The Strong Free Will Theorem (2009) [pdf] • Hacker News Board

Re: The Strong Free Will Theorem (2009) [pdf]

#51

Post by SubiculumCode » Wed, Nov 07, 2018, 3:47 PM UTC

dmreedy wrote: post #47

simonh wrote: post #7

I really think this, along with much philosophical musing about free will, is entirely missing the point. Pre-determination is essential to free will. You literally cannot have free will without it. Random choice, or even non-predetermined correlated outcomes of entangled objects don't lead to free will, they lead to uncertain decisions and those are not the same thing. If my decisions are not a product of my prior s…

I'd say dualism absolutely solves this problem, or at least can provide the tools to do so. (I say all of this as a devil's advocate, and nothing more) Imagine that heaven exists, and is a kind of meta-universe that our reality is a subset of. It has access to a higher order of systems than those within its subset, and they can say things about truth that the reality subset cannot (because of incompleteness; a system…

Do you mean something like: There exists a multiverse in which the soul gets to choose which element of the multiverse it resides in moment to moment. So while each element of the multiverse (a particular reality) is completely deterministic, the one experienced by the soul is chosen.

Re: The Strong Free Will Theorem (2009) [pdf]

#52

Post by dmreedy » Wed, Nov 07, 2018, 3:53 PM UTC

SubiculumCode wrote: post #51

dmreedy wrote: post #47

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I'd say dualism absolutely solves this problem, or at least can provide the tools to do so. (I say all of this as a devil's advocate, and nothing more) Imagine that heaven exists, and is a kind of meta-universe that our reality is a subset of. It has access to a higher order of systems than those within its subset, and they can say things about truth that the reality subset cannot (because of incompleteness; a system…

Do you mean something like: There exists a multiverse in which the soul gets to choose which element of the multiverse it resides in moment to moment. So while each element of the multiverse (a particular reality) is completely deterministic, the one experienced by the soul is chosen.

Sure, if you want to keep the 'influence' between the two systems to a minimum.

If you allow the mutation of the subset reality by a soul in the meta-heaven, then you can have it all operate in a single universe; the soul is capable of adjusting the nondeterminism of particles in the brain, thereby making decisions happen that appear random to us, but are informed by a higher system of reasoning. In the way that a programmer might adjust constants, or a video game player might choose stats.

And just want to reiterate: I'm not trying to advance this explanation! Just fun to think about.

Re: The Strong Free Will Theorem (2009) [pdf]

#53

Post by jatsign » Wed, Nov 07, 2018, 3:58 PM UTC

dmreedy wrote: post #47

simonh wrote: post #7

I really think this, along with much philosophical musing about free will, is entirely missing the point. Pre-determination is essential to free will. You literally cannot have free will without it. Random choice, or even non-predetermined correlated outcomes of entangled objects don't lead to free will, they lead to uncertain decisions and those are not the same thing. If my decisions are not a product of my prior s…

I'd say dualism absolutely solves this problem, or at least can provide the tools to do so. (I say all of this as a devil's advocate, and nothing more) Imagine that heaven exists, and is a kind of meta-universe that our reality is a subset of. It has access to a higher order of systems than those within its subset, and they can say things about truth that the reality subset cannot (because of incompleteness; a system…

Similar to your idea is Kant's "thing-in-itself", which is just a way of saying that for any given object, there are attributes to it we're not able to observe - indeed, attributes we can't even imagine.

We're trapped in our brain, behind a wall of sensory apparatus. There's no reason to assume that our senses provide the complete totality of reality. And if there are aspects of reality we cannot sense, then there is more to reality than we can ever know. Kant called these attributes the "noumenal" world, while what we can see and observe is the "phenomenal" world. However, these are NOT separate areas - just two aspects of the same thing. Not dualism.

Schopenhauer took this to the next step and said that there are aspects to ourselves we can't observe, so part of our selves exists in the noumenal world. The phenomenal world is deterministic, but if we have free will, it must exist as part of the noumenal world.

Re: The Strong Free Will Theorem (2009) [pdf]

#54

Post by tylerjwilk00 » Wed, Nov 07, 2018, 4:03 PM UTC

simonh wrote: post #7

I really think this, along with much philosophical musing about free will, is entirely missing the point. Pre-determination is essential to free will. You literally cannot have free will without it. Random choice, or even non-predetermined correlated outcomes of entangled objects don't lead to free will, they lead to uncertain decisions and those are not the same thing. If my decisions are not a product of my prior s…

We are probably arguing semantics but the alternative to pre-determination is not free will as much as it is probabilistic.

