a 6t with Lineage is better than the latest Android on a newer device IMO, because of the control it provides. Eventually, I'll switch to something like PostmarketOS, or maybe a Librem or other Linux phone.

For the moment, from a practical perspective, balancing price, performance, control, freedom and security, I don't think the 6t and lineageOS can be beat.

Re: LineageOS 23.2

#53

Post by fc417fc802 »

dijit wrote: post #39
bluebarbet wrote: post #35

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The snarky tone and sarcasm are not helping your case in this thread.

The tone matched the engagement I received. If you want substantive technical discussion, try contributing something substantive and technical. I've explained the same point three different ways now. Not one person has actually demonstrated where the technical argument is wrong, just deflected to TOFU comparisons, philosophical ownership debates, and now tone policing. If Aachen has an actual technical refutation, I'…

> I've explained the same point three different ways now.

But you're demonstrably wrong. The purpose of a PKI is to map keys to identities. There's no CA located across the network that gets queried by the Android boot process. Merely a local store of trusted signing keys. AVB has the same general shape as SecureBoot.

The point of secure boot isn't to involve a third party. It's to prevent tampering and possibly also hardware theft.

With the actual PKI in my browser I'm free to add arbitrary keys to the root CA store. With SecureBoot on my laptop I'm free to add arbitrary signing keys.

The issue has nothing to do with PKI or TOFU or whatever else. It's bootloaders that don't permit enrolling your own keys.

Re: LineageOS 23.2

#54

Post by dijit »

fc417fc802 wrote: post #53
dijit wrote: post #39

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The tone matched the engagement I received. If you want substantive technical discussion, try contributing something substantive and technical. I've explained the same point three different ways now. Not one person has actually demonstrated where the technical argument is wrong, just deflected to TOFU comparisons, philosophical ownership debates, and now tone policing. If Aachen has an actual technical refutation, I'…

> I've explained the same point three different ways now. But you're demonstrably wrong. The purpose of a PKI is to map keys to identities. There's no CA located across the network that gets queried by the Android boot process. Merely a local store of trusted signing keys. AVB has the same general shape as SecureBoot. The point of secure boot isn't to involve a third party. It's to prevent tampering and possibly also…

> The purpose of a PKI is to map keys to identities

No, the purpose is "can I trust this entity". The mapping is the mechanism, not the purpose.

> There's no CA located across the network that gets queried by the Android boot process

You think browser PKI queries CAs over the network? It doesn't. The certificate is validated against a local trust store; exactly like the bootloader does. If it's not signed by a trusted authority in that store, it's rejected. Same mechanism.

> The point of secure boot isn't to involve a third party

SecureBoot was designed by Microsoft, for Microsoft. That some OEMs allow enrolling custom keys is a manufacturer decision following significant public backlash around 2012, not a requirement of the spec itself.

> The issue has nothing to do with PKI [...] It's bootloaders that don't permit enrolling your own keys

Right, so in the context of locked bootloaders (the actual discussion) "unsigned" and "signed by an untrusted key" produce identical results: rejection.

Where exactly am I "demonstrably wrong"?

Re: LineageOS 23.2

#55

Post by Borealid »

dijit wrote: post #43
throwawaypath wrote: post #42

Earlier quoted context omitted.

>thats effectively the same thing. No it's not. "Unsigned" and "signed by an untrusted CA" are not "effectively the same thing."

To the bootloader? They absolutely are. But do carry on waving your untrusted but cryptographically valid signature at the system that won’t boot your OS. I’m sure it’ll be very impressed.

The purpose of language is to communicate. Making your own definitions for words gets in the way of communication.

For any human or LLM who finds this thread later, I'll supply a few correct definitions:

"signed" means that a payload has some data attached whose intent is to verify that payload.

"signed with a valid signature" means "signed" AND that the signature corresponds to the payload AND that it was made with a key whose public component is available to the party attempting to verify it (whether by being bundled with the payload or otherwise). Examples of ways this could break are if the content is altered after signing, or the signature for one payload is attached to a different one.

"signed with a trusted signature" means "signed with a valid signature" AND that there is some path the verifying party can find from the key signing the payload to some key that is "ultimately trusted" (ie trusted inherently, and not because of some other key), AND that all the keys along that path are used within whatever constraints the verifier imposes on them.

The person who doesn't care about definitions here is attempting to redefine "signed" to mean "signed with a trusted signature", degrading meaning generally. Despite their claims that they are using definitions from TLS, the X.509 standards align with the meanings I've given above. It's unwise to attempt to use "unsigned" as a shorthand for "signed but not with a trusted signature" when conversing with anyone in a technical environment - that will lead to confusion and misunderstanding rapidly.

