The Soviets had better aircraft, then pilots defected to the US and Americans reverse engineered them.
The F-15 Eagle: Origins and Development, 1964-1972 [pdf]
51–60 of 113 posts
Re: The F-15 Eagle: Origins and Development, 1964-1972 [pdf]
#52Earlier quoted context omitted.
Looks like this is the best you are going to get, some photos in the answer: https://www.quora.com/Did-the-F-15-fighter-plane-have-any-co... Fairchild Republic F-X: https://qph.cf2.quoracdn.net/main-qimg-5032893d14a8556ef65b4... General Dynamics F-X: https://qph.cf2.quoracdn.net/main-qimg-725ce5a1fe83a987224ca... North American Rockwell NA-335: https://qph.cf2.quoracdn.net/main-qimg-aad2b19e0e947f1cc2a4a...
There are drawings of the Fairchild and North American ones in the PDF (page 60) as well. The Fairchild one looks incredibly Ace Combat (I think it's the super wide engine pods).
That’s what I meant. The PDF is the first I’ve seen.
Re: The F-15 Eagle: Origins and Development, 1964-1972 [pdf]
#53Earlier quoted context omitted.
Isn’t the F22 the successor to the F15, being air superiority fighters?
It was but production was scaled back so much, and the peer enemy aircraft it was needed to defeat still largely don't exist yet. As a result the production lines were shut down and equipment moved to permanent storage and other multirole fighters that are usually less expensive end up doing the F22's job. In the horrifying event of a US-China war or similar they'd be front line units along with F-35s and other moder…
Sure, 100% agree w/ all of that. Just pointing out that F15 vs F35 as a fighter isn't the right comparison, as they're not intended to fill the same roles. I think of the F22 as the ultimate expression of the old style of fighters, whereas the F35 is the start of a new style of military aircraft.
Re: The F-15 Eagle: Origins and Development, 1964-1972 [pdf]
#54Earlier quoted context omitted.
This whole "multi-service aircraft can't work" meme has been going for essentially a century, and has been wrong just as long. The F-4 Phantom, probably deserving the title of greatest Western multi-role aircraft of the cold war, had long successful service with both USAF and USN (and USMC), with fewer inter-service airframe differences than between the F-35A and F-35C. Multi-service aircraft are totally workable, th…
I generally agree with your thesis, but: The F-4 was built for the Navy and the other services saw what a great plane it was and bought in. The F-35 is intended as a lightweight multi role aircraft, so it’s full of compromises already. The F-111A/B as a shared USAF/USN aircraft is much harder as there’s not as much margin for compromise in something that is supposed to be the pinnacle of current performance.
I'd say the F-111 is a particularly odd case, given the vastly different initial requirements involved. To be clear, everything that made the F-111 a great long-range interdictor for the USAF would have have also made for a great long-range interceptor and strike platform for the USN. It wouldn't have made a good air superiority fighter, and the experience over Vietnam made it clear that this capability was still very much necessary, and there was nowhere near enough budget (or, more critically, carrier deck and hangar space) for the USN to operate both an air superiority fighter and a dedicated long-range interceptor.
There is a very long list of could-have-been multi-service aircraft, though. If you look at the number of ground-based operators of the F-18, clearly the USAF could have been satisfied with it as well. The USN probably could have been satisfied by a navalized F-22 derivative (the story of 1990s/early 2000s procurement is complicated), the USMC definitely could have been satisfied by a navalized AH-64 rather than developing the AH-1Z, etc.
The services are just very resistant to ever needing to compromise on procurement issues unless Congress and the DoD make it clear that they have to. The USN feels their needs are special, and that the USAF would dominate any shared procurement and force them to compromise too much, while the USAF feels like every pound added for carrier operation is a direct affront. Neither view is entirely wrong - the development delays and compromises of a navalized platform like the Dassault Rafale are another good example of the costs of shared development - but the simple reality of modern aircraft development costs and defense budgets means joint platforms are here to stay.
Re: The F-15 Eagle: Origins and Development, 1964-1972 [pdf]
#55Earlier quoted context omitted.
It's more like the F35 over promises and under delivers compared to what it is expected to replace. The F15 comes with a 20,000 hour airframe, while the F35 comes with a 8000 hour airframe. The F15 can get to target much faster, much farther, and still have fuel to do something when it gets there. The F15 can carry 12 AIM-120s (or 24 depending), while the F35 can carry 4. The F15's a great interceptor. The F35 is a g…
This is why both platforms were designed to be used together as a team. F-35 provides sensor fusion and the F-15 is the missile truck. That also allows the F-35 to continue to evade detection, since launching attacks tends to get you noticed by the enemy. Modern air combat can't be measured in direct comparison like this, or even thought of in terms of "we should be using X instead of Y" The F-35 costs are also going…
It always seemed to me that F-35 is an advanced replacement to F-16, which excelled in networked and multi-role operations.
Of course, by now the networked operations are in use by other aircraft too, just F-16 and F/A-18 operate at the very tip of the multi-role.
Whether the networked use could remain operational in a conflict against technologically advanced enemy (with saturated ECM and comparably aggressive AA systems) is not yet proven. Also with addition of drones, the whole air-dominance becomes a tough objective to attain.
