I worked at Facebook for most of 2017 and 2018. In the first week, they made it clear that you would be fired instantly for any improper access of user data. They further said that if you need to access any sensitive personal data, or if you need to log in as a user in order to debug a problem, you need to have approval from your manager _before_ the access, not after. Also, you are not allowed to access the data of…
A Facebook engineer abused access to user data to track down woman
51–60 of 108 posts
Re: A Facebook engineer abused access to user data to track down woman
#52> At the time, more than 16,000 employees had access to users’ private data, according to the book. > Stamos suggested tightening access to fewer than 5,000 employees and fewer than 100 for particularly sensitive information like passwords. I'm sorry, what? I can tell you the number of legitimate engineers that should have access to user's passwords. It's a nice, round number. It's zero.
"like passwords" probably comes from the journalist and doesn't actually mean that anyone has access to passwords.
Re: A Facebook engineer abused access to user data to track down woman
#53Re: A Facebook engineer abused access to user data to track down woman
#54Re: A Facebook engineer abused access to user data to track down woman
#55Pretty inexcusable by 2015. FB was hardly a new company at that point. Every Googler gets the message that you keep your mitts off private information in logs (or get terminated) drilled into them in their first week of training. Logs access is a) restricted b) audited c) tiered and d) enforced . That was the case in 2011 when I started and it's the case now. Not saying Google is perfect, but it's not like companies…
I know an engineer, a security engineer at Google who is pretty well-known, who went to work at Google specifically so he could get at peoples personal data. I don’t know if he actually does it, but he boasted quite openly for years that he wanted to be the “architect“ and see everything and know everyone’s secrets. He is now a highly placed Google security employee.
Re: A Facebook engineer abused access to user data to track down woman
#56> At the time, more than 16,000 employees had access to users’ private data, according to the book. > Stamos suggested tightening access to fewer than 5,000 employees and fewer than 100 for particularly sensitive information like passwords. I'm sorry, what? I can tell you the number of legitimate engineers that should have access to user's passwords. It's a nice, round number. It's zero.
Is the password sent to Facebook or does it never leave the client? (Genuine question - I have no idea how modern web apps do authentication)
Some insecure websites (not Facebook) may not do this, and instead store your credentials in a database without encryption. It's a terrible idea, and GP's comment seemed to be referring to this when they (correctly) suggested that no one should have access to a database of plain-text passwords.
The replies mostly refer to the fact that even if the password never hits FB's database, there is still code running on authentication servers that handles that password in plain text before it's been encrypted. Limiting engineer access to authentication servers is a good idea, but it'd be challenging to prevent ALL engineers from having access.
Re: A Facebook engineer abused access to user data to track down woman
#57Earlier quoted context omitted.
I'm surprised that this stuff is audit only. At my company, at least in the past five years or so, this type of access has been forbidden to almost all employees. You need to request access to these types of systems and provide justification for why you should have it. Access is controlled on a per-system basis -- it's not blanket access. Many of the most sensitive systems have auto-expiring access for humans. Nowada…
How “sensitive” is facebook user data though? All content in a facebook account is already visible to an average of >100 people - their facebook friends. (Messenger had stronger protections than OP is describing)
Re: A Facebook engineer abused access to user data to track down woman
#58As a side note, he was mostly only interested in having hook ups and orgies with Ukrainian tourist women, while in Egypt, made even more bizarre when we found out he has a wife back in the United States, of which, worked at Apple.
He was not a well liked guy and he was very rude to the Egyptian natives, especially towards the Bedouins.
Re: A Facebook engineer abused access to user data to track down woman
#59I worked at Facebook for most of 2017 and 2018. In the first week, they made it clear that you would be fired instantly for any improper access of user data. They further said that if you need to access any sensitive personal data, or if you need to log in as a user in order to debug a problem, you need to have approval from your manager _before_ the access, not after. Also, you are not allowed to access the data of…
They had this rule at America Online when I worked there early 2000s. It was routinely violated by the managers, and was really only in place for the rank and file to cover their butts. I just assume bad management and executives of Facebook routinely violate peoples privacy by digging through their information, it’s there, and Facebook hasn’t exactly shown an interest in protecting privacy.
The idea that people can just go in and access personal data at Facebook without some sort of actual pre-authorization is insane.
Re: A Facebook engineer abused access to user data to track down woman
#60Earlier quoted context omitted.
Is it not possible to only have the hashes or does it have to get persisted somewhere in the process?
Usually it's in the logs. So small number of SREs can sometimes access them (if there are logged). And even if they are not logged, they can always show up during tcpdump debugging of network issues and such. Client side hashing could solve this, but almost no one does it.
That is definitely not usual