The point here is largely that reality (at our level) is not something which can be simply solved by the application of a couple of rules, from which Right Action will thenceforth necessarily flow. Reality is a big, complex, ball of Stuff, and any attempts to impress morality upon it will be met with many corner cases which produce unwanted results unless we spend our time engaged with dealing with what initially loo…
Bentham's Mugging (2022)
51–60 of 103 posts
Re: Bentham's Mugging (2022)
#52Re: Bentham's Mugging (2022)
#53https://blog.superb-owl.link/p/contra-ozy-brennan-on-ameliat...
Re: Bentham's Mugging (2022)
#54The problem here isn't with the main character's moral philosophy, but with his decision theory. He'd be dealing with exactly the same predicament if the mugger were threatening to harm him . The solution is indeed "don't give in to muggers", but it's possible to define this in a workable way. Suppose the mugger can choose between A (don't try to mug Bentham) or forcing Bentham to choose between B (give in) or C (don…
"Always go for C (or any strategy)" is not in general a utilitarian strategy, so the mugger would not expect Bentham to employ it.
Your argument assumes that the characters have perfect knowledge, but the point of the parody is that utilitarian choices can change as more information is revealed.
Yes, the mugger could have said something like "if I were to promise to cut off my finger unless you gave me £10, would you do it?", Bentham could have have followed up with "if you knew I would reply no to that question, would you make that promise?", the mugger could have replied "no," Bentham could have responded "In that case, no", and the mugger would have walked away. But Bentham doesn't have all the information until he is faced with the loss of a finger which he can prevent by giving up £10. Bentham is obliged to do so, as it maximises the overall good at that (unfortunate) point.
The idea that Bentham can be "trapped" in a situation where he is obliged to cause some small harm to himself in order to prevent a greater harm is the parody of utilitarianism which is at the heart of the story.
Re: Bentham's Mugging (2022)
#55The most pressing problem facing utilitarians has never been choosing between principled vs. consequentialist utilitarianism. It's how to take a vector of utilities, and turn it into a single utility. What function do I use? Do I sum them, is it the mean, how about root-mean-squared? Why does your chosen function make more sense than the other options? Can I perform arithmetic on utilities from two different agents,…
> It's how to take a vector of utilities, and turn it into a single utility. Not just "how", but whether doing such a thing is even possible at all. And even that doesn't push the problem back far enough: first the utilitarian has to assume that utilities, treated as real numbers, are even measurable or well-defined at all.
Re: Bentham's Mugging (2022)
#56Earlier quoted context omitted.
> It's how to take a vector of utilities, and turn it into a single utility. Not just "how", but whether doing such a thing is even possible at all. And even that doesn't push the problem back far enough: first the utilitarian has to assume that utilities, treated as real numbers, are even measurable or well-defined at all.
I don't think a utilitarian requires that utilities are real numbers, just that they satisfy a total ordering.
Re: Bentham's Mugging (2022)
#57The point here is largely that reality (at our level) is not something which can be simply solved by the application of a couple of rules, from which Right Action will thenceforth necessarily flow. Reality is a big, complex, ball of Stuff, and any attempts to impress morality upon it will be met with many corner cases which produce unwanted results unless we spend our time engaged with dealing with what initially loo…
So we end up coming full circle from "here are the rules" to "play each situation by ear". Ethics is just too dang hard!
Re: Bentham's Mugging (2022)
#58> Here's the thing: there is, clearly, more utility in me keeping my finger than in you keeping your measly ten pounds. How is this clear? This is one of the things I find strange about academic philosophy. For all the claims about trying to get at a more rigorous understanding of knowledge, the foundation at the end of the day seems to just be human intuition. You read about something like the Chinese Room or Mary’s…
Re: Bentham's Mugging (2022)
#59Earlier quoted context omitted.
I don't think a utilitarian requires that utilities are real numbers, just that they satisfy a total ordering.
It requires a total ordering and an aggregation function (and to be useful in the real world rather than purely abstract, a reliable and predictive measuring mechanism, but that's a different issue.) I’m pretty sure (intuitively, haven’t considered a formal argument) if both exist, then there is a representation where utilities can be represented as (a subset of) the reals.
Yes. And note that this is true even for just a single person's utilities, i.e., without even getting into the issues of interpersonal comparison. For example, a single person, just to compute their own overall utility (never mind taking into account other people's), has to be able to aggregate their utilities for different things.
> if both exist, then there is a representation where utilities can be represented as (a subset of) the reals.
Yes. In more technical language, total ordering plus an aggregation function means utilities have to be an ordered field, and for any reasonable treatment that field has to have the least upper bound property (i.e., any sequence of members of the field has to have a least upper bound that is also in the field), and the reals are the only set that satisfies those properties.
Re: Bentham's Mugging (2022)
#60I feel like this statement hides something critical, "Here's the thing: there is, clearly, more utility in me keeping my finger than in you keeping your measly ten pounds." My point is that, is that so clear? Or is the utility function being presumed here lacking?
They're all lacking in someway, so sure.