Yes this _will_ happen verse this will _most likely_ happen.

Free will is the ability to influence the probability that a certain outcome is realized. Your decisions could be predictable as a function of probability.

Your definition of 'me' (your prior state) includes the quantum states of your constitute parts. Just because there is a degree of uncertainty in those states does not mean they are not of 'you'.

The degree of pre-determination is just a matter of scale (akin to classical vs quantum). The deeper you go the less pre-determined something can be.

Re: The Strong Free Will Theorem (2009) [pdf]

#55

Post by snowwrestler » Wed, Nov 07, 2018, 4:12 PM UTC

colanderman wrote: post #35

simonh wrote: post #7

I really think this, along with much philosophical musing about free will, is entirely missing the point. Pre-determination is essential to free will. You literally cannot have free will without it. Random choice, or even non-predetermined correlated outcomes of entangled objects don't lead to free will, they lead to uncertain decisions and those are not the same thing. If my decisions are not a product of my prior s…

Following that train of thought, could free will simply be the capacity to predict one's own (deterministic) actions, based on one's current state, and ascribing that to some internal volition? Similarly, the "inner monologue" simply the capacity to observe one's own (deterministic) thought process? Conversely, is the judgement that another entity is free-willed no more than an admission that one is unable to predict…

Maybe when people talk about "free will", what they are really talking about is the ability to deviate from the simplest conception of an evolutionary strategy.

For example you wouldn't say a plant has free will. It just sits where it is planted, collecting sunlight, water, CO2, and minerals, and grows as specified in its genome. It doesn't deviate from the evolutionary strategy of its species.

You probably wouldn't say an ant has free will. It can move around, sure, but it seemingly does so according to a complex set of rules that are consistently embodied by all members of its species.

Does a dog have free will? I think we're getting closer to the line. A dog can clearly make choices against the simplest evolutionary strategy. A dog needs food to eat, it's driven to prefer certain foods... but some dogs can choose to let a tasty treat sit on the table (or even on its nose!) without consuming it. Some dogs seem to act in a way that we would call altruistic, endangering itself to save a human child, for example.

And of course, humans are capable of making all sorts of decisions that seem counter to a simple conception of an evolutionary strategy. On the positive side, choosing to forego reproducing in favor of pursuing some social goal, like a career. On the negative side, choosing to kill someone despite knowing they could be caught and punished (and therefore not reproduce).

And I think the opposite holds too--when we imagine a being without free will, the defining characteristic seems to be that it always follows a rigid set of rules, with no possibility of deviation.

I keep referring to the "concept" of a simple evolutionary strategy; does that mean this is not a rigorous definition of free will? Well I would say that free will is itself a human concept, so I think it's valid to explore its meaning in the context of other human concepts.

I think it's entirely possible that humans are actually deterministic and predictable, but the rules of our behavior are so complex that we could never know or apply them in a practical way, the way we know and use the rules that govern plants, for instance.

Re: The Strong Free Will Theorem (2009) [pdf]

#56

Post by tylerjwilk00 » Wed, Nov 07, 2018, 4:16 PM UTC

esotericn wrote: post #36

ifdefdebug wrote: post #34

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Your decision is between black and red while looking at the spinning roulette wheel. The random element is the outcome of your bet, which can not possibly be inferred from the current state at the time of making the decision. So if I could rewind and replay, and actually make a different decision each time, it would really be my will, I think. Most, if not all, real-world decisions take a non-zero uncertainty about t…

In that case, you didn't "will" the different decision, it was a result of your internal RNG.

It's not random though - it is probabilistic. And even if it was an internal 'RNG' it is is still _their's_ not someone else's.

