"They figured out mail clients which don't properly check for decryption errors and also follow links in HTML mails. So the vulnerability is in the mail clients and not in the protocols. In fact OpenPGP is immune if used correctly while S/MIME has no deployed mitigation." - by GnuPG ( https://twitter.com/gnupg/status/995931083584757760 )
This is worth reading with the Researcher then (publicly :)) asking him to "keep this quiet". I think some of the subsequent commentators have a point which is that the media will take this to mean PGP is broken.
A new set of vulnerabilities affecting users of PGP and S/MIME
51–60 of 79 posts
Re: A new set of vulnerabilities affecting users of PGP and S/MIME
#52An (older) example of expected behaviour [2].
[1] https://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-users/2018-May/06032... [2] https://sourceforge.net/p/enigmail/bugs/538/#43ff
Re: A new set of vulnerabilities affecting users of PGP and S/MIME
#53Earlier quoted context omitted.
To be more precise, the standardized encryption system is called OpenPGP (RFC4880) whereas PGP is the name of tool which was written by Phil Zimmermann.
Though it would appear the source of the original PGP software is no longer publicly accessible [1], so how would one know if it was vulnerable? I think the EFF probably meant people using various implementations right? [1] https://philzimmermann.com/EN/findpgp/
It looks like its rather an mail client issue than an OpenPGP implementation issue: https://twitter.com/gnupg/status/995931083584757760?s=19
Re: A new set of vulnerabilities affecting users of PGP and S/MIME
#54I've always handled PGP via cut-and-paste of the ascii armored block, through a text file on a ramdisk (or between systems), then using command-line pgp or gpg to decrypt, and the reverse. Not always on a VM or machine without external network access, but for signing keys for software and stuff, yes. It just seemed too easy to mess up auto-decrypt/auto-encrypt and accidentally send out cleartext -- the cut and paste…
Re: A new set of vulnerabilities affecting users of PGP and S/MIME
#55I've always handled PGP via cut-and-paste of the ascii armored block, through a text file on a ramdisk (or between systems), then using command-line pgp or gpg to decrypt, and the reverse. Not always on a VM or machine without external network access, but for signing keys for software and stuff, yes. It just seemed too easy to mess up auto-decrypt/auto-encrypt and accidentally send out cleartext -- the cut and paste…
I wonder if that doesn't open up similar problems: Pasting the mail into the gpg command line program prints out the clear text to the terminal. There are all kinds of magic control sequences that might be in that clear text. Isn't that conceptually similar to having HTML "executed"?
Re: A new set of vulnerabilities affecting users of PGP and S/MIME
#56Response by Werner Koch (GPG), contains some details: https://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-users/2018-May/06031...
>Due to broken MIME parsers a bunch of MUAs seem to concatenate decrypted HTML mime parts which makes it easy to plant such HTML snippets. To me this sounds strictly like a MUA issue, not a PGP/SMIME one. If that's really all it is it does seem massively overblown to me. Why not single out the broken MUA implementations instead of saying "don't decrypt emails OR YOU'LL DIE"? I mean just look at the wild speculation i…
Re: A new set of vulnerabilities affecting users of PGP and S/MIME
#57Earlier quoted context omitted.
This is worth reading with the Researcher then (publicly :)) asking him to "keep this quiet". I think some of the subsequent commentators have a point which is that the media will take this to mean PGP is broken.
According to Werner Koch (link to the email posted by other commenters already), the GnuPG people weren't contacted about this issue. So that comment from the researcher looks a little out of place, iMO.
Re: A new set of vulnerabilities affecting users of PGP and S/MIME
#58Re: A new set of vulnerabilities affecting users of PGP and S/MIME
#59Re: A new set of vulnerabilities affecting users of PGP and S/MIME
#60Response by Werner Koch (GPG), contains some details: https://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-users/2018-May/06031...