Preventing the target resolver from seeing client's IP address breaks GeoDNS. This is already a problem with 1.1.1.1 which doesn't honour the EDNS client subnet extension. Given generally DNS is just the start of an intereaction, usually followed by the connection directly between the client and intended destination, I don't see what kind of snooping these privacy measures are there to prevent.
Improving DNS Privacy with Oblivious DoH
51–60 of 367 posts
Re: Improving DNS Privacy with Oblivious DoH
#52Until we get rid of SNI[1] in HTTPS for good there will still be providers (like my ISP) that do deep packet inspection on SNI and kill the connection right away if you happen to visit a forbidden site (and this was western Europe, yesterday, on a site behind CloudFlare) [1] https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Server_Name_Indication
[0] https://twitter.com/vinifortuna/status/1304189371688660992
Re: Improving DNS Privacy with Oblivious DoH
#53Earlier quoted context omitted.
As I see this, this is a very clever move by Cloudflare. It's intentional to force websites to move to their CDN or atleast use a CDN with anycast and prevent you from making your own CDN like you could cheaply before (spinning up DO droplets and doing loadbalancing with geo DNS).
That's a weird take. (a) this is a proposed standard not just some Cloudflare service and (b) you can just use Cloudflare DNS if you want and forget about the rest.
Re: Improving DNS Privacy with Oblivious DoH
#54Also, not sure how useful the Tor comparison is, since Tor does 3 hops as opposed to their 1 so it would be a shame if it doesn't beat that.
Re: Improving DNS Privacy with Oblivious DoH
#55Governments subpoena the information or just block the protocol outright. ( or in China, get it delivered to their door by Apple )
Commercial parties have a bag full of tricks from fingerprinting to embeds on the page itself to track you.
Privacy seeking users are already tunneling their traffic.
That leaves script kiddies at Internet cafes. TLS kind of fixed that already so... Good work?
Re: Improving DNS Privacy with Oblivious DoH
#56Until we get rid of SNI[1] in HTTPS for good there will still be providers (like my ISP) that do deep packet inspection on SNI and kill the connection right away if you happen to visit a forbidden site (and this was western Europe, yesterday, on a site behind CloudFlare) [1] https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Server_Name_Indication
About getting rid of SNI... https://blog.cloudflare.com/encrypted-client-hello/ Been working on that also.
Re: Improving DNS Privacy with Oblivious DoH
#57Earlier quoted context omitted.
Tor is not a run of the mill SOCKS proxy, not least in that it inserts arbitrarily high latency into the user data path. On the other hand, an actual run of the mill SOCKS proxy would have visibility of the user's queries and their identity, defeating the purpose of the design.
> an actual run of the mill SOCKS proxy would have visibility of the user's queries and their identity, defeating the purpose of the design. Why would it have visibility of the queries? If I send a TLS connection (containing my DoH query) through that SOCKS proxy, then the SOCKS proxy is unable to decrypt that TLS connection without breaking certificate verification and thus can't read my DoH query.
Re: Improving DNS Privacy with Oblivious DoH
#58So, having read the blog post from Cloudflare I don't understand why the proxy (needs to terminate|terminates) TLS. I thought HTTPS proxying (or rather: Any TCP protocol) was a solved problem by the HTTP CONNECT verb or SOCKS proxies. What am I missing?
Re: Improving DNS Privacy with Oblivious DoH
#59Earlier quoted context omitted.
DNSCrypt needs meaningful industry support otherwise it's sadly irrelevant. I think by now we can all agree "industry support" basically means the 3 browser vendors. DoH has at least Mozilla and Google on board, and presumably Microsoft are tailing along.
> DoH has at least Mozilla and Google on board, and presumably Microsoft are tailing along. Note that DoH (and DoT) shipped in iOS 14 and Big Sur, though aren't particularly easy to enable.
Specifically, you must install a properly configured .mobileprofile with HTTPS/TLS in the DNSSettings > DNSProtocol part of the payload (along with DNS server addresses of course). Merely pointing at a DoH/DoT supporting DNS server in the settings GUI won't do it, the OS doesn't do any probing and automatically use it just because it's available. For applications DNS Settings is covered under the Network Extension framework [0].
It's definitely nice Apple now has this built-in, and since they're onboard with Cloudflare/Fastly maybe this new twist will be pretty fast too. But obviously they're going to have to make this more automated for it to really make a widespread difference, ideally it'd simply see if the supplied DNS server (manual or DHCP) could run DoH/DoT and then just use it by default with no interaction required.
----
0: https://developer.apple.com/documentation/networkextension/d...
Re: Improving DNS Privacy with Oblivious DoH
#60Whats the point? Governments subpoena the information or just block the protocol outright. ( or in China, get it delivered to their door by Apple ) Commercial parties have a bag full of tricks from fingerprinting to embeds on the page itself to track you. Privacy seeking users are already tunneling their traffic. That leaves script kiddies at Internet cafes. TLS kind of fixed that already so... Good work?
Exactly that, no more, no less.