Re: The Strong Free Will Theorem (2009) [pdf]

#57

Post by simonh » Wed, Nov 07, 2018, 4:24 PM UTC

dmreedy wrote: post #47

simonh wrote: post #7

I really think this, along with much philosophical musing about free will, is entirely missing the point. Pre-determination is essential to free will. You literally cannot have free will without it. Random choice, or even non-predetermined correlated outcomes of entangled objects don't lead to free will, they lead to uncertain decisions and those are not the same thing. If my decisions are not a product of my prior s…

I'd say dualism absolutely solves this problem, or at least can provide the tools to do so. (I say all of this as a devil's advocate, and nothing more) Imagine that heaven exists, and is a kind of meta-universe that our reality is a subset of. It has access to a higher order of systems than those within its subset, and they can say things about truth that the reality subset cannot (because of incompleteness; a system…

I think that's just hiding the internals of the non-physical part of us from view, but it doesn't change anything. I already addressed the status of non-material components of a person in my post - if they are part of the person then they are part of their state. Whether you can 'see into' that state or not doesn't make any difference to the fact that it's still part of you and still a precondition of and an input into your decisions. They may be the outcome of nothing in 'this universe' (ridiculous concept, what does universe even mean if the definition isn't, well, universal?), but they are still the outcome of something in 'a' universe and that something has state.

Even randomness or the appearance of it doesn't make any difference. A person's state might very well include a source of randomness, in fact it almost certainly does. See my comments on this elsewhere in the thread.

Re: The Strong Free Will Theorem (2009) [pdf]

#58

Post by esotericn » Wed, Nov 07, 2018, 4:29 PM UTC

tylerjwilk00 wrote: post #56

esotericn wrote: post #36

Earlier quoted context omitted.

In that case, you didn't "will" the different decision, it was a result of your internal RNG.

It's not random though - it is probabilistic. And even if it was an internal 'RNG' it is is still _their's_ not someone else's.

If you take an action based on determining the probabilities of an event, you would take that action every single time because the state would be identical every time.

You look at the roulette board. You bet on red.

We rewind time.

You still bet on red. The state is identical.

Did _you_ come up with that decision? Of course you did, who else could have?

My claim is not that there's no "you".

It's that "free will" is meaningless unless we use a weird interpretation of terminology.

If you'd do the same thing every time, there's no 'freedom'.

If you do different things, but it's based on some sort of tiebreaker RNG, there's no 'will'.

Re: The Strong Free Will Theorem (2009) [pdf]

#59

Post by simonh » Wed, Nov 07, 2018, 4:39 PM UTC

fjuerfilis wrote: post #29

simonh wrote: post #20

Earlier quoted context omitted.

>The prior state idea seems more accurate, but even that (at least in its extreme state) doesn't seem to me to encapsulate the idea of free will because it disallows the idea of a decision being undetermined and free to decide. I certainly think randomness comes into play for sure, but conceptually my personal prior state might include a source of randomness. It could be just one factor, and I might make choices base…

Yes, I agree that is one model, but what I wrestle with ultimately I suppose is whether indeterminism per se is what defines free will, in part or whole. If you have a prior state that is in part systematic, and part random, is the randomness per se free will? Does that encapsulate the notion of free will? Maybe? But both of those are still causally deterministic in a sense, in that even with randomness, there's some…

I think randomness really is a red herring. To the extent that a decision of ours is random, it is not ours. That doesn't necessarily absolve us of responsibility.

In No Country for Old Men a guy flips a coin to decide if he will kill someone. He chose to flip the coin though - delegating a choice to randomness does not abrogate us of responsibility. By doing so he created the framework in which the outcome arrises, whatever that outcome is. He made it possible, even likely and bears responsibility for that by selecting the set of possible outcomes and the degree of randomness. Also he does this many times, so it wasn't a "random choice to randomly choose", it's a consistent repeated pattern of behaviour that directly emerges from his personal ongoing mental state.

I don't go around randomly killing people and that's a consistent pattern that emerges from my persistent ongoing (if evolving) mental state and it _is_ a free choice. The fact that it's pre-determined is fine, because it means it comes from me.

Re: The Strong Free Will Theorem (2009) [pdf]

#60

Post by simonh » Wed, Nov 07, 2018, 4:47 PM UTC

srtjstjsj wrote: post #41

simonh wrote: post #7

I really think this, along with much philosophical musing about free will, is entirely missing the point. Pre-determination is essential to free will. You literally cannot have free will without it. Random choice, or even non-predetermined correlated outcomes of entangled objects don't lead to free will, they lead to uncertain decisions and those are not the same thing. If my decisions are not a product of my prior s…

You are assuming your conclusion. If free will exists, it might exist outside the current understanding of physics. Most likely, it does ( if it exists! )

I did address dualism. I'm not making any assumptions about whether dualism is true or not. If dualism is true, the immaterial part is just another form of state that is part of the self from which the decision emerges.