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Hover.com: we store & email passwords in plaintext for usability

help.hover.com

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Re: Hover.com: we store & email passwords in plaintext for usability

#51

Blaming Hover.com is shooting the messenger. The problem here is that this is what customers want . As long as you ask Hover to compete for business in a race to the bottom of the "convenience" barrel, you are going to have this problem. If Hover stop doing this, someone else wil come along and take Hover's business by sending plaintext passwords around in email. So. You either live with it and do your business with…

Trenchant, but ultimately orthogonal.

The Big Problem here isn't that Hover has decided that user convenience warrants storing passwords insecurely. That is a problem, of course, but it is not as big a problem as The Big Problem here.

The Big Problem is the grafs spent defending the soundness of Hover's password storage strategy. Hover does not appear to understand that they have conceded user security. They believe that a combination of their network security and physical security† mitigates these flaws. If you're going to sell out user security to minimize customer support costs, I'd at least like to know that you know that's what you're doing.

That Hover does not appear to know what they are doing suggests that there is much more badness to be had in their systems, which is a problem that will burn them much more painfully than password hashes.

Notably, not application security --- no external auditor would let "user passwords appear in plaintext in a database column" slide.

Re: Hover.com: we store & email passwords in plaintext for usability

#52
post #33

Please correct me if I'm wrong, but... storing password hashes (actually key derived from password) is only meant to secure up password re-use. If there is any other reason, please disregard the text below and just correct me ;-) Isn't password re-use a social problem rather than technical one? Perhaps we ought to use a different -- social -- measure to prevent password reuse. Throwing technical solutions onto social…

For most people the social solution creates a worse usability problem than the one Hover is trying to fix. With unique passwords, the user is now responsible for maintaining (and securing) a list of passwords. Password managers can help here, but this assumes that the password manager doesn't have exploitable vulnerabilities of its own. In addition the password manager may not be accessible when not using the "home" computer.

Re: Hover.com: we store & email passwords in plaintext for usability

#53
My hosting provider (Bytemark) sends out passwords in plaintext, though I'm not sure if they're stored that way. It is a lot more convenient that having to follow a password reset link, though I'm not entirely convinced by the security/usability trade-off (there's not much on my accounts, since the password simply allows access to the control panel, not root access on the machines).

Re: Hover.com: we store & email passwords in plaintext for usability

#54

Whenever I call up MediaTemple for support, they always ask me my password for verification. Does that mean they also store passwords in plaintext? (serious question)

Not necessarily, they could in theory be entering your password into their computer and seeing if it matches the hash, exactly as if you logged in. But, if they're asking for you to read your password to their call centre down the phone, I'd be surprised if they were that savvy.

Re: Hover.com: we store & email passwords in plaintext for usability

#55

Blaming Hover.com is shooting the messenger. The problem here is that this is what customers want . As long as you ask Hover to compete for business in a race to the bottom of the "convenience" barrel, you are going to have this problem. If Hover stop doing this, someone else wil come along and take Hover's business by sending plaintext passwords around in email. So. You either live with it and do your business with…

I disagree. All they did (edit: to clarify, it seems to me that they only tried two alternatives) was try sending a password reset link and the unencrypted password itself. I don't think sending the user a new password would be that big a deal (we're assuming they receive the email, as both methods will fail if not), and you could show them the password reset page immediately after they logged in with the new password.

Win/win.

Re: Hover.com: we store & email passwords in plaintext for usability

#56
post #51

Blaming Hover.com is shooting the messenger. The problem here is that this is what customers want . As long as you ask Hover to compete for business in a race to the bottom of the "convenience" barrel, you are going to have this problem. If Hover stop doing this, someone else wil come along and take Hover's business by sending plaintext passwords around in email. So. You either live with it and do your business with…

Trenchant, but ultimately orthogonal. The Big Problem here isn't that Hover has decided that user convenience warrants storing passwords insecurely. That is a problem, of course, but it is not as big a problem as The Big Problem here. The Big Problem is the grafs spent defending the soundness of Hover's password storage strategy. Hover does not appear to understand that they have conceded user security. They believe…

I see were going to argue about whether to ascribe to malice, that which can be explained by stupidity. I'm going to go against the aphorism and say "malice." I suspect they know exactly what they're doing, and they also know that their strategy of "security be damned, let's sell some more domain names" requires a plausible explanation of security, thus they come out and tell us something that you and I know to be false.

But the audience for this blatant nonsense are the people who want Hover.com to mail their password to them, so they think they can get away with telling us that "a combination of their network security and physical security† mitigates these flaws." You know this to be false, I know it to be false, and I suggest they know it as well.

Re: Hover.com: we store & email passwords in plaintext for usability

#57
post #20

This isn't a microblogging service or pet social network. A domain registrar is storing your password in plaintext? Really? Didn't we go over this a thousand times? If I was on Hover (which I considered), I'd transfer my domains immediately. Moving to a plaintext password system to get fewer support requests is like removing the door from your house so you don't have to keep fumbling for the key.

Precisely. Doing something like this is always a trade-off, and yes, it might make sense for something like a blogging service (the same way Posterous inbound mail has the small potential to go wrong), so I can see where Hover is coming from. But really, in the case of a domain registrar, wow. If you're administering a domain, you're no longer in "mainstream user" territory.

There should really be some minimal set of conditions for domain registrars, with one of them specifying a reasonable security model for password retrieval.

Re: Hover.com: we store & email passwords in plaintext for usability

#58
post #51

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Trenchant, but ultimately orthogonal. The Big Problem here isn't that Hover has decided that user convenience warrants storing passwords insecurely. That is a problem, of course, but it is not as big a problem as The Big Problem here. The Big Problem is the grafs spent defending the soundness of Hover's password storage strategy. Hover does not appear to understand that they have conceded user security. They believe…

I see were going to argue about whether to ascribe to malice, that which can be explained by stupidity. I'm going to go against the aphorism and say "malice." I suspect they know exactly what they're doing, and they also know that their strategy of "security be damned, let's sell some more domain names" requires a plausible explanation of security, thus they come out and tell us something that you and I know to be fa…

I think it's slightly more likely that they think it might be true, and they want it to be true, so they're going to be incurious. Either way, my only real point is: there's probably going to be SQLI somewhere in that app too. And if they take file uploads anywhere, my guess is you'll be able to run code remotely.

(I know neither of these things to be true for a fact and am just making a rhetorical point.)

Re: Hover.com: we store & email passwords in plaintext for usability

#60
post #20

This isn't a microblogging service or pet social network. A domain registrar is storing your password in plaintext? Really? Didn't we go over this a thousand times? If I was on Hover (which I considered), I'd transfer my domains immediately. Moving to a plaintext password system to get fewer support requests is like removing the door from your house so you don't have to keep fumbling for the key.

After some positive research, I just purchased two domains from Hover. This is unacceptable however and I will be moving them away.

What registrar would anyone say is the most security focused and/or government resistant?

Maybe it should be a 2011 AskHN?

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