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0-click deanonymization attack targeting Signal, Discord, other platforms

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Re: 0-click deanonymization attack targeting Signal, Discord, other platforms

#51
post #32

> it's possible for an attacker to run a cache geolocation attack to find out which local datacenter they're near--similar to how law enforcement track mobile devices through cell phone towers. very much disagree on this, they track mobile devices through your connection strength to multiple cellular towers while this attack proves which singular datacenter the victim is nearest. Don’t get me wrong the write up is re…

> Don’t get me wrong the write up is really interesting but it does feel like the author is a bit of a sensationalist. They claim to be 15 years old. Cut them some slack.

"bit of a sensationalist" is reasonable feedback; no slack needed. After all, this is how they learn.

Re: 0-click deanonymization attack targeting Signal, Discord, other platforms

#53
post #31

What's old is new. Does anyone remember the forum signatures that would display the viewers IP address and location on a little wooden signpost held up by a troll-looking creature? https://cdn.geekzone.co.nz/images/forums/danasoftcache.jpg

That was a troll feature. It usually showed any user his own information.

MAYBE some forum doxxed users by posting their informatio? but I didn't see any.

Re: 0-click deanonymization attack targeting Signal, Discord, other platforms

#54
post #40

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Last time I used Cloudflare I think their settings default to only "Origin SSL/TLS" (or whatever they call it), which wouldn't encrypt anything between Cloudflare and the origin, it would only encrypt data between Cloudflare and the end-user/browser.

But the Signal client encrypts images before sending them to the Signal server. If it padded out the images at that point, the images would all be indistinguishable from each other unless Cloudflare were actually able to break the encryption (which would completely undermine the entire security model).

Ah yes, I'm sorry, I mistook the context. If Signal encrypts the images E2E, you're right that it wouldn't matter what Cloudflare does, especially if padded.

Re: 0-click deanonymization attack targeting Signal, Discord, other platforms

#55
post #40

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Aren’t the files end-to-end encrypted? How would they inspect the files?

Last time I used Cloudflare I think their settings default to only "Origin SSL/TLS" (or whatever they call it), which wouldn't encrypt anything between Cloudflare and the origin, it would only encrypt data between Cloudflare and the end-user/browser.

TLS doesn’t matter for End-to-end encrypted stuff though, you could exchange the data over Telnet and it would still be secure. The content itself is already encrypted before being transmitted and can only be decrypted by the receiver.

Re: 0-click deanonymization attack targeting Signal, Discord, other platforms

#56

So if you send a picture to a Signal user, it's retrieved via cloudflare, and cached in a data center near that user; now you can look up the cache status and find the data center used. I'd say "deanonymization" is stretching it, unless the user is in the middle of nowhere (no other users near the data center). But interesting writeup anyway.

It could be useful for correlation. Say for example that you're an investigating agent in regular contact with someone. A single data-point wouldn't mean anything. However, a sequence of daily image retrievals might tell you that they spend 90% of their time in WA and 10% of their time elsewhere. That information alone still might not mean anything, but if you also have a specific suspect in mind, it may help confirm…

There's probably at least a few instances where you send someone you think is American a picture but it gets cached in Moscow, or vice versa. Or you post a meme to a Californian left-wing group and it gets cached in DC. Not hard to imagine situations where getting an unexpected rough location could be a valuable signal.

Re: 0-click deanonymization attack targeting Signal, Discord, other platforms

#57

Cool writeup with some interesting techniques and approaches! I'll echo the other comments and say "deanonymization" is stretching the definition of the word, along with "grab the user's location", as it isn't anything near precise. 150 miles is approx. a 2-hour drive on the highway from Atlanta, GA to Augusta, GA. In that radius, there's probably 700,000+ people. I do think the auto-retrieve attachment feature of Si…

You can disable the auto-download. Settings > Data and storage > Media auto-download, you can choose what to auto download for mobile data/wifi/roaming.

Re: 0-click deanonymization attack targeting Signal, Discord, other platforms

#59
post #15
post #4

This is certainly an "attack" but not one you'd normally associate with zero click. There is no code execution, but some tricks to see which Cloudflare datacenter cached the image -- giving a very rough area the user is in. Impressive and insightful nonetheless.

depending on the circumstance, the rough area might already be useful to adversaries of the person trying to hide. I wouldn't expect things like criminals etc. to suffer from this, 300 miles is a big radius for example... but if you want to know if 'the guy is still in country' or something like that (for instance law enforcement) it's useful for them. such parties could then collaborate with local resources to do fu…

Law enforcement could probably just ask cloudflare for the exact IP address that retrieved the attachment.
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