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Freenet: A Distributed Anonymous Information Storage and Retrieval System (2000) [pdf]

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Re: Freenet: A Distributed Anonymous Information Storage and Retrieval System (2000) [pdf]

#51
post #20

Earlier quoted context omitted.

VOAT turning into a cesspool of everything that was being banned from Reddit is another example of that, too.

“The moral of the story is: if you’re against witch-hunts, and you promise to found your own little utopian community where witch-hunts will never happen, your new society will end up consisting of approximately three principled civil libertarians and seven zillion witches.”

Some of my best friends are witches ;)

Re: Freenet: A Distributed Anonymous Information Storage and Retrieval System (2000) [pdf]

#52

Does anyone still use Freenet? What happened with it?

You can find usage stats on Freenet. But I found a couple reports on clearnet:

Uploaded: 2018-11-28 (UTC) https://d6.gnutella2.info/freenet/USK@sUm3oJISSEU4pl2Is9qa1e...

Generated August 25, 2017. https://www.asksteved.com/stats/

Re: Freenet: A Distributed Anonymous Information Storage and Retrieval System (2000) [pdf]

#53
post #20

Earlier quoted context omitted.

VOAT turning into a cesspool of everything that was being banned from Reddit is another example of that, too.

“The moral of the story is: if you’re against witch-hunts, and you promise to found your own little utopian community where witch-hunts will never happen, your new society will end up consisting of approximately three principled civil libertarians and seven zillion witches.”

It is amazing that we're still not used to the idea that freedom has drawbacks, and that even with those drawbacks it's still preferable to the alternative.

Re: Freenet: A Distributed Anonymous Information Storage and Retrieval System (2000) [pdf]

#54

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> That's actually fine considering the goals of the system, but any time anyone mentioned it Ian and others would go a bit ballistic. The system did not and could not store information permanently, if it did it would fill up, which is a non-starter when it depends on people volunteering their hard disk space. I don't know about going ballistic, but since this issue is addressed directly in their papers (section 3.4 o…

I would think you should have long ago learned the lesson that if you don't have a FAQ page somewhere with huge titles and colorful answers, people will never read a paper. Hell, most people don't read FAQs either.

In future we'll use tags ;)

Re: Freenet: A Distributed Anonymous Information Storage and Retrieval System (2000) [pdf]

#55

It makes me wonder about use cases for tools like freenet, tor, etc. Espionage of some sort comes to mind and the need to deliver a message from sender to receiver without identifying any participants . Otherwise there is some other implicit recognition that anonymity can be productive. Anonymity clearly changes how individuals communicate, but the research I know of tends to focus more on how people like to behave b…

> It makes me wonder about use cases for tools like freenet, tor, etc.

Considering the content accessible through such services, their best use by far is as honeypots to catch dangerous criminals.

Re: Freenet: A Distributed Anonymous Information Storage and Retrieval System (2000) [pdf]

#57
When I was young I thinkn internet is freedom. These day it is more of a control device by the state.

In the older days, you can hide from the state. These day you can’t. Your day to day activities are recorded.

China is just one example. And they are not the only one.

Re: Freenet: A Distributed Anonymous Information Storage and Retrieval System (2000) [pdf]

#58
post #28
post #26

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Is it even possible to anonymously lease a VPS? I guess you would need to use cash, at a minimum.

Sure. Do everything via Tor, using Whonix to avoid leaks. Hit Tor through nested VPN chains. Buy some Bitcoin, and then mix two or three times. Use a different Whonix instance for each mixing step, and a different mixing service. Then lease your VPS. And if it really matters, you can daisy chain VPS via Tor .onion SSH.[0] 0) https://www.ivpn.net/privacy-guides/onion-ssh-hosts-for-logi...

> Buy some Bitcoin, and then mix two or three times.

Simply exchange them to Monero. If you want, mix them, but only a single pass is needed. A mixer is a trusted 3rd-party, which introduces serious counterparty risk, and vulnerable to multiple forms to input-output correlation attacks, in the worst case, provides no security.

If you are paranoid, create multiple Monero wallets, and send the funds back and forth, each time with a randint(1, 100) hours delay to frustrate timing analysis. Please note that you should only run full node Monero, and must run it inside Whonix, otherwise, the unencrypted Monero traffic is exposed. The situation of P2P-level encryption of the entire cryptocurrency world is a disaster, almost all traffic is clear.

Ring-CT is possibly not the best cryptographic implementation of transaction anonymity, but currently the best practical implementation available. CoinJoin is a P2P version of mixer, but has no wide deployment, zn-SNARKs involves cutting-edge cryptography and provides 80-bit security (read, not confident), but 90% of Zcash transactions are clear transactions, makes private transactions vulnerable.

Or, once GNU/Taler is available, making an anonymous payment would be as easy as using PayPal.

Re: Freenet: A Distributed Anonymous Information Storage and Retrieval System (2000) [pdf]

#59

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> That's actually fine considering the goals of the system, but any time anyone mentioned it Ian and others would go a bit ballistic. The system did not and could not store information permanently, if it did it would fill up, which is a non-starter when it depends on people volunteering their hard disk space. I don't know about going ballistic, but since this issue is addressed directly in their papers (section 3.4 o…

I would think you should have long ago learned the lesson that if you don't have a FAQ page somewhere with huge titles and colorful answers, people will never read a paper. Hell, most people don't read FAQs either.

Despite the fact that it was mentioned in the paper, developers continued to deny that it was a serious problem or claim that it had been solved since. Periodic re-insertion and date-based redirects were both touted as answers.

As for "can't" that's not accurate. You can certainly prevent old data from being pushed out, by returning an error on insertion of new data if there's no free space. That's how many other storage systems (e.g. every filesystem ever) work. While it's true that you can't fully protect against a reduction of capacity when nodes go offline, that's a very different issue. Freenet being cache-like rather than storage-like was a decision of convenience, not a technical necessity.

Re: Freenet: A Distributed Anonymous Information Storage and Retrieval System (2000) [pdf]

#60
post #41
post #9

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It's no wonder really. If you build a system that allows anonymity and untraceability you will end up hosting everything that can't normally happen without anonymity and untraceability. Hackers marvel at the idea of complete anonymity and untraceability because it's technically exciting and fits so well with the hacker thinking. I mean, why should you have to reveal who you are because of mere accountability? Everyon…

‘Information wants to be free’

Interestingly, many of that principle's strongest proponents are selective in its application. While they're adamant that information in the sense of content should be free, they're equally adamant that information in the sense of identity should be strictly limited and controlled by its owners. Unfortunately, as soon as you remove identity you also remove accountability, and while there are edge cases (e.g. political dissent) where that's a good thing, most of the time it's not.

Personally, I think anonymity sucks. I'm all for pseudonyms, which have some continuity and reputation and thus some accountability. Modern cryptography provides ways to prevent impersonation, and even to claim a pseudonym if the owner desires, but when you consider methods such as traffic analysis it's not trivial. These are problems Freenet tried to address, but then they took a bit of a wrong turn toward complete anonymity. That, and the bad taste left in people's mouths by positioning a message system with some accidental persistence as a true data store, is why other systems eclipsed it.

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