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First Council of Nicaea

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Re: First Council of Nicaea

#51

Post by 082349872349872 »

knightoffaith wrote: post #50
082349872349872 wrote: post #47

Earlier quoted context omitted.

For the moment, let's put any "part of/containment/belonging to" relation between creator and created aside (in part due to the subtleties you note; in part because I'm more interested in the necessity and possibility of creations, and —despite having slept on it— don't understand Aquinas yet). (in parentheses: sorry for my ad-hoc notation earlier; I've been looking for a survey paper on Algebraic Theology to find ou…

Sorry for the delay. I think what you've said is generally correct in that: yes, Aquinas thinks that making a thing better is possible insofar as its accidents can be made better, but not its essence since changing its essence would make that thing cease to be that thing. Your sentence analogy is apt. Aquinas does indeed think creation is contingent (though someone like Leibniz does too---it's just that Leibniz think…

Delay is no problem; I've hit the point where I probably won't come up with anything new for another week at least. Thanks for coming back!

Aquinas' point is highly relevant: if both God and his creation were infinitely perfect, they'd be indistinguishable and we'd be back at pantheism.

Re: First Council of Nicaea

#52

Post by knightoffaith »

082349872349872 wrote: post #51
knightoffaith wrote: post #50

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Sorry for the delay. I think what you've said is generally correct in that: yes, Aquinas thinks that making a thing better is possible insofar as its accidents can be made better, but not its essence since changing its essence would make that thing cease to be that thing. Your sentence analogy is apt. Aquinas does indeed think creation is contingent (though someone like Leibniz does too---it's just that Leibniz think…

Delay is no problem; I've hit the point where I probably won't come up with anything new for another week at least. Thanks for coming back! Aquinas' point is highly relevant: if both God and his creation were infinitely perfect, they'd be indistinguishable and we'd be back at pantheism.

To be sure - God and creation being indistinguishable isn't something that Spinoza would agree with either. Two relevant items here.

One is that God has an infinite number of attributes, only two of which are extension and thought (the only ones we can know). All physical things are modes of the attribute of extension, and all "mental" things are modes of the attribute of thought. So if creation just means the set of all physical things (or even "mental" things), these are just the set of all modes of extension, an attribute of God, (along with the set of all modes of thought, another attribute of God, if you include mental things). But these are but extension and thought are but two of the infinitely many attributes of God.

Two is that Spinoza draws a distinction between the set of all of the modes of the attributes of God (Natura naturata) and God himself (Natura naturans). (See the Note of Proposition 29 of Part 1 of Ethics.)

So if by pantheism we mean that God is nothing but the set of all things, Spinoza does not seem to be a pantheist.

That isn't to say that Spinoza is just a perfectly orthodox theologian, of course, but just that reducing the radical nature of his theology to the word "pantheism" (construed as creation and God being the same) appears to be an oversimplification.

(Also, minor note, in the last comment I said Leibniz thinks God actualizes the best possible worlds, that's a typo, I meant the best possible world, singular.)

Re: First Council of Nicaea

#53

Post by 082349872349872 »

knightoffaith wrote: post #52
082349872349872 wrote: post #51

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Delay is no problem; I've hit the point where I probably won't come up with anything new for another week at least. Thanks for coming back! Aquinas' point is highly relevant: if both God and his creation were infinitely perfect, they'd be indistinguishable and we'd be back at pantheism.

To be sure - God and creation being indistinguishable isn't something that Spinoza would agree with either. Two relevant items here. One is that God has an infinite number of attributes, only two of which are extension and thought (the only ones we can know). All physical things are modes of the attribute of extension, and all "mental" things are modes of the attribute of thought. So if creation just means the set of…

thanks for the relevant items. I've started in on https://www.gutenberg.org/files/3800/3800-h/3800-h.htm so it may be a while before I make it back to this thread...

pedantry: 1P29 runs seriously afoul of Quantum Mechanics

Re: First Council of Nicaea

#54

Post by 082349872349872 »

knightoffaith wrote: post #52
082349872349872 wrote: post #51

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Delay is no problem; I've hit the point where I probably won't come up with anything new for another week at least. Thanks for coming back! Aquinas' point is highly relevant: if both God and his creation were infinitely perfect, they'd be indistinguishable and we'd be back at pantheism.

To be sure - God and creation being indistinguishable isn't something that Spinoza would agree with either. Two relevant items here. One is that God has an infinite number of attributes, only two of which are extension and thought (the only ones we can know). All physical things are modes of the attribute of extension, and all "mental" things are modes of the attribute of thought. So if creation just means the set of…

Rough going so far, as Spinoza is both precise and uses words in the senses they had in Scholastic times.

I think I understand how Spinoza is not a pantheist, though: God determines Creation, in that the Creation is the maximal object that could be created from God, and the Creation determines God, in that God is the minimal object that could create the Creation, so they're two very distinct things, but in a 1:1 relationship.

(examples: intension/extension in logic, cones/gamut in vision, grammar/language in informatics)

I'm not sure how easy the distinction between his viewpoint and pantheism would have been to explain to someone with a XVII background, but Aquinas defo would've been unhappy with the "the deity can create any universe he wants, as long as it's black" part.

(hmm. if our universe only uses up two attributes, 'thought' for all the abstracts and 'extent' for all the concretes, are there any other universes lurking in the remaining infinity of attributes? this also opens the question of whether we're dealing with a countable infinity of attributes, or a higher cardinal...)

Re: First Council of Nicaea

#55

Post by 082349872349872 »

082349872349872 wrote: post #54
knightoffaith wrote: post #52

Earlier quoted context omitted.