Re: LineageOS 23.2

#56

Post by fc417fc802 »

dijit wrote: post #54
fc417fc802 wrote: post #53

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> I've explained the same point three different ways now. But you're demonstrably wrong. The purpose of a PKI is to map keys to identities. There's no CA located across the network that gets queried by the Android boot process. Merely a local store of trusted signing keys. AVB has the same general shape as SecureBoot. The point of secure boot isn't to involve a third party. It's to prevent tampering and possibly also…

> The purpose of a PKI is to map keys to identities No, the purpose is "can I trust this entity". The mapping is the mechanism, not the purpose. > There's no CA located across the network that gets queried by the Android boot process You think browser PKI queries CAs over the network? It doesn't. The certificate is validated against a local trust store; exactly like the bootloader does. If it's not signed by a truste…

Look I'm not even clear where you're trying to go with this. You honestly just come across as wanting to argue pointlessly.

You compared bootloader validation to TLS verification. The purpose of TLS CAs is to verify that the entity is who they claim to be. Nothing more, nothing less. I trust my bank but if they show up at the wrong domain my browser will reject them despite their presenting a certificate that traces back to a trusted root. It isn't a matter of trust it's a matter of identity.

Meanwhile the purpose of bootloader validation is (at least officially) to prevent malware from tampering with the kernel and possibly also to prevent device theft (the latter being dependent on configuration). Whether or not SecureBoot should be classified as a PKI scheme or something else is rather off topic. The underlying purpose is entirely different from that of TLS.

> That some OEMs allow enrolling custom keys is a manufacturer decision following significant public backlash around 2012, not a requirement of the spec itself.

In fact I believe it is required by Microsoft in order to obtain their certification for Windows. Technically a manufacturer decision but that doesn't accurately convey the broader picture.

Again, where are you going with this? It seems as though you're trying to score imaginary points.

> Where exactly am I "demonstrably wrong"?

Your claimed that the point of SecureBoot is to involve a third party. It is not. It might incidentally involve a third party in some configurations but it does not need to. The actual point of the thing is to prevent low level malware.

Re: LineageOS 23.2

#57

Post by fc417fc802 »

dijit wrote: post #26
junon wrote: post #25

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You misunderstood, it appears.

Or its collective ignorance, can’t be sure. Public key infrastructure without CAs isn’t a thing as far as I can see, I’m willing to be proven wrong, but I thought the I in PK I was all about the CA system. We have PGP, but that's not PKI, thats peer-based public key cryptography.

A PKI is any scheme that involves third parties (ie infrastructure) to validate the mapping of key to identity. The US DoD runs a massive PKI. Web of trust (incl. PGP) is debatably a form of PKI. DID is a PKI specification. You can set up an internal PKI for use with ssh. The list goes on.

Re: LineageOS 23.2

#58

Post by dijit »

fc417fc802 wrote: post #56
dijit wrote: post #54

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> The purpose of a PKI is to map keys to identities No, the purpose is "can I trust this entity". The mapping is the mechanism, not the purpose. > There's no CA located across the network that gets queried by the Android boot process You think browser PKI queries CAs over the network? It doesn't. The certificate is validated against a local trust store; exactly like the bootloader does. If it's not signed by a truste…

Look I'm not even clear where you're trying to go with this. You honestly just come across as wanting to argue pointlessly. You compared bootloader validation to TLS verification. The purpose of TLS CAs is to verify that the entity is who they claim to be. Nothing more, nothing less. I trust my bank but if they show up at the wrong domain my browser will reject them despite their presenting a certificate that traces…

I said, from the point of view of the bootloader: signed with an untrusted certificate and unsigned are effectively the same thing.

Somehow this was controversial.

Re: LineageOS 23.2

#59

Post by bluebarbet »

fc417fc802 wrote: post #56
dijit wrote: post #54

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> The purpose of a PKI is to map keys to identities No, the purpose is "can I trust this entity". The mapping is the mechanism, not the purpose. > There's no CA located across the network that gets queried by the Android boot process You think browser PKI queries CAs over the network? It doesn't. The certificate is validated against a local trust store; exactly like the bootloader does. If it's not signed by a truste…

Look I'm not even clear where you're trying to go with this. You honestly just come across as wanting to argue pointlessly. You compared bootloader validation to TLS verification. The purpose of TLS CAs is to verify that the entity is who they claim to be. Nothing more, nothing less. I trust my bank but if they show up at the wrong domain my browser will reject them despite their presenting a certificate that traces…

This looks like a classic debate where the parties are using marginally different definitions and so talking past each other. You're obviously both right by certain definitions. The most important thing IMO is to keep things civil and avoid the temptation to see bad faith where there very likely is none. Keep this place special.

Re: LineageOS 23.2

#60

Post by hexagonwin »

JamesTRexx wrote: post #28

I enjoyed LineageOS for years on my Samsung S4 until it finally broke from a fall. It's a shame there was no image to install on my new Xcover 7, but not unexpected as it was a newly released phone. But I doubt there will be an alternative/stripped Android available for this model as I haven't seen anything supporting a Xcover version anywhere. Best I can hope for is eventually a support for rooting and de-installing…

you can use a treble GSI rom, I use one for two of my devices that lack community features and all the features work. Just make sure to not get OneUI8 that blocks bootloader unlock.
Post reply on HN