It gets "leaked" to a web app that I'm choosing to connect to? Why do I care?
Yeah we don't need privacy, especially to third party extensions loaded by sites, we should just set our user agent to our full name, address and phone number.
Chromium based browsers leak user local IP via WebRTC foundation attribute
51–60 of 88 posts
Re: Chromium based browsers leak user local IP via WebRTC foundation attribute
#52How to disable WebRTC on Firefox Mobile? I have uBlock which prevents from leaking the local IP but I don't want WebRTC at all. Why did they take about:config from us?
Damned if you do, damned if you don’t. Disabling WebRTC would make your Firefox instance extremely unique and thus easily fingerprinted.
Having WebRTC enabled can be dangerous for other reasons. You could be seeding a torrent unknowingly just by visiting a website. This can turn into a freaking disaster if you live in country like Germany.
It's a shame that browsers don't ask you for WebRTC like they do with webcams.
Re: Chromium based browsers leak user local IP via WebRTC foundation attribute
#53Earlier quoted context omitted.
I don't think that there are many people using WebRTC especially within the same LAN, but fingerprinting is used by almost every commercial site. So I can assume that this "feature" was used in 99.99% cases for fingerprinting. This shows how browser developers race to push new features without proper estimation of privacy concerns. Luckily this was somewhat fixed by using randomized Apple mDNS names instead of IPs. B…
> But as a result the browser has to support Apple DNS protocol which can potentially increase attack surface. The "Apple" DNS protocol is standard DNS, over a multicast IP address, on port 5353. You can literally use plain old dig to perform mDNS lookups: $ dig @224.0.0.251 -p 5353 +short hello.local 192.168.123.45 If DNS lookups considerably increase your attack surface, something is very, very wrong with your arch…
The DNS names WebRTC generates for this purpose are random, and known only to the signaling participants.
Re: Chromium based browsers leak user local IP via WebRTC foundation attribute
#54How to disable WebRTC on Firefox Mobile? I have uBlock which prevents from leaking the local IP but I don't want WebRTC at all. Why did they take about:config from us?
Yeah, that one was as annoying as what they did to extensions, but at least the Fennec build in F-Droid has it enabled. https://f-droid.org/en/packages/org.mozilla.fennec_fdroid/
Re: Chromium based browsers leak user local IP via WebRTC foundation attribute
#55https://webrtcforthecurious.com/
WebRTC is designed to be secure, so a privacy leak is not good.
Re: Chromium based browsers leak user local IP via WebRTC foundation attribute
#56What’s the issue there? How is knowing the local IP a security issue? And FWIW, the local IP does not get leaked when using a VPN. (edit: Or rather, the VPN local IP gets leaked. Same question, no idea if that’s security relevant in some way?) edit: Thanks everyone, I completely forgot about fingerprinting.
Leaking any kind of data is yet another data point for fingerprinting. You only need a few to uniquely identify a user.
Re: Chromium based browsers leak user local IP via WebRTC foundation attribute
#57I use two browsers. One with WebRTC disabled (Firefox) and one with WebRTC enabled (Safari/Chromium). The former also runs a myriad of other addons which increase privacy. The latter I use to connect to PiKVM.
Re: Chromium based browsers leak user local IP via WebRTC foundation attribute
#58Re: Chromium based browsers leak user local IP via WebRTC foundation attribute
#59If you are unfamiliar with WebRTC I recommend checking out "WebRTC for the Curious": https://webrtcforthecurious.com/ WebRTC is designed to be secure, so a privacy leak is not good.
Maybe it would have made more sense to make peer-to-peer opt-in explicit?
Re: Chromium based browsers leak user local IP via WebRTC foundation attribute
#60If you are unfamiliar with WebRTC I recommend checking out "WebRTC for the Curious": https://webrtcforthecurious.com/ WebRTC is designed to be secure, so a privacy leak is not good.
WebRTC is designed to support direct peer-to-peer connections so the privacy leak is required. Maybe it would have made more sense to make peer-to-peer opt-in explicit?
The concern was dialog fatigue. If a web site prompts permission to ‘gather local candidates’ most users are just going to hit OK. So this wouldn’t stop abusive uses of WebRTC as hoped.