Live data from Hacker News

Avoiding Internet Centralization

mnot.github.io

51–60 of 111 posts

Re: Avoiding Internet Centralization

#51

Earlier quoted context omitted.

LE also forces you to rely on DNS, which is highly centralized..

How is DNS centralised?

Well on a technical level there are root servers. But DNS is a hierarchy and so if the root servers ever tried to pull a fast one there are second-in-command authorities that could take over: the cctld orgs. People would rather follow their lead than ICANN, so they have the real power. I'm pretty sure this is by design.

Re: Avoiding Internet Centralization

#52
post #21
post #5

A recent example is "Message Layer Security". While Wire and Matrix are working on a decentralized version the IETF is, unfortunately, working towards one based on a central entity. Source: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=25102916 https://matrix.org/blog/2021/06/25/this-week-in-matrix-2021-...

Interesting to see Wire, and Matrix making an effort in this. Unlike Signal which still requires your phone number and is completely centralized to their servers whist promoting their 85% pre-mined cryptocurrency that they can dump at any time.

[deleted]

Re: Avoiding Internet Centralization

#53

Something not really covered is this concept: "Maybe don't let one telecom company acquire too much control". Look at the history of everything that was acquired by either Qwest/CenturyLink or Level3, and then the merger of Level3. You can't tell me that the existence of Lumen, the combined Centurylink-Level3 entity is good for anyone, except for their shareholders. It's the very definition of too much centralization…

Starlink should help with this by bypassing traditional networks.

They are the definition of centralized.

Re: Avoiding Internet Centralization

#54

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Right. Even putting aside blockchain-based systems, you can have systems without a dictator because they're based on voting. Suppose the root is a set of public keys, each with a top level domain. Adding one requires a supermajority of the others to agree. Removing one is impossible; it can sign its own successor and that's it. You now have a federated system with no single chokepoint.

> because they're based on voting All voting systems require protection against Sybil attacks. The best methods to protect against Sybil attacks are centralized. The not-best methods use proof of work, which has extreme downsides and only makes Sybil attacks expensive, not impossible.

Sybil attacks aren't possible in what was just described though since it requires a vote to create a new voter.

Re: Avoiding Internet Centralization

#56
post #3

> Some protocols require the introduction of centralization risk that is unavoidable by nature. For example, when there is a need a single, globally coordinated 'source of truth', that facility is by nature centralized. No, there is nothing unavoidable in making a centralized DNS system.

What? Practical addressability requires centralization by definition. How could it work otherwise?

Re: Avoiding Internet Centralization

#57
post #2

> 5.2. Encrypt, Always: When deployed at scale, encryption can be an effective technique to reduce many inherited centralization risks. ... The problem here is the word "Always". Encryption is good for just the reasons they say. But only encryption, always encryption, not having an option for plain text is highly centralizing in itself. This is because the current status quo for encryption is to use TLS based on cert…

> This is because the current status quo for encryption is to use TLS based on certificate authorities. Not everything has to be TLS or even HTTP. Look at messaging apps. Signal is encrypted, but the end-to-end encryption it uses isn't TLS and doesn't use certificate authorities. > If Lets Encrypt ever goes corrupt like dot Org did it would cause an incredible amount of trouble and that entity would have power over a…

> that any other CA could implement.

For reference, many CAs (even paid ones) have implemented it:

Digicert https://docs.digicert.com/certificate-tools/Certificate-life...

Sectigo (formerly Comodo) https://sectigo.com/resource-library/sectigo-adds-acme-proto...

Re: Avoiding Internet Centralization

#58
post #2

> 5.2. Encrypt, Always: When deployed at scale, encryption can be an effective technique to reduce many inherited centralization risks. ... The problem here is the word "Always". Encryption is good for just the reasons they say. But only encryption, always encryption, not having an option for plain text is highly centralizing in itself. This is because the current status quo for encryption is to use TLS based on cert…

> This is because the current status quo for encryption is to use TLS based on certificate authorities. Not everything has to be TLS or even HTTP. Look at messaging apps. Signal is encrypted, but the end-to-end encryption it uses isn't TLS and doesn't use certificate authorities. > If Lets Encrypt ever goes corrupt like dot Org did it would cause an incredible amount of trouble and that entity would have power over a…

> if you have one bad CA they can sign any domain even if they shouldn't -- but in this case it prevents what you're worried about.

This is why certificate transparency is a thing and most browsers require it for public internet domains[0,1].

0: https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+/refs/heads/...

1: https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT205280

Re: Avoiding Internet Centralization

#59
post #3

> Some protocols require the introduction of centralization risk that is unavoidable by nature. For example, when there is a need a single, globally coordinated 'source of truth', that facility is by nature centralized. No, there is nothing unavoidable in making a centralized DNS system.

What? Practical addressability requires centralization by definition. How could it work otherwise?

See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zooko%27s_triangle for an exploration of the tradeoffs.

Re: Avoiding Internet Centralization

#60

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> because they're based on voting All voting systems require protection against Sybil attacks. The best methods to protect against Sybil attacks are centralized. The not-best methods use proof of work, which has extreme downsides and only makes Sybil attacks expensive, not impossible.

> All voting systems require protection against Sybil attacks. The voting system is the protection against Sybil attacks. A successful Sybil attack would allow you to add your own TLDs, but if you can't already do that then you can't do a Sybil attack. The real issue with that kind of system is deciding on the initial group of voters.

How do the existing group of voters prove to themselves that the to-be-added voter is actually a unique person, and not a sockpuppet? If it’s something like a government ID, then they’ve outsourced the Sybil protection, and not actually gotten rid of it.
Post reply on HN