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How I discovered a hidden microphone on a Chinese NanoKVM

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Re: How I discovered a hidden microphone on a Chinese NanoKVM

#51
post #45

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It is possible to keylog via audio. https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/10190721

It would take an especially perverse mind to keylog using audio on a KVM , though. The KVM basically has access to everything, any secondary spying using a microphone or a camera would provide very little added value.

Maybe it's for the super secret stuff that the datacenter emergency ops worker knows not to type through the KVM? ;-)

Re: How I discovered a hidden microphone on a Chinese NanoKVM

#52
post #23

Earlier quoted context omitted.

No, because the drive circuit for a speaker is the opposite of the circuit for a microphone. The output stage of a speaker amplifier is just that, an output . The only way to record audio from a speaker, which is totally possible, is to have also purposely built an input stage also attached to the speaker. Which at that point you might as well just use a microphone... Audio input and output are not reversible.

I don't know what you mean here, I can plug a speaker into my mic slot and use that to record, just as plugging a mic into the speaker slot gives a (crappy) speaker.

Because on your computer the engineers purposely put a switch that can direct the signal to either the input hardware or the output hardware.

It's not a mic slot, it's a general analog I/O port with a 3.5mm form factor.

Re: How I discovered a hidden microphone on a Chinese NanoKVM

#53
Once I dissected the code of a FDA-approved medical device, Vendys Endothelix. If connected to the internet, the device would covertly send measurement data to a specific email address. The usernames and comments baked in the code suggested Chinese development. I would be curious to know what percentage of our highly sensitive data ends up overseas.

Re: How I discovered a hidden microphone on a Chinese NanoKVM

#54
> To summarize: the device is riddled with security flaws, originally shipped with default passwords, communicates with servers in China, comes preinstalled with hacking tools, and even includes a built-in microphone

So like pretty much any BMC out there, just with the benefit that an attacker taking over that thing doesn't have direct access to reflash your bios with a backdoored version?

Any halfway sane person deployed any kind of BMC or networked KVM to a access restricted management VLAN for at least a decade now because all of those things are a big mess, and the impact of them getting owned typically is pretty severe.

Re: How I discovered a hidden microphone on a Chinese NanoKVM

#56

Once I dissected the code of a FDA-approved medical device, Vendys Endothelix. If connected to the internet, the device would covertly send measurement data to a specific email address. The usernames and comments baked in the code suggested Chinese development. I would be curious to know what percentage of our highly sensitive data ends up overseas.

I think it's safe (or maybe prudent) to assume that pretty much all phones, computers, and network switching gear are backdoored by someone.

Re: How I discovered a hidden microphone on a Chinese NanoKVM

#57
post #38

You are using a KVM. When not trusting the manufacturer a microphone is the least of your problems xD

This said wildly inappropriate features included do violate the principle of least user authorization. You expect if your KVM gets hacked your servers are pretty fucked, the problem now is any conversation you had by the KVM is suspect too.

Goes along with 'the S in IOT stands for security'.

Re: How I discovered a hidden microphone on a Chinese NanoKVM

#58

To be fair, the microphone _is_ listed on the specsheet of the LicheeRV Nano https://wiki.sipeed.com/hardware/en/lichee/RV_Nano/1_intro.h... I assume they didn't intend to put a mic on the KVM product, but they wanted to make a KVM product, already had this SBC product, which reusing their existing stock of helped keep cost low. Should they have been more up front about it it? Sure, and it's not great that they had a…

The Chinese part makes one think the Chinese could access the microphone. Nevermind that, if they could access the device, they'd also be able to read your kvm i/o.

And rather than "the Chinese", how about "anyone robo-dialling some SSH connections"?
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