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Web fingerprinting is worse than I thought

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Re: Web fingerprinting is worse than I thought

#51
post #41

Earlier quoted context omitted.

What makes you think that this is a worthwhile addition to the world?

We're focused on serving ethical use cases such as combating fraud, account takeover, scams and more.

But if I was a fraudster you'd still take my money, right?

Re: Web fingerprinting is worse than I thought

#52

Surely if your website collects data using browser fingerprinting this is covered by GDPR and you have to tell your visitors/ask for permission? https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2018/06/gdpr-and-browser-finge...

GDPR doesn't really apply outside of Europe, despite what the EU might claim.

also, one could just roll it up into a wall of fine print or something, no? who reads these things anyway?

Re: Web fingerprinting is worse than I thought

#53
post #4

It's important to know that the mentioned "resistFingerprinting" breaks a lot of the web. Examples include the back button, uploading photos on some websites uploads random data instead of the photo, etc.

For the photo problem you can give explicit permission for the website to use Canvas and then reupload the photo. It's annoying, but oh well.

Re: Web fingerprinting is worse than I thought

#55
post #15

I wish browsers did more to combat this. There should be ways to randomize or normalize every bit of information they try to gather.

It’s a double edged sword you need to walk the edge of. Almost everything they use to fingerprint you has a fully legitimate use case which is why it was added. The more you do to prevent fingerprinting the more you hobble the web as a platform. A lot of restrictions that got placed on the canvas tag to help prevent fingerprinting for instance really limited its functionality. In my opinion a workable solution would…

Well, we could fingerprint the fingerprint detection code ...

Re: Web fingerprinting is worse than I thought

#56
post #4

It's important to know that the mentioned "resistFingerprinting" breaks a lot of the web. Examples include the back button, uploading photos on some websites uploads random data instead of the photo, etc.

I just tried putting it on with the idea of trying it out for one workday to see if it breaks something. It immediataly broke favicons on my GitLab tabs (turning them into random vertical stripes of pixels), which is both odd and a pretty bad start.

I really like the idea behind this feature, but it seems the Web API might have become too complex to counteract bad actors like this. It's particularly scary that it can correlate your activity in private mode with your identity in normal mode.

Re: Web fingerprinting is worse than I thought

#57

Look, forget about threat models. It's relatively trivial these days to avoid fingerprinting attacks if you want to (as a private, web browsing individual). I use fingerprinting actively in enterprise apps as a form of silent 3FA. It's a useful backstop. If I have a user who forgot their password but retrieves it via email, I'll usually let them pass if their fingerprint matches one of their priors; otherwise my soft…

"It's relatively trivial these days to avoid fingerprinting attacks". Why should it be on me to avoid them? And more importantly, it's NOT trivial.

Re: Web fingerprinting is worse than I thought

#58
post #7

Earlier quoted context omitted.

This would be one of the things about IPv6, we'd have lifetime fixed IP addresses (or address ranges at least). Wouldn't we?

There's "Privacy Extension" for that, from https://labs.ripe.net/author/johanna_ullrich/ipv6-addresses-... > The IPv6 Privacy Extension is defined in RFC 4941. It is a format defining temporary addresses that change in regular time intervals; successive addresses appear unrelated to each other for outsiders and are a means of protection against address correlation. Their regular change is independent from the network…

Thanks, can you answer a couple of questions:

So carriers (ISPs) still would need to do NAT, the RFC didn't seem (I skimmed) explicit?

Isn't the removal of processing traffic a large part of the sell for IPv6.

Also, surely the ISP can sell IP-to-user correlation lists as I assume they do now? They can presumably do it anonymously bit with some other party seeking the other part of the data that allows deobfuscation of users (eg to comply with GDRP)?

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