From the bottom of the first page in the report: Overall Gain – 1964-2019 .................................................... Berkshire: 2,744,062% S&P: 19,784% Huh? 2 million percent vs. 19k ?
Annual Letter to Berkshire Shareholders (2019) [pdf]
51–60 of 80 posts
Re: Annual Letter to Berkshire Shareholders (2019) [pdf]
#52“Shareholders having at least $20 million in value of A or B shares and an inclination to sell shares to Berkshire may wish to have their broker contact Berkshire’s Mark Millard at 402-346-1400. We request that you phone Mark between 8:00-8:30 a.m. or 3:00-3:30 p.m. Central Time, calling only if you are ready to sell.” $BRK.B holder myself — What is this? Is this essentially if you have a big enough position you can…
Re: Annual Letter to Berkshire Shareholders (2019) [pdf]
#53I’ve been enjoying this letter when this weird outdated analogy stopped me cold in my tracks: „In reviewing my uneven record, I’ve concluded that acquisitions are similar to marriage: They start, of course, with a joyful wedding – but then reality tends to diverge from pre-nuptial expectations. Sometimes, wonderfully, the new union delivers bliss beyond either party’s hopes. In other cases, disillusionment is swift.“…
> And unlike a marriage, he can trade portions of his company holdings back, which in a sense makes it more like dating than a marriage proper. Err…divorces are a thing? I can’t make sense of this complaint unless you’re somehow claiming that the concept of marriage itself is anachronistic…
Re: Annual Letter to Berkshire Shareholders (2019) [pdf]
#54“Shareholders having at least $20 million in value of A or B shares and an inclination to sell shares to Berkshire may wish to have their broker contact Berkshire’s Mark Millard at 402-346-1400. We request that you phone Mark between 8:00-8:30 a.m. or 3:00-3:30 p.m. Central Time, calling only if you are ready to sell.” $BRK.B holder myself — What is this? Is this essentially if you have a big enough position you can…
Selling 20 millions would cost you a little fortune in broker fees. In turn BRK are buying back and paying brokerage. It makes sense to sell directly. And I don't think you get a better price than the market even selling 20M, you just sell at market price. This saves money to YOU, the shareholder, so you should be happy with it.
Re: Annual Letter to Berkshire Shareholders (2019) [pdf]
#55Earlier quoted context omitted.
Read the last twenty years of Buffet's letters. No snark intended. His letters intended for investors are the best use of your time rather than a book someone wrote for vanity.
The Intelligent Investor by Benjamin Graham is a classic. Graham's approach shaped Buffett's. Personally, I found The Intelligent Investor to be more clearly written than Buffett's letters. It more clearly left me with a framework for how to approach value investing.
Re: Annual Letter to Berkshire Shareholders (2019) [pdf]
#56After reading all the positive comments about BRK in this thread I came across this article: https://www.nasdaq.com/articles/hypocrisy-berkshire-hathaway... For somebody with little knowledge of financial services (i.e., me), how would you recommend that I interpret this?
The government’s job is to protect people from the negative side effects of the aforementioned activity.
Clayton homes is one party doing its job properly (Berkshire), and the other dropping the ball (the US government).
We cannot just hope and pray companies will follow our vague and differing ideas about what is right. If we want them to act a certain way, we have to write laws to make that happen.
Re: Annual Letter to Berkshire Shareholders (2019) [pdf]
#57After reading all the positive comments about BRK in this thread I came across this article: https://www.nasdaq.com/articles/hypocrisy-berkshire-hathaway... For somebody with little knowledge of financial services (i.e., me), how would you recommend that I interpret this?
Berkshire’s job is finding stable, undervalued companies and buying them with the funds from massive insurance company floats (ie leverage). The government’s job is to protect people from the negative side effects of the aforementioned activity. Clayton homes is one party doing its job properly (Berkshire), and the other dropping the ball (the US government). We cannot just hope and pray companies will follow our vag…
Re: Annual Letter to Berkshire Shareholders (2019) [pdf]
#58Re: Annual Letter to Berkshire Shareholders (2019) [pdf]
#59" The result was significant property damage and a major disruption in Lubrizol’s business. Even so, both the company’s property loss and business-interruption loss will be mitigated by substantial insurance recoveries that Lubrizol will receive. But, as the late Paul Harvey was given to saying in his famed radio broadcasts, “Here’s the rest of the story.” One of the largest insurers of Lubrizol was a company owned b…
As long as they have a granular understanding of the perceived vs actual risk profile across geographies over time, they'll be able to make huge sums of money by staying just adjacent to the high-risk areas.
Imagine three houses in a row. The risk of fire may be the same for all three. That changes as soon as the leftmost house catches fire. They would never insure that house; it's already on fire. The middle house has a statistically higher chance of catching fire than the rightmost house, yet the relative proximity to the fire drives fear up among both adjacent owners—actual risk vs perceived risk in a nutshell. Both are more likely to want to buy insurance, with the middle owner willing to pay more. The insurance provider can set premiums that take into account both the actual risk profile and the perceived risk profile.
It's reductive, but it illustrates a point: money is made when there is a delta between the perceived value and actual value. That usually happens when there's a fundamental transition that is unrecognized by the market. If you can spot the wave, you can ride it.
Climate change isn't a random event—it's an observable transition. And it's going to cause one hell of a wave.