Even assuming SGX is to be trusted and somehow the government would not be able to peek inside (implausible), this "tech" will not solve legal problems... see "tornado cash" for an example. "No logs" is either impossible, illegal or a honeypot.
A privacy VPN you can verify
51–60 of 160 posts
Re: A privacy VPN you can verify
#52Earlier quoted context omitted.
> Can I know for sure that this isn't a compromised SGX configuration, since the system has been broken in the past? As far as I'm aware, no. Any network protocol can be spoofed, with varying degrees of difficulty. I would love to be wrong.
> Any network protocol can be spoofed, with varying degrees of difficulty. Because of the cryptographic verifications, the communication cannot be spoofed.
Pray tell how a black box peer can validate its not had its private keys cloned?
Re: A privacy VPN you can verify
#53Earlier quoted context omitted.
> Can I know for sure that this isn't a compromised SGX configuration, since the system has been broken in the past? As far as I'm aware, no. Any network protocol can be spoofed, with varying degrees of difficulty. I would love to be wrong.
Intel audits configuration on system launch and verifies it runs something they know safe. That involves CPU, CPU microcode, BIOS version and a few other things (SGX may not work if you don't have the right RAM for example). The final signature comes in the form of a x509 cerificate signed with ECDSA. What's more important to me is that SGX still has a lot of security researchers attempting (and currently failing) to…
Depends on your threat model. You cannot, under any circumstance, prove (mathematically) that a peer is the only controller of a private key.
Again, I would love to know if I'm wrong.
The fact that no publicly disclosed threat actor has been identified says nothing.
Re: A privacy VPN you can verify
#54I don't buy this.
They could run one secure enclave runningng the legit version of code and one insecure hardware running insecure software.
Then they put a load balancer in front of both.
When people ask for the attestation the LB sends traffic to the secure enclave, so you get the attestation back and all seems good.
When people send vpn traffic the loadbalancer sends them to the insecure hardware with insecure software.
So sgx proves nothing..
Re: A privacy VPN you can verify
#55Earlier quoted context omitted.
Cryptocurrencies? Aka the least private form of transactions, where not only the sender and receiver know, but the whole block chain immutably stores for everyone else to view?
So what do you suggest instead?
Semi-serious: redeemable codes you can buy at a national retail chain, ostensibly using cash. It has the unfortunate side effect of training people to fall for scams, however. Bonus points if you can somehow make the codes worthless on the black market, I guess.
Re: A privacy VPN you can verify
#56One of the many reasons I love Mullvad (been using it for 4 years now) is their simple pricing—$5/month whether you subscribe monthly, yearly, or even 10 years out.
I wanted to give your product a try, but the gap between the 1-month and 2-year plans is so big that a single month feels like a rip-off, while I’m not ready to commit to 2 years either.
On payments: for a privacy-focused product, Monero isn’t just a luxury, it’s a must (at least for me). A VPN that doesn’t accept Monero forces users into surveillance finance, since card and bank payments are legally preserved forever by processors. That means even if the VPN “keeps no logs,” the payment trail still ties your real identity to the service.
Re: A privacy VPN you can verify
#57Earlier quoted context omitted.
I really am interested in how this works. How can the client software verify that the SGX attestation actually is from the same machine as the VPN connection? I guess there's probably an answer here, but I don't know enough about SGX.
The way this works is by generating a private key inside the enclave and having the CPU attest its public key. This allows generating a self signed TLS certificate that includes the attestation (under OID 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.105.1) and a client connecting verifying the TLS certificate not via the standard chain of trust, but by reading the attestion, verifying the attestation itself is valid (properly signed, matching me…
Hmm. That really does seem pretty clever, and if it works the way it sounds like it does, obviously does resolve most of the concerns around how this would work and avoid obvious pitfalls. I still stand by the more obvious concern (paranoid people probably don't trust that Intel SGX isn't possible for powerful actors to compromise) but I do understand why one would pursue this avenue and find it valuable.
Re: A privacy VPN you can verify
#58They claim to allow anonymous sign up and payments, but requires an email,an account, zip code and name for Crypto payments, but fake info could be used I guess. I tried ordering via Crypto, but it constantly gives me this error: "Unable to load order information. Try again". Honestly, I feel more comfortable using Mullvad. This team has some folks with questionable backgrounds and I wouldn't trust Intel. Also VPN pr…
Being outside the US doesn’t shield you from it. And worse, it is harder for the American government to eavesdrop on US soil than it is outside America. Of course, if a national spying apparatus is after you, regardless of the nation, pretty good chance jurisdiction doesn’t matter.
> And worse, it is harder for the American government to eavesdrop on US soil
The GP mentioned Snowden and yet you say this. What material and significant changes have happened since 2013 to make this claim?
Re: A privacy VPN you can verify
#59Someone had a comment here that just disappeared, mentioning it's by Mark Karpelès (yes, the same guy from MtGox) and Andrew Lee. Why did that remark get deleted?
And that's the PIA Andrew Lee, not the Firebase Andrew Lee.
Re: A privacy VPN you can verify
#60This is honestly less trustworthy than nordvpn from my POV. The problem with confidential compute is that given enough technical expertise (ime exploits) all these systems are possible to compromise which is perfect for honeypots. Kinda sounds like one of those interpol plots with phones designed for criminals.
I always found confidential compute to be only good to isolate the hosting company from risk - not the customer!