Earlier quoted context omitted.
And that observation makes the article doubly weird: 1) Nobody needs an AI to figure out Tit-for-Tat is a good strategy. It isn't complicated. 2) The technical economic term for this collusion is probably something like 'efficient market price', where the sellers have agreed on what the fair price is to offer their service. Collusion can't mean that the sellers all have an implicitly coordinated price, because the ma…
> The technical economic term for this collusion is probably something like 'efficient market price' That's definitely untrue. I mean, clearly an order book shows many sellers with different opinions about what a fair price is, but it would seem reasonable that the price in between the bid and the ask is a close approximation of the efficient market price. > Collusion can't mean that the sellers all have an implicitl…
I think he meant Efficient Market Hypothesis, which could be posed as a strategy.
> That's also pretty untrue, or so pedantic as to be meaningless.
It's still collusion.
> You're really stuck applying Econ 101 in one of the worst places, retail.
This is Game Theory, not Econ 101. I also think it's one of the best places.
> But sellers on Amazon? C'mon man, sellers coordinate prices via implicit information exchange on Amazon in a way that, if they were allowed to, they would just collude straightforwardly to do so.
I've seen it happen. I've even seen collusion with online reviews on there.