To be sure - God and creation being indistinguishable isn't something that Spinoza would agree with either. Two relevant items here. One is that God has an infinite number of attributes, only two of which are extension and thought (the only ones we can know). All physical things are modes of the attribute of extension, and all "mental" things are modes of the attribute of thought. So if creation just means the set of…

Rough going so far, as Spinoza is both precise and uses words in the senses they had in Scholastic times. I think I understand how Spinoza is not a pantheist, though: God determines Creation, in that the Creation is the maximal object that could be created from God, and the Creation determines God, in that God is the minimal object that could create the Creation, so they're two very distinct things, but in a 1:1 rela…

this looks useful; a modern formalisation: https://eprints.illc.uva.nl/id/eprint/1537/1/MoL-2017-02.tex...

Re: First Council of Nicaea

#56

Post by 082349872349872 »

082349872349872 wrote: post #55
082349872349872 wrote: post #54

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Rough going so far, as Spinoza is both precise and uses words in the senses they had in Scholastic times. I think I understand how Spinoza is not a pantheist, though: God determines Creation, in that the Creation is the maximal object that could be created from God, and the Creation determines God, in that God is the minimal object that could create the Creation, so they're two very distinct things, but in a 1:1 rela…

this looks useful; a modern formalisation: https://eprints.illc.uva.nl/id/eprint/1537/1/MoL-2017-02.tex...

starting to get a little clearer; was Gödel's proof inspired by Spinoza's? They both use many of the same mathematical tools...

Re: First Council of Nicaea

#57

Post by knightoffaith »

082349872349872 wrote: post #54
knightoffaith wrote: post #52

Earlier quoted context omitted.

To be sure - God and creation being indistinguishable isn't something that Spinoza would agree with either. Two relevant items here. One is that God has an infinite number of attributes, only two of which are extension and thought (the only ones we can know). All physical things are modes of the attribute of extension, and all "mental" things are modes of the attribute of thought. So if creation just means the set of…

Rough going so far, as Spinoza is both precise and uses words in the senses they had in Scholastic times. I think I understand how Spinoza is not a pantheist, though: God determines Creation, in that the Creation is the maximal object that could be created from God, and the Creation determines God, in that God is the minimal object that could create the Creation, so they're two very distinct things, but in a 1:1 rela…

>Creation is the maximal object that could be created from God

Well, just the only one, but I suppose the maximal element of a set with one element is just that element, so yeah.

>Creation determines God, in that God is the minimal object that could create the Creation

Well, the only thing that could create Creation, but I suppose the minimal element of a set with one element is just that element, so yeah.

>Aquinas defo would've been unhappy with the "the deity can create any universe he wants, as long as it's black" part.

Hmm, I don't know what you mean by this. Spinoza isn't saying this, Spinoza is saying that God must have created only this universe, and everything that God does is necessary---there's nothing else he can do.

>if our universe only uses up two attributes

OK, so it's not that our universe is only uses two attributes, it's that we can only perceive things with respect to two attributes. There's only one possible universe, which is this one, and it's necessarily this one.

Re: First Council of Nicaea

#58

Post by knightoffaith »

082349872349872 wrote: post #56
082349872349872 wrote: post #55

Earlier quoted context omitted.

this looks useful; a modern formalisation: https://eprints.illc.uva.nl/id/eprint/1537/1/MoL-2017-02.tex...

starting to get a little clearer; was Gödel's proof inspired by Spinoza's? They both use many of the same mathematical tools...

They are both ontological proofs, yep. Though Godel is using modal logic, which won't be invented for centuries until after Spinoza's time.

Re: First Council of Nicaea

#59

Post by 082349872349872 »

knightoffaith wrote: post #58
082349872349872 wrote: post #56

Earlier quoted context omitted.

starting to get a little clearer; was Gödel's proof inspired by Spinoza's? They both use many of the same mathematical tools...

They are both ontological proofs, yep. Though Godel is using modal logic, which won't be invented for centuries until after Spinoza's time.

oops, I was reading the "contingent things must be dependent upon necessary things" as implying modality, but you're right that if it's there it's only implicit.

Re: First Council of Nicaea

#60

Post by 082349872349872 »

knightoffaith wrote: post #57
082349872349872 wrote: post #54

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Rough going so far, as Spinoza is both precise and uses words in the senses they had in Scholastic times. I think I understand how Spinoza is not a pantheist, though: God determines Creation, in that the Creation is the maximal object that could be created from God, and the Creation determines God, in that God is the minimal object that could create the Creation, so they're two very distinct things, but in a 1:1 rela…

>Creation is the maximal object that could be created from God Well, just the only one, but I suppose the maximal element of a set with one element is just that element, so yeah. >Creation determines God, in that God is the minimal object that could create the Creation Well, the only thing that could create Creation, but I suppose the minimal element of a set with one element is just that element, so yeah. >Aquinas d…

Yes, I was purposely playing with the trivial definitions of maximal and minimal (max{x} = min{x} = x) to draw out an analogy with the modern concept of Galois Connections.

> there's nothing else he can do.

Right, and I thought Aquinas' take was that he must be capable of doing otherwise, but doesn't.

> we can only perceive things with respect to two attributes

Aha, so this universe uses all (are they countable?) attributes, but we imperfect finite creatures only perceive thought and extension; angels might perceive three, or a dozen, or all the attributes? (which would make sense: Samuel Johnson can both think of a rock and perceive its extension of mass in space, but the rock, while it might "perceive" the extension of Johnson's foot in space does not think of Johnson. So a creature beyond us as we are beyond the rock might have metathought? "be not afraid" indeed!)

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