Re: The F-15 Eagle: Origins and Development, 1964-1972 [pdf]
#56> OSD, however, refused to tolerate this kind of intransigence and in May 1966 McNamara ordered a joint review of the commonality issue. Conducted over the next 18 months, the review confirmed that the needs of the Air Force and Navy could not be met by a single airframe. The two services argued that attempts to merge their requirements would produce, at exorbitant cost, a grotesque mutation with increased weight, an…
This whole "multi-service aircraft can't work" meme has been going for essentially a century, and has been wrong just as long. The F-4 Phantom, probably deserving the title of greatest Western multi-role aircraft of the cold war, had long successful service with both USAF and USN (and USMC), with fewer inter-service airframe differences than between the F-35A and F-35C. Multi-service aircraft are totally workable, th…
> This whole "multi-service aircraft can't work" meme has been going for essentially a century, and has been wrong just as long.
I'm not sure that's really the case. When we see successful cross-service adoption, it's because the aircraft simply was that so good the other branch saw a lot of value in buying it. So far the only program that has worked from inception is the F-35. The others failed to get traction in the other service (F-111, F-16). What all other aircraft that have crossed services have in common is iterative design resulting in a superior aircraft:
Air Force to Navy
- F-86 Sabre designed for Air Force, Navy adopted it as FJ2 Fury (straight wing) and FJ3 Fury (swept wing version of FJ2). The FJ3 was a counter to the MIG-15 and was a navalized F-86. It's performance was superior at the time.
Navy to Air Force
- F-4 Phantom II. Naval multi-role fighter was just that good... better than most mission-specialized Air Force fighters at their own missions. Iterative design from the McDonnel F3H Demon that borrowed some ideas from the Douglass F5D Skyray.
- A-7 Corsair II. Naval attack aircraft. It's primary value was that it was inexpensive to operate and hit a sweet spot for payload and range. Iterative design from F-8 Crusader (which was probably the best air superiority fighter of it's era).
Re: The F-15 Eagle: Origins and Development, 1964-1972 [pdf]
#57Earlier quoted context omitted.
Wikipedia disagrees and claims the last BVR missile engagement at BVR range was 30 years ago and BVR missiles are usually combat ineffective. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Beyond-visual-range_missile BVR is kind of a cold war tech; "its WW3 shoot down all the soviet bombers" it doesn't have another mission at this time. To risky to use.
Wikipedia is wrong. Conflicts between two powers where both have fighter jets are infrequent so of course BVR engagements are infrequent, so saying "it hasn't happened in 30 years" would be misleading even if it wasn't incorrect. But it is incorrect, because most engagements in Ukraine ever since the first month of the war have been at beyond visual range. And should a conflict ever break out between China and the US…
BVR engangements are happeneniing when the shooting side discovers the targeted side first. If they don't, it is visual range again. Obviously low observability aircraft, e.g. a F-35 or 22, have an advantage here. But then the other side can have AWACS to guide their attackers. And let's not forget, jets like a Rafale of Eurofighter, or even a F/A-18, have smaller radar signatures than a F-15. An once the stealth aircraft fired their BVR shots, everybody knows where they are. And, given that BVR kills are not instantly, the other side has a window to close in enough to shoot back.
The Phantom (?) initially didn't have a cannon. Why? Becaise before Vietnam everybody thought dog fighting to be obsolete. Then the US Navy created Top Gun, becaise it turned out dog fighting very much did happen. Same for BVR, and as soon as the other side is stealthy enough to be only discovered up close, well, all engagements are going to happen at visiual range again anyway.
Not to forget, a F-22 or F-35 carrying serious load outs, tanks l, missiles, bombs, is pretty mich non-stealthy any way.
Re: The F-15 Eagle: Origins and Development, 1964-1972 [pdf]
#58Earlier quoted context omitted.
That tends to happen because military procurement is always a set of compromises, so there lies a tremendous amount of room for basically arguing about how to weigh the different requirements/criteria/mission sets. Also while the article vindicates Sprey's want of having a lightweight fighter, the reality is that while lightweight fighters did come, they quickly became exactly what Sprey would not have wanted (once t…
The Boyd biography by Robert Coram tells the story of the battle between the Fighter Mafia and the Bomber Generals. It also talks about, what I'd at best call regulatory capture. There was an outrageous series of events around procurement of the Bradley fighting vehicle. An excerpt from the craziness that ensued: "The Bradley was a tragedy waiting to happen. It was packed with ammunition, fuel, and people. The thinne…
Oh that’s grim - and seems so foolish. People will die.
Assuming that is a direct quote, the editor has missed ‘insure’. It should be ’ensure’.
Edit: others have posted possible reasons for the test method which give important context.
Re: The F-15 Eagle: Origins and Development, 1964-1972 [pdf]
#59The Soviets had better aircraft, then pilots defected to the US and Americans reverse engineered them.
Certain aspects were better, yes. That's because the Soviets made different trade-offs in the design -- variously because of doctrine, time constraints, availability of exotic materials (and the ability to use them in manufacturing), and "helpful" direction from Moscow.
The MiG-25 "Foxbat" is a famous example. To succeed in it's role as an high-speed interceptor it should have been made from titanium. But it's a very expensive and difficult metal to work with, so temperature critical parts were instead made from stainless steel. In the west there were lots of jokes about it rusting in the rain and the use of vacuum tubes, but tubes allowed it to have a very powerful radar. Plus that's what they had to work with (the Soviets having great difficulties making high-current semiconductors).
Re: The F-15 Eagle: Origins and Development, 1964-1972 [pdf]
#60I got to see F-15s flying every day for almost three years pretty close up. They are amazing machines.
I get to see them flying at low level pretty much daily, as I live on the Mach Loop in Wales where they practice. The howl as they go over never gets old, though I guess I’d feel very differently if they weren’t just training.