Earlier quoted context omitted.
See sibling thread, we're being duplicated; the point of this OAuth flow is to sign in on a different device , using the trusted one. That different device might be a legitimate TV with a TPM and cryptographic attestations that it truly belong to John Doe, there is still no way for your iPhone and Apple to check whether you meant to sign in to John Doe's TV or if they are a scammer and sent you the (legitimate) sign-…
It's essentially an enrollment workflow using an existing enrolled device, yes?
Making unphishable 2FA phishable
51–56 of 56 posts
Re: Making unphishable 2FA phishable
#52Earlier quoted context omitted.
Normally iirc oauth will just transport the token in a browser redirect to the allowed domain that linked to the login page. evil.com will not be allowed, or if it is the token will end up scoped to evil.com.
If evil.com requests access to manage my Twitter account, and it fools me into accepting, why does it matter how the token is transported? Evil.com now has access to my Twitter account.
Re: Making unphishable 2FA phishable
#53Earlier quoted context omitted.
AllowTcpForwarding no ftl
eh if you have shell access anyway this is easy to circumvent.
Re: Making unphishable 2FA phishable
#54https://embracethered.com/blog/posts/2022/device-code-phishi...
Re: Making unphishable 2FA phishable
#55Earlier quoted context omitted.
eh if you have shell access anyway this is easy to circumvent.
"If" is a good word. The setting above is usually being used in environments where network security is a bit paranoid, so shell access won't help against lack of a hole through the firewall somewhere in-between, unless there's a way to use avian carriers.
Re: Making unphishable 2FA phishable
#56Earlier quoted context omitted.
Copy and paste means a user can be phished. The user can copy and paste it to an attacker.
The token could be made only usable by the cli process that asked for it (should be really).
1. Attacker runs the cli process to generate the URL
2. Attacker sends the URL to the victim saying "as a second factor verification, you need to copy this code into this form"
3. Victim does it
4. Attacker enters the code into the original cli process