How common are such small DKIM keys? I'm pretty sure mine are 2048-bit, though I'd have to check as they were last set a fair while ago.
First sentence: > In our study on the SPF, DKIM, and DMARC records of the top 1M websites, we were surprised to uncover more than 1,700 public DKIM keys that were shorter than 1,024 bits in length
Cracking a 512-bit DKIM key for less than $8 in the cloud
51–60 of 433 posts
Re: Cracking a 512-bit DKIM key for less than $8 in the cloud
#52Love the practicality demonstrated here. It is unclear how old this article is. Based on the poster's previous submissions, I assume today?
Re: Cracking a 512-bit DKIM key for less than $8 in the cloud
#53Earlier quoted context omitted.
For a number of years it was (non-officially) thought to be a feature to use weak DKIM keys. Some folks argued that short keys allowed you to preserve deniability, since DKIM signatures would only be short-lived and nobody would be able to use DKIM signatures to prove that any email was authentic. (I’m not saying that this is why most companies used short keys, just that there was a general view that short keys were…
Isn't deniability at odds with DKIM's goal? What would be the point of setting DKIM then? Sure, it helps with spam scores. But most companies rely on a major email provider to send emails, so maybe they wouldn't have deliverability issues anyway?
Deniability and perfect forward secrecy are at odds with how people use email anyway. But that doesn't stop people from demanding both very loudly, and some people from promising them.
Re: Cracking a 512-bit DKIM key for less than $8 in the cloud
#54I think the cynic in me says "so what" mostly because dkim as an ancient technology is hardly secure. I don't think we're any less prone to email fakery and spam. I'd be interested to see a possible new solution or a revamping of email as a protocol but that's unlikely. We're more likely to keep it like snail mail as we prioritise different forms of communication. Unfortunately nothing has beat the universal email ad…
Because email addresses have existed since the begining of the web, anyone who has ever been on the internet has one and uses it for identification purposes. This will not change without another universal standard which everybody automatically has.
Its like IPv4, we all have the ability to use IPv6 but do we? Hell no we just use NAT as its an easier quick fix.
Changing any addressing on the internet is tough because you always have to have backwards compatibilty, which kind of ruins the point of moving forward.
Re: Cracking a 512-bit DKIM key for less than $8 in the cloud
#55Because we need that compute for our React frameworks.
Re: Cracking a 512-bit DKIM key for less than $8 in the cloud
#56Anyone know or have experience how well supported ECDSA is for DKIM?
Re: Cracking a 512-bit DKIM key for less than $8 in the cloud
#57Earlier quoted context omitted.
Probably because RSA 2048 is not yet broken, and once there we still have RSA 4096 to lean back on which is since quite some time the most common key size for most things using RSA (DKIM being one of the exceptions). In the context of DKIM we're waiting for Ed25519 to reach major adoption, which will solve a lot of annoyances for everyone.
> Probably because RSA 2048 is not yet broken […] 3072 has been recommended by various parties for a few years now: * https://www.keylength.com
Re: Cracking a 512-bit DKIM key for less than $8 in the cloud
#58Earlier quoted context omitted.
For a number of years it was (non-officially) thought to be a feature to use weak DKIM keys. Some folks argued that short keys allowed you to preserve deniability, since DKIM signatures would only be short-lived and nobody would be able to use DKIM signatures to prove that any email was authentic. (I’m not saying that this is why most companies used short keys, just that there was a general view that short keys were…
I forget where but someone proposed regularly rotating your DKIM key and publishing old keys for deniability. So you can still use strong keys and provide a level of deniability.
Re: Cracking a 512-bit DKIM key for less than $8 in the cloud
#59Earlier quoted context omitted.
For a number of years it was (non-officially) thought to be a feature to use weak DKIM keys. Some folks argued that short keys allowed you to preserve deniability, since DKIM signatures would only be short-lived and nobody would be able to use DKIM signatures to prove that any email was authentic. (I’m not saying that this is why most companies used short keys, just that there was a general view that short keys were…
Isn't deniability at odds with DKIM's goal? What would be the point of setting DKIM then? Sure, it helps with spam scores. But most companies rely on a major email provider to send emails, so maybe they wouldn't have deliverability issues anyway?
Re: Cracking a 512-bit DKIM key for less than $8 in the cloud
#60Could someone help me understand why we're not dramatically ramping up key sizes across the board on all encryption? Not as a solution, but as a buy-some-time measure. Compute is rapidly increasing, there is continuous chatter about quantum and yet everyone seems to be just staring at their belly buttons. Obviously bigger keys are more expensive in compute, but we've got more too...why only use it on the cracking sid…
What size do you